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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past half century, courts and legal scholars have written 
innumerable opinions and articles that mention, discuss, praise, and 
criticize antipsychotic medications,! the class of psychoactive medications 
that physicians began prescribing in the 1950s2 to treat psychoses.3 In 
1. The earliest case in the LEXIS database of combined federal and state case law 
that mentions an antipsychotic medication is Williams v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 319 
(B.D. Va. 1955). Williams concerns a non compos mentis seaman who underwent 
treatment at "Central State Hospital ... the only public or private institution available to 
Negro mental patients in Virginia." [d. at 321. The decision describes the overcrowding 
at this "public institution," where, in early 1955, "there were 4578 patients on hand, or 
an excess of 1180 over the rated capacity .... To care for the 4578 patients there are two 
psychiatrists .... " [d. at 323. After discussing the limitations of then available 
psychiatric therapies, "the Court... noted an interesting article appearing in Time 
magazine (March 7, 1955) involving the use of new drugs referred to as chlorpromazine 
and reserpine which have been very effective in certain types of schizophrenia cases." 
[d. at 322. 
For a review of earlier criticisms of antipsychotic medications, see generally Thomas 
G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial 
Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic 
Medications, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 77 (1983). For a recent critical discussion of these 
medications, see generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH 
TREATMENT 61-86 (1997). A highly critical view of antipsychotic medication appears in 
the majority opinion in State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 758-60 (La. 1992) (describing 
involuntary psychopharmacological treatment of a condemned inmate-who would 
receive a lethal injection if competent for execution-as "the physical intrusion of 
powerful, dangerous and unpredictable drugs into his body and brain"). 
2. Chlorpromazine, more commonly known by its proprietary name Thorazine® , 
was the first of these drugs. See discussion infra Part ill.A. (discussing its discovery and 
initial use in the 1950s). Throughout this Article's main text, medications are referred to 
primarily using their nonproprietary names, in accordance with the usual poliCies of 
scientific publications. Medications' better known trade names, which often appear in 
legal publications, are mentioned in these footnotes. 
3. In current medical usage, "psychosis" is "a mental disorder characterized by 
gross impairment in reality testing as evidenced by delusions, hallucinations, markedly 
incoherent speech, or disorganized and agitated behavior, usually without apparent 
awareness on the part of the patient of the incomprehensibility of his behavior." 
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1489 (29th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
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the rapidly growing field of mental disability law,4 antipsychotic 
medications figure prominently in cases and legislation involving 
hospitalized patients' right to refuse treatment,S involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalization,6 outpatient civil commitment,1 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,S malpractice litigation,9 Medicaid entitlements,1O rights 
DORLAND'S]. The various syndromes classified as psychotic disorders "emphasize 
different aspects of the various definitions of psychotic." AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 827 (4th ed. text rev. 
2000) [hereinafter DSM-N-TR]. Psychotic symptoms occur in several types of mental 
disorders. Id. at 750-51. See infra note 136 (listing several currently recognized 
varieties of psychotic disorders). 
4. See I MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
1-6 (2d ed. 1998) (summarizing "the astonishing development" and "recent explosion of 
mental disability legislation and litigation"). 
5. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 153-385 (1999). The seminal cases in 
this area are Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650 
(1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. 
Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); and Rivers v. Katz, 
495 N.E.2d 337, 504 (N.Y. 1986). The Rogers and Rennie decisions limited themselves 
to antipsychotic medications. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653 n.l; Rennie, 653 F.2d at 839 n.2. 
Rivers also mentions the use of lithium, a mood stabilizing medication used for many 
psychiatric conditions, including manic depressive illness. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 340. 
6. In Vitek v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court found that notwithstanding a 
prisoner's conviction for robbery and incarceration in state prison, he retained "a 
residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without 
complying with minimum requirements of due process." 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). One 
reason for this was that at the hospital, the convict might receive "[c]ompelled treatment 
in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs." [d. at 492. The "compelled 
treatment" was antipsychotic medication. Brief of Appellee Larry D. Jones at 16, Vitek 
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (No. 78-1155). 
7. State statutes and case law concerning outpatient commitment (OPC) 
frequently mention compliance with medication as a criterion for allowing this procedure 
instead of inpatient commitment. 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 493 n.1384 (citing statutes 
and cases). Civil libertarian commentators have criticized OPC as a tool for forcing 
patients to take medication. Steven Schwartz & Cathy Costanzo, Compelling Treatment 
in the Community: Distorted Doctrine and Violated Values, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1329, 
1368 (1987) (stating that OPC is "synonymous with forced medication"); Susan Stefan, 
Preventive Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 288, 294 (1987) (stating that forced medication is the "core" of 
OPC). Psychiatrists endorse using OPC to force medication compliance as a means of 
keeping patients from becoming violent. See generally Jeffrey Geller, Rights, Wrongs, 
and the Dilemma of Coerced Community Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1259 
(1986). Perlin recognized that OPC can both extend state "control over those not subject 
to inpatient commitment" and permit persons to remain free in the community rather 
than being hospitalized. 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 499. See discussion infra Part V.B.3 
(discussing the relationshp between OPC and medication). 
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.c.); see also 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (requiring community placement of 
mentally disabled persons when treating professionals recommend such placement, the 
patients agree to placement, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated 
considering the state's resources and treatment needs of other patients). In his Olmstead 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy worried that release of psychiatric patients from 
1036 
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of incarcerated felons,t1 competence to stand trial,12 the insanity 
defense,13 and administration of the death penalty.14 
institutions might result in their becoming homeless, in part because of the "common 
phenomenon" in which "a patient. .. because of the mental illness itself, lacks the 
discipline or capacity to follow the regime the medication requires." Id. at 610 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
9. E.g., Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917,923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the 
jury's negligence award for tardive dyskinesia caused by improperly administered 
antipsychotic medications). 
Tardive dyskinesia is a syndrome of long-standing or permanent abnormal 
involuntary movements that is most commonly caused by long-term use of 
typical antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs.... Tardive dyskinesia presents 
clinically as involuntary movements of the tongue, facial, and neck muscles, 
upper and lower extremities, truncal musculature, or occasionally muscle 
groups that subserve breathing and swallowing.... [Examples of these 
movements include] tongue protrusions, lip smacking, puckering of the lips, 
chewing movements,... cheek puffing[,]... grimacing, blinking,... and 
rapid ticlike movements of the face .... 
SlEVEN E. HYMAN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUG THERAPY 35 (3d ed. 1995). 
For a recent discussion of malpractice aspects of tardive dyskinesia, see generally John 
Baker, Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice Exposure Through a Risk-
BellefitAllalysis, 1 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CAREL. 799 (1997). 
10. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that state 
Medicaid programs were obligated to make clozapine, a then new and expensive 
antipsychotic drug, available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug was 
medically necessary); Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1992) 
(holding that state Medicaid programs were obligated to make clozapine, a then new and 
expensive antipsychotic drug, available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug 
was medically necessary); see discussion infra Part Ill.D.1 (discussing clozaine). 
11. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding that involuntary 
medication is permissible to prevent harm to an inmate or others, when shown to be 
medically necessary, and that the prison's procedure for overriding an inmate's refusal 
met the requirements of the Due Process Clause); Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 472 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that not providing clozapine to inmates was not a violation of the 
court order); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 409 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that state 
constitutional protection against arbitrary government action gives a prisoner a qualified 
right to refuse psychotropic drugs). 
12. E.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (reversing the conviction 
because the defendant's right to a fair trial was compromised by his involuntary 
treatment with antipsychotic medication); United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305-
13 (4th Cir. 1988) (limiting the right of an incompetent defendant to stand trial and to 
refuse antipsychotic medication); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 138 
(D.D.C. 2001), ajf'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (authorizing the involuntary 
medication of a pretrial detainee). 
13. Concerning a defendant's right to stop taking antipsychotic medication during 
a trial at which he raises the insanity defense so as to present himself to jurors in an 
unmedicated state, see generally 4 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 9A-4.6g, at 206-07 (2002). 
Compare People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that 
the court was "declin[ing] to adopt a per se rule that a drug-normalized accused must be 
allowed to discontinue medicinal treatment so that the jury may observe his demeanor in 
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The pharmacotherapeutic properties of antipsychotic medications-
their actions, therapeutic uses, benefits, adverse effects, contraindications, 
and risks-are quintessentially medical topics, even when the situations 
and contexts in which doctors prescribe or recommend their use raise 
legal questions. Frequently, however, the legal database (that is, 
published opinions, legislation, regulation, and law review articles) is the 
principal or sole information source cited and consulted by lawyers, 
judges, and scholars who write about these drugs and make decisions 
concerning the persons that may have to take them. 15 What often results 
is the perpetuation of mistaken, outdated, distorted, biased, contradictory,16 
a drug-free state"), appeal dismissed, 477 U.S. 902 (1986), with State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 
1379, 1381 (N.H. 1978) (stating that a "defendant has no absolute right to be tried free 
from the influence of the drugs administered to him"). One would expect that it would 
take far longer than three days for the defendant to return to the same "unmedicated 
state" in which he might have been before being arrested. For most antipsychotic drugs, 
when an individual has received the medication for several weeks, detectible, clinically 
significant amounts of the medication or its active metabolites may remain in the body 
long after the individual has stopped taking the medication. Also, the antipsychotic 
effects of these drugs may persist long after patients stop taking them. HYMAN ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 14 ("[B]ehavioral effects in patients can last long after serum levels are 
no longer detectable."). 
14. In at least two cases, state supreme courts have held that involuntarily 
medicating condemned inmates to make them competent for execution would violate 
state constitutional provisions. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992); 
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 60-62 (S.C. 1993), rev'd in part, State v. Torrence, 
406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991). See generally 4 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 12-4.3, at 550-53 
(2002) (listing cases and scholarly articles). 
15. See, e.g., Hightower by Dehler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (N.D. 
Ga. 1996) (citing cases and law review articles concerning actions and side effects of 
antipsychotic drugs); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53-54 (Mass. 1981) 
(utilizing a 1973 law review article as the principal source for a description of adverse 
effects); Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 15-17 
(Ohio 2000) (citing only cases and law review articles); 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 
161-64 (1999) (law review articles are the principal sources for the text's description of 
side effects, though dozens of medical articles are listed in footnotes). 
16. For example, Justice Kennedy's views regarding mental illness and the role of 
pharmacotherapy in Olmstead v. L.c., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), conflict with the views he 
expressed in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138. In Riggins, Kennedy acknowledged the value of 
antipsychotic medication in treating psychosis, but would forbid involuntary 
pharmacological treatment of mentally ill pretrial defendants to restore their competence. 
He stated that the side effects of antipsychotic drugs seemed so inevitably severe and 
disabling that they "can compromise the right of a medicated criminal defendant to 
receive a fair trial" by altering his demeanor and ability to confer with counsel. Id. at 
142-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Seven years later, by contrast, Kennedy noted that 
"medical science" had made "remarkable advances and achievements" and that mental 
illnesses were '"treatable." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He 
stated "that for the person with severe mental illness who has no treatment[,] the most 
dreaded of confinements can be the imprisonment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts 
reality out and subjects him to the torment of voices and images beyond our own powers 
to describe." [d. at 609-10. Many patients, "because of the mental illness itself, lack[] 
the discipline or capacity to follow the regime the medication requires." [d. Medical 
science had indeed advanced in the seven year period between these opinions, and 
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or just plain foolish ideas about psychotic disorders, the actions and 
adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs, and physicians' goals in treating 
patients with psychoses.17 At the same time, the emerging scientific 
understanding of psychotic disorders and the role drugs play in their 
treatment remains misunderstood and underappreciated.18 
Courts' and legal scholars' potential for misunderstanding antipsychotic 
treatment has recently acquired a new dimension. In the 1990s, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration approved four new antipsychotic drugs19 
for the treatment of patients with psychotic disorders. These medications 
are not always effective and, like the older drugs, do not cure psychotic 
disorders. However, these new medications are at least as effective as, 
and possibly more effective than, previously available compounds?O 
Moreover, the new antipsychotic drugs are "novel" or "atypical" in that 
several of these advances are discussed in subsequent sections of this Article. However, 
severe mental illnesses were quite treatable in 1992, and the consequences of leaving 
them untreated were no different seven years later. For pre-1992 discussions by 
psychiatrists concerned about this problem, see generally E. FuLLER TORREY, NOWHERE 
TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1988), and H. Richard 
Lamb, Will We Save the Homeless Mentally Ill?, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 649 (1990). 
17. Indeed, Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum published their 1983 Hofstra Law Review 
article to counter just these problems. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 79; see 
also infra Part VI.B.l. 
18. See, e.g., Perry, 610 So. 2d at 758 (likening treatment with antipsychotic 
medications to government restrictions on individuals' access to pornography); Sheldon 
Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the COllStitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 
1725, 1747-48 (1984) ("The physiological causes and concomitants of mental illness 
remain matters for speculation. Physiologically, antipsychotic effects cannot be 
confidently distinguished from crude measures-such as bleeding, purging, and, in all 
probability, lObotomy-which render individuals too weak or preoccupied to attend to 
their psychotic urgings." (footnote omitted)); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse 
Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 
28-29 (1996) (endorsing the same view). 
19. The medications were clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, and quetiapine. A 
fifth new antipsychotic agent, ziprasidone, became available in early 2001 and a sixth 
agent, aripiprazole, may be released before the end of 2002. Melody Petersen & Andrew 
Pollack, Problems at Bristol Are Clear; Solution Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2002, at Cl. 
See infra Part II1.D (describing these medications further). 
20. Michael D. Jibson & Rajiv Tandon, New Atypical Antipsychotic MedicatiollS, 
32 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 215, 220-21 (1998). The degree to which the new 
antipsychotics are better is a matter of ongoing debate. See, e.g., John Geddes et al., 
Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia: Systematic Overview and 
Meta-Regression Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J., 1371-76 (2000) (noting that meta-analysis 
of fifty-two randomized trials suggests that the newer drugs are only slightly more 
effective than the older drugs at high doses; compared to moderately dosed older drugs, 
newer "antipsychotics had no benefits in terms of efficacy or overall tolerability," but 
caused fewer side effects). 
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they alleviate psychotic symptoms with a much reduced risk of the side 
effects that were a nearly inevitable consequence of treatment with the 
older, "conventional" medications.21 
This last point has special legal, as well as therapeutic. significance 
because the drawbacks of the older antipsychotic agents generated much 
of the concern about, and litigation related to, the use of these drugs. 
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs have been a specific element in 
the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis of a pretrial 
detainee's right to refuse treatmenr2 and of the right of prisoners not to 
receive involuntarily administered antipsychotic drugs absent certain 
procedural safeguards?3 Side effects also have figured prominently in 
state court decisions concerning administration of antipsychotic drugs to 
civilly committed inpatients,24 to incompetent individuals with guardians,25 
and to condemned inmates that have been found incompetent to be 
executed?6 A few malpractice cases have made psychiatrists subject to 
potentially massive judgments for failing to properly use and monitor 
these medications.27 
The potential advantages of the new antipsychotic agents are now 
beginning to influence courts' opinions. A July 1, 2002 search of the 
LEXIS database of federal and state cases after 1944 showed that at least 
21. Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 215. For more on the problems caused by 
older antipsychotic drugs, see infra Part IILC. 
22. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (stating that the involuntary 
administration of thioridazine, and resulting side effects, could infringe on fair trial rights 
by compromising testimony, communication with counsel, and ability to follow trial). 
23. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (recognizing an inmate's 
"significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic 
drugs" and stating that although an inmate's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted 
medication was not insubstantial, prison regulation concerning the procedure for 
overriding an inmate's refusal met the requirements of the Due Process Clause). 
24. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (,,[Ojne of the 
factors to be considered in the exercise of professional judgment ... is whether and to 
what extent the patient will suffer harmful side effects."); Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of 
Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Mass. 1983) (finding "adverse side effects" to be a 
factor in the judge's decision concerning the involuntary administration of medication); 
Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74,81 (1986) (stating that the court is to consider, among 
other factors, "the adverse side effects" before ordering medication for an incompetent 
psychiatric inpatient). 
25. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53-54 (Mass. 1981) (stating that 
the possibility of adverse effects requires that decision for administration be made by a 
judge, not by the guardian). 
26. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 760 (La. 1992) (characterizing antipsychotic 
medications as "powerful, dangerous and unpredictable"). 
27. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 917, 922-23 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming 
a $760,000 damage award and describing side effects); Accardo v. Cenac, 722 So. 2d 
302, 313 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (revising a tardive dyskinesia award upward to $1.2 
million). 
1040 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1041 2002
[VOL.39: 1033,2002] Unbuckling the Straitjacket 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
171 cases had mentioned or discussed these new drugs;28 these cases 
address a variety of issues, including informed consent,29 the right to 
refuse treatment,30 and the rights of Medicaid patients31 and prisoners32 
to have these drugs available. A search that same date of the LEXIS law 
review database revealed sixty-six articles that mention these medications. 
Legal scholars have considered the cost issues and the antitrust 
implications of the method by which the first of these new drugs was 
introduced,33 and the new medications have begun to receive attention 
from law review authors writing about malpractice,34 the right to refuse 
treatment,35 managed psychiatric care,36 outpatient commitment,37 research 
28. The search strategy, "«new or newer or novel or atypical) w/3 «anti-psychotic 
or antipsychotic) prell (medication or medicine or drug») or cloza! or risperidone or 
resperidone or respiridone or risperdal or olanzap! or zyprexa or quetiapine or seroquel 
or geodon or ziprasidone," was designed to include cases that referred to the new 
antipsychotic drugs without mentioning one of them specifically by name. See State v. 
Jung, 724 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (Ohio Ct App. 1999) (citing Dr. Douglas Songer's 
discussion of "several newer medications which have fewer side effects"), and cases in 
which the names of these medications were misspelled. The strategy may not have 
found cases with unanticipated misspellings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 
96-11156(001-004), 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 664, at *2-3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 
1998) (referring to "Resperidol" and ''Zypreza'' but containing the proper spelling of 
olanzapine). All cases found are listed in this Article's Appendix. 
29. See infra Part V.B.2. 
30. See infra Part VI.C. 
31. See b!fra Parts IV.A and V.C.l. 
32. See infra Part V.C.l. 
33. Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in the Proprietary 
Drug Industry, 39 VlLL. L. REv. 1209, 1224-25 (1994) (arguing that a court would have 
found that bundling clozapine to a patient monitoring system violated the Jefferson 
Parish test); Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State Government 
Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REv. 655, 666-72 (1994) (commenting on ethical issues 
surrounding the State of New York's concerns about the cost of clozapine); Mark A. 
Hurwitz, Note, Bundling Patented Drugs and Medical Services: An Antitrust Analysis, 
91 COLUM. L. REv. 1188, 1215-20 (reasoning that the tying of clozapine to lab tests 
does not violate Justice O'Connor's "rule of reason" test articulated in Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984». 
34. See generally Baker, supra note 9. 
35. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of 
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 299 & nn. 88-89 (1992) 
(discussing the risks of clozapine); Dora W. Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: 
The Case Against Administering Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 
55 V AND. L. REv. 165 (2002) (opposing the use of medications to restore a criminal 
defendant's competence to stand trial); David M. Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New 
Medici1le: Revisiti1lg I1Ivoluntary Psychotropic Medicati01l of the Criminal Defendant, 
2001 WIS. L. REv. 307 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, the implications of new treatments 
for restoring competence to stand trial); Daniel Abraham, Note, Riggins Protects the 
I1Isa1lity Defe1lda1lt, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 131 (2000) (urging courts to be wary of 
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on persons with mental impairments,38 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act,39 professional rivalries,40 and assessing the professional judgment of 
psychiatrists.41 
That legal thinkers sometimes regard antipsychotic medication as a 
"chemical straitjacket,,42 reflects both a flawed understanding of what 
medication side effects in insanity defendants, notwithstanding the availability of new 
antipsychotic agents); Recent Case, United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), D.C. Circuit Holds that the Government May Forcibly Treat Incompetent 
Criminal Defendants with Antipsychotic Medication to Render Them Competent to Stand 
Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 737 (2001) (discussing the implications of medicating 
defendant to restore trial competence). In the author's opinion, David Siegel's article 
contains what is, to date, the best summary in law review articles concerning the 
properties of the new antipsychotics. Siegel et aI., supra at 346-51. 
36. See Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Managed Care, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1163, 1179 (2000) (discussing the failure of 
health plans to cover novel antipsychotics); Emile L. Loza, Access to Pharmaceuticals 
Under Medicaid Managed Care: Federal Law Compiled and State Contracts Compared, 
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 449, 469-70 (2000) (describing the restrictions on clozapine in 
managed state Medicaid programs). 
37. Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with 
Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1319-1320 (2000) (discussing the relationship between the severity 
of side effects and the justification for outpatient commitment). 
38. Laurie M. Flynn & Ronald S. Honberg, Achieving Proper Balance in Research 
with Decisionally-Incapacitated Subjects: NAMI's Perspectives on the Working Group's 
Proposal, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 174, 176 (1998) (explaining the benefits and 
potential risks of participating in research involving antipsychotic drugs). 
39. Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation That Drives Us Crazy: An Overview 
of "Mental Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMBo L. REv. 79, 
119 (2000-2001) (discussing the interplay among clozapine therapy, the ADA, and 
Sutton V. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999». 
40. See Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law 
Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 25, 28-29 (1992) (using clozapine to illustrate interprofessional conflicts). 
41. Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The 
Right of Those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 347, 348 (1992) (discussing clozapine treatment of detainees or committed 
patients); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to 
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 691 (1992) 
(discussing cost factors as nonclinical influences on medical decisions). 
42. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 18, at 72 (stating that patients experience these 
drugs as a "chemical straight-jacket"); Gelman, supra note 18, at 1737, 1783 (advocating 
use of the phrase "chemical restraint" in judicial opinions on antipsychotic drugs because 
of the phrase's political connotations); Elizabeth Dickinson Furlong, Note, Coercion in 
the Community: The Application of Rogers Guardianship to Outpatient Commitment, 21 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 485 (1995) (containing several references 
to antipsychotic drugs as "chemical restraints"); see also Cochran V. Dysart, 965 F.2d 
649, 650 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing psychotropic medication as an "alternative" to 
"straightjackets" and "frontal lobotomies"); United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 978 
(8th Cir. 1990) (describing psychotropic medication as an "alternative" to 
"straightjackets" and "frontal lobotomies"), vacated by United States V. Holmes, 900 
F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 60 (Mass. 1981) 
(stating that when the safety of others is part of the justification for involuntary 
medication, "antipsychotic drugs function as chemical restraints"). 
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these drugs d043 and the genuine limitations44 of all the antipsychotic 
medications that were available in the United States until just a few 
years ago. The arrival of novel agents, however, has allowed patients to 
receive antipsychotic medication with fewer side effects, a lower risk of 
neurological damage,45 and possibly better outcomes46 than the older 
drugs permitted. Thus, most patients who take antipsychotic drugs need 
no longer endure chemical straitjacketing to get relief from their delusions, 
hallucinations, and disordered thinking. Judges, legal scholars, and 
lawyers who deal with persons who take antipsychotic drugs now should 
experience an analogous process, one that unbuckles the conceptual 
straitjacket that frequently has prevented recognition of the need for and 
value of antipsychotic medications. Courts and legal scholars must 
evaluate antipsychotic drugs without being misled by distorted and 
increasingly outdated views found in existing case law and secondary 
legal sources. 
The goal of this Article is to encourage legal scholars and decisionmakers 
to reconsider the legal significance of antipsychotic medication. To do 
this, the Article presents the legal literature's first systematic review of 
the emerging legal significance of, and unresolved issues related to, the 
recent advances in the psychopharmacology of psychoses. The next two 
Parts offer summaries of psychiatry's current views on the nature of 
schizophrenia47 and its pharmacotherapy.48 Schizophrenia is just one of 
the psychiatric disorders for which novel antipsychotic drugs are 
officially indicated49 and prescribed.5o This Article focuses its discussion 
43. See infra Parts III.A-B (reviewing the actions of antipsychotic drugs). 
44. See infra Part III.C (discussing the side effects of older drugs). 
45. See infra Parts III.C, N.B.l (discussing the risks associated with the newer 
drugs). 
46. See infra Part III.D.2. 
47. See infra Part II. 
48. See infra Part III. 
49. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2319 (56th ed. 2002) [hereinafter PDR] 
(stating that clozapine "is indicated for the management of severely ill schizophrenic 
patients"); id. at 1797 (stating that risperidone "is indicated for the management of the 
manifestations of psychotic disorders"); id. at 1974 (stating that olanzapine "is indicated 
for the treatment of schizophrenia" and "acute manic episodes"); id. at 685 (stating that 
quetiapine "is indicated for the treatment of schizophrenia"); id. at 2689 (same for 
ziprasidone). 
50. "Once a product has been approved for marketing [for any disorder], a 
physician may choose to prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient 
popUlations that are not included in approved labeling. . .. [A]ccepted medical practice 
includes drug use that is not reflected in approved drug labeling." [d. at foreword. 
Numerous articles discuss the use of novel antipsychotic drugs for conditions other than 
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on schizophrenia both to simplify exposition and because recent advances 
in understanding this disorder typify psychiatrists' current thinking 
about severe mental illnesses generally, as well as the role that 
antipsychotic drugs play in treating those illnesses. 
Subsequent Parts discuss legal issues and policy problems in which 
the newer antipsychotic agents are already or may soon be figuring 
importantly. Part N examines the relationship between the high cost of 
novel antipsychotics compared to older, generic antipsychotic medications 
and the implications this cost differential may have for policymakers and 
third party payment decisions. Part V reviews potential sources of 
physician and institutional liability that might arise from financially 
motivated decisions to restrict or limit use of novel antipsychotics. Part 
VI reviews litigation on the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
medication, focusing on how the benefit and side effect profiles of novel 
agents have influenced courts' perceptions of and decisions about 
involuntary administration of these drugs. Part Vll presents a short 
quantitative summary of cases that mention novel antipsychotic agents, 
and Part VIII summarizes this Article's major points. 
ll. THE CURRENT CONCEPTION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Recent studies estimate that about two million adults in the U.S., 
schizophrenia. Joseph R. Calabrese et aI., Clozapine for Treatment-Refractory Mania, 
153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 759, 762 (1996) (stating that clozapine is often effective in 
manic patients that have not responded to treatment with mood stabilizers); Robert M. A. 
Hirschfeld et aI., Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with Bipolar Disorder 
(Revision), 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 9 (Supp. Apr. 2002) (recommending novel agents 
for treatment of acute mania in bipolar disorder); Susan L. McElroy et aI., An Overview 
of the Treatment of SchizoaJfective Disorder, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 20 (1999) 
(reviewing novel antipsychotic agents useful in treating schizoaffective disorder); Rajesh 
Narendran et aI., Olanzapine Therapy in Treatment-Resistant Psychotic Mood 
Disorders: A Long-Term Follow-Up Study, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 509, 515 (2001) 
(concluding that the use of olanzapine is more successful in patients with mood 
symptoms); S. Nassir Ghaemi, New Treatments for Bipolar Disorder: The Role of 
Atypical Neuroleptic Agents, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 33, 33 (2000) (discussing the 
role of atypicals in treating persons with bipolar disorder); Paola Rocca et aI., Treatment 
of Borderline Personality Disorder with Risperidone, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 241, 
241 (2002) (concluding that risperidone can help some patients with borderline 
personality disorder); Martha Sajatovic et aI., Quetiapine Alone and Added to a Mood 
Stabilizer for Serious Mood Disorders, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 62, 62 (2001) 
(stating that quetiapine may help persons "with serious mood disorders who are 
suboptimally responsive to mood stabilizers alone"); Trisha Suppes et aI., Repon of the 
Texas Consenslls Conference Panel on Medication Treatment of Bipolar Disorder 2000, 
63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 288, 292 (2002) (stating that all atypicals have a potential 
role in treating bipolar disorder's manic phase and that olanzapine is an appropriate first 
choice); Mauricio Tohen et aI., Olanzapine Versus Placebo in the Treatment of Acute 
Mania, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 702, 708 (1999) (concluding that olanzapine is effective 
in reducing manic symptoms). 
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approximately one percent of the U.S. adult population, suffer from the 
disorder that psychiatrists diagnose as schizophrenia.51 Psychiatrists' 
current goals in the pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia reflect 
the capabilities of the antipsychotic drugs now available, medical 
science's developing conceptualization of the disorder itself, and 
physicians' beliefs about how antipsychotic medications correct or 
modify the pathological processes that manifest themselves in symptoms 
and psychological dysfunction.52 Although antipsychotic drugs are still 
termed "major tranquilizers" in case law,53 legal publications,54 physicians' 
testimony,55 and even the Physicians' Desk Rejerence,56 this designation 
ignores the specific actions of these drugs and misleadingly suggests that 
their main role is to reduce agitation. This Part presents a summary of 
modem psychiatry's understanding of schizophrenia as it has emerged in 
51. William E. Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in 
the United States: Using a Clinical Significance Criterion to Reconcile 2 Surveys' 
Estimates, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 115, 121 (2002). See infra Part II.B. 
(describing the clinical criteria that psychiatrists use to diagnose schizophrenia). 
52. For a recent and well-organized summary of theories concerning the etiology 
of schizophrenia, see generally Debra A. Pinals & Alan Breier, Schizophrenia, in 2 
PSYCHIATRY 936 (Allan Tasman et al. ed., 1997). 
53. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 28 P.3d 34, 47, 49, 55 (Cal. 2001) (making three 
references to major tranquilizers); People v. Kinkead, 695 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ill. 1998) 
(referring to Thorazine as a potential "major tranquilizer" or "an antipsychotic"); In re 
Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81,83 n.l (Minn. 1996) (stating incorrectly that 
medical literature uses the terms "neuroleptic," "antipsychotic," and "major tranquilizer" 
interchangeably); Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (calling 
Thorazine a "major tranquilizer"). Currently, psychiatrists frequently use the terms 
"neuroleptic" or "conventional agent" to refer to older antipsychotic medications, and the 
terms "novel" or "atypical" to refer to the antipsychotic medications introduced since 
1989. See infra in Parts IIl.C, D.l (discussing these terms). 
54. Baker, supra note 9, at 824; Sharon L. Flower, Comment, Resolving Voluntary 
Melltal Health Treatmellt Disputes in the Community Setting: Benefits of and Barriers to 
Effective Mediation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 881, 881 n.2 (1999) (stating that 
"Thorazine is a major tranquilizer"); M. Catherine Healy, Comment, Riggins v. Nevada: 
Are "Syllthetically Sane" Criminal Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?, 20 NEW ENG. 
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 385, 385 (1995) (stating that patients treated with 
"major tranquilizers" are "zombified"); Avital Stadler, Comment, California Injects New 
Life I/lto an Old Idea: Taking a Shot at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the 
Constitution, 46 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1306 (1997). But see Lester J. Perling, Health Care 
Advance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 193,201 (1993) (stating that the term "major tranquilizer" is used "incorrectly"). 
55. Williamson v. Haynes Best Western of Alexandria, 688 So. 2d 1201, 1214 (La. 
Ct. App. 1997) (physician uses term); People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1997) (physician uses term), vacated, 583 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. 1998). 
56. PDR, supra note 49, at 2533 ("Haloperidol is the first of the butyrophenone 
series of major tranquilizers."). 
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the last quarter century, with the aim of helping readers appreciate how 
leading psychiatric researchers conceptualize the role of antipsychotic 
therapy. 
A. Twentieth Century Developments in Understanding the Disorder 
1. Bleuler's Conception 
The contemporary view of schizophrenia has its roots in the work of 
Eugen Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist who coined the word "schizophrenia" 
early in the twentieth century.57 Although the term "schizophrenic" is 
often used colloquially to describe the holding of dual, conflicting 
attitudes, as though the term referred to a multiple or split personality,58 
the word's Greek roots, (JXi~etV and <I>pf]y actually connote a mind that is 
divided or tom apart.59 According to psychiatrist Nancy Andreasen, 
Bleuler's use of the term schizophrenia emphasizes that the disorder 
should be "defined by an underlying cognitive process" rather than by its 
often-variable outward appearance,60 or, as Bleuler himself put it, as a 
"splitting of the psychic functions.,,61 Throughout the twentieth century, 
57. EUGEN BLEULER, DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR THE GROUP OF SCHIZOPHRENIAS 
(Joseph Zinkin trans., 1950). 
58. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 928. 
59. 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2159, 2664 
(1971). 
60. Nancy C. Andreasen, A Unitary Model of Schizophrenia: Bleltler's 
"Fragmented Phrene" as Schizoencephaly, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 781, 782 
(1999). For a slightly different interpretation, see Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 928. 
However, the latter authors agree with Andreasen that "BIeuler used the word 
[schizophrenia] to capture his b'elief that this mental illness was one in which different 
aspects of the psyche were split." Id. 
61. BLEULER, supra note 57, at 9. His description continued: 
In every case we are confronted with a more or less clear-cut splitting of 
the psychic functions.... The psychic complexes do not combine in a 
conglomeration of strivings with a unified resultant as they do in a healthy 
person. . .. Often ideas are only partially worked out, and fragments of ideas 
are connected in an illogical way to constitute a new idea. Concepts lose their 
completeness, seem to dispense with one or more of their essential 
components; indeed, in many cases they are only represented by a few 
truncated notions. 
Thus, the process of association often works with mere fragments of ideas 
and concepts. This results in associations which normal individuals will regard 
as incorrect, bizarre, and utterly unpredictable. Often thinking stops in the 
middle of a thought; or in the attempt to pass to another idea, it may suddenly 
cease altogether, at least as far as it is a conscious process (blocking). Instead 
of continuing the thought, new ideas crop up which neither the patient nor the 
observer can bring into any connection with the previous stream of thought. 
... In the severest cases emotional and affective expressions seem to be 
completely lacking. 
!d. at 9-10. 
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the term schizophrenia, when used by psychiatrists, denoted a severe and 
debilitating disorder characterized by a pervasive impairment in thinking, 
behavior, and interpersonal relationships.62 
Bleuler's approach to schizophrenia assumed that this condition, like 
any medical disorder, should be described and understood by cataloging 
constellations of signs and symptoms and by paying careful attention to 
the disorder's clinical course and patients' ultimate outcomes.63 Under 
this "medical model" of illness, schizophrenia was a condition equivalent to 
pneumonia or diabetes, that is, a specific, diagnosable, organically based 
disorder with well-defined manifestations, a typical course, and a 
characteristic prognosis. The disorder's treatment, which consisted of 
hospitalization, physician administered and directed therapy, as well as 
the supportive efforts of medical personnel (for example, nursiI;lg staff), 
followed logically from this medical diagnosis and was directed toward 
alleviating symptoms and restoring functioning, to the extent possible.64 
2. Mid-Century Views 
By the 1960s, schizophrenia had become disputed territory. Though 
the Bleulerian medical paradigm retained its adherents, several other 
schools of thought within and without psychiatry offered alternative, 
competing explanatory models for the disorder.65 Under the behaviorist 
or "moral model" of illness, a patient's unacceptable behavior, rather 
than his underlying sickness or diagnosed condition, was the nexus of 
clinical concern. Treatment, administered by psychologists and other 
behavioral experts rather than physicians, was designed to alter that 
behavior via a set of contingencies or reinforcements.66 In the 
62. Susan K. Schultz & Nancy C. Andreasen, Schizophrenia, 353 LANCET 1425, 
1425 (1999). 
63. For a short description of Bleuler's contributions to the modern conception of 
schizophrenia, and for a discussion of other disease-model-oriented twentieth century 
approaches to the description of schizophrenia, see Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 
928-29, and 1. Hoenig, The Concept of Schizophrenia: Kraepelin-Bleuler-Schneider, 
142 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 547, 549-52 (1983). 
64. Miriam Siegler & Humphry Osmond, Models of Madness, 112 BRIT. J. 
PSYCffiATRY 1193, 1194-95 (1966). 
65. [d. at 1193. 
66. See id. at 1195-97. "[B]y and large the view of operant behavior therapists is 
that maladaptive behavior is no different than any other behavior .. " The problem 
facing the therapist is therefore to identify maladaptive behaviors in an individual's 
repertoire and remove them through operant techniques." JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, INIRODUcnON 
TO PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: A THEORy-CONSTRUCTION APPROACH 335 
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"psychoanalytic model," schizophrenia was part of a continuum of 
emotional difficulties that arose either from traumatic experiences or 
from failures to negotiate an earlier phase of psychological development. 
Psychoanalytic treatment of schizophrenia consisted in talking therapy 
that aimed to interpret pathological thinking, help the patient achieve 
insight, and thereby permit the patient to overcome the early childhood 
conflict from which the symptoms arose.67 The "family interaction 
model" placed the locus of sickness in the family, rather than within an 
individual. Under this view, the schizophrenic patient reflected and 
acted out the disturbed functioning of his family, and treatment was 
focused on getting the family to interact in a healthier way.68 The 
Szaszian "conspiratorial model" held that neither schizophrenia nor any 
other mental illness existed. What was called schizophrenia was merely 
deviant behavior, and calling someone crazy was a political act that 
served to justify interference with his civil liberties through forced 
therapy and hospitalization. According to Szasz and his adherents, 
psychiatrists were agents of social control.69 
3. Medical Science's Current View: A Brain-Based Disorder 
By the end of the twentieth century, scientific evidence had shown 
overwhelmingly that schizophrenia was a brain-based illness that could 
be addressed effectively, though not cured, with pharmacological agents 
that altered neuronafo functioning.7I Several other studies had shown 
(1973). For a description of the in-hospital behavioral treatment of a person with 
schizophrenia, in which desired (rational) behaviors are rewarded and bizarre behaviors 
are ignored (extinguished), see id. at 337-38. The classic exposition of the behaviorist's 
world view is Beyond Freedom and Dignity. B.P. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND 
DIGNITY (1971). 
67. Siegler & Osmond, supra note 64, at 1197-98. For a summary of 
psychodynamic contributions to the treatment of schizophrenia, see Pinals & Breier, 
supra note 52, at 958. There are two classic works in this area SILVANO MIEn, 
lNrERPRErATION OF SCffiZOPHRENIA (1955); HARRy STACK SULUVAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A 
HUMAN PROCESS (1962). 
68. Siegler & Osmond, supra note 64, at 1198-1200. There are also two classic 
works in this area. Gregory Bateson et aI., Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, 1 
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 251 (1956) (describing the "double bind" as a causative factor); 
GREGORY BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND (1972). 
69. THOMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1974); Siegler & 
Osmond, supra note 64, at 1200. 
70. The word "neuronal" means "pertaining to a neuron or neurons." DORLAND'S, 
supra note 3, at 1212. Neurons are "the conducting cells of the nervous system." [d. at 
1211. 
71. Innumerable studies have reported the effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in 
quelling the symptoms of schizophrenia. For a summary of early research, see Jonathan 
O. Cole et aI., Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. 
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that by continuing to take antipsychotic medication after they recover, 
patients can greatly reduce their risk of suffering a relapse.72 This was 
not to say that individual psychotherapy, behavioral treatments, or 
family therapy had no role in treating schizophrenia. Research had 
clearly shown that these treatments could be very usefu1.73 However, 
nonpharmacological interventions were now regarded as helping patients 
and their families cope with the consequences of a biologically-based 
disorder and as addressing symptoms that medication alone could not 
completely correct.14 Several independent lines of evidence support the 
contention that "[s]chizophrenia is a biological brain disease.,,75 
a. Genetic Evidence 
First, individuals vary greatly in their genetic susceptibility to 
schizophrenia, just as is the case with other common medical disorders. 
The probability that a first-degree relative of someone with schizophrenia 
will himself contract the disorder is ten times greater than the probability 
of someone who has no first-degree relatives with schizophrenia. The 
concordance rate of schizophrenia in monozygotic (identical) twins, who 
share the same genetic makeup, is higher than the concordance rate for 
dizygotic (fraternal) twinS.76 
PSYCHlA1RY 246 (1964). More recent summaries also concern older antipsychotic 
medications. See John M. Davis et al., Important Issues in the Drug Treatment of 
Schizophrenia, 6 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 70 (1980); John M. Kane, Treatment of 
Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133 (1987) (noting both pooling and 
summarizing studies showing that antipsychotic drugs are effective for approximately 
seventy percent of patients in acute episodes of schizophrenia). 
72. See, e.g., Patricia L. Gilbert et al., Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenic 
Patients: A Review of the Literature, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHlA1RY 173 (1995) 
(presenting a meta-analysis showing that after 9.7 months, patients maintained on 
antipsychotic drugs experienced a sixteen percent relapse rate and fifty-three percent of 
patients not taking medication relapsed). 
73. See, e.g., Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Auditory Hallucinations: A Review of 
Psychological Treatments, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. 137 (1998); Dennis G. Dyck et al., 
Management of Negative Symptoms Among Patients with Schizophrenia Attending 
Multiple-Family Groups, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 513 (2000) (stating that multifamily 
educational groups are effective in reducing negative symptoms). 
74. See Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 958-960. Substantial evidence suggests 
that nondrug therapies can work in concert with antipsychotic medication to improve 
outcomes in patients with schizophrenia. /d. 
75. Paula C. Ashe et al., Schizophrenia, a Neurodegenerative Disorder with 
Neurodevelopmental Antecedents, 25 PROGRESS NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & 
BIOLOGICALPSYCHIA1RY 691, 692 (2001). 
76. DSM-lV-TR, supra note 3, at 309; see also, e.g., Preben Bo Mortensen et al., 
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b. Viral Etiologies 
Second, studies have revealed an association between prenatal 
exposure to viral infections and schizophrenia. A study of persons born 
after the 1957 influenza epidemic in Helsinki suggested that individuals 
whose mothers were exposed to the virus while pregnant, especially 
those whose mothers were exposed during the second trimester, a critical 
period for brain development, were at increased risk of developing 
schizophrenia.77 Several studies have demonstrated an increased rate of 
winter births among persons with schizophrenia, suggesting that 
susceptibility to the disorder may be linked to the higher rates of viral 
infections during those months.78 
c. Evidence from Brain Scans and Autopsy Studies 
Third, a host of computerized tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) studies have demonstrated that persons with schizophrenia 
have enlarged brain ventric1es,79 which implies a decrease in brain 
matter itself.so Radiological studies have demonstrated size decrements 
in portions of the brain that are responsible for memory, attention, 
emotional expression, social affiliation, and information integration.s1 
Effects of Family History and Place and Season of Birth on the Risk of Schizophrenia, 
340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 603, 603 (1999) (finding that having a parent or sibling with 
schizophrenia increased the relative risk of developing schizophrenia by factor of seven 
to nine). 
77. See generally Sarnoff A. Mednick et ai., Adult Schizophrenia Following 
Prenatal Exposure to an Influenza Epidemic, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 189 (1988) 
(finding that second trimester exposure to an influenza epidemic increased the risk of 
psychiatric hospitalization with diagnosis of schizophrenia); E. O'Callaghan et ai., 
Schizophrenia After Prenatal Exposure to 1957 A2 Influenza Epidemic, 337 LANCET 
1248 (1991) (finding that a study of England and Wales births yields similar finding and 
provides "clinical and neuropathological evidence of aberrant fetal brain development in 
the pathogenesis of schizophrenia"). 
78. See generally Richard L. O'Reilly, Viruses and Schizophrenia, 28 
AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 222 (1994). 
79. The four brain ventricles are "the cavities within the brain which are filled with 
cerebrospinal fluid." DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 1955. Their structure is illustrated, 
id., and their function is described in many texts on nervous system anatomy. See, e.g., 
MALCOLM B. CARPENTER, CORE TEXT OF NEUROANATOMY 25-28 (1972). 
80. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 938-39. A recent meta-analysis of fifty-
eight previously published studies concludes that "cerebral volume was lower ... and 
total ventricular volume was higher... in patients with schizophrenia than in 
comparison subjects." Ian C. Wright et ai., Meta-Analysis of Regional Brain Volumes in 
Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 16, 22 (2000). For a highly technical but 
authoritative summary of brain abnormalities ascertained in "neuroimaging studies," that 
is, radiologic studies of brain structure, such as CT and MRl scans, see Jeffrey A. 
Lieberman, Is Schizophrenia a Neurodegenerative Disorder? A Clinical and 
Neurobiological Perspective, 46 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 729, 733-34 (1999). 
81. Nancy Andreasen et ai., Structural Abnormalities in the Frontal System in 
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Several postmortem studies have demonstrated localized, microscopic 
abnormalities in the shape and organization of neurons from brains of 
individuals that had schizophrenia.82 
d. Birth Complications 
Fourth, schizophrenia is associated with birth complications. One 
recent study found that birth complications that were associated with 
lowered brain oxygen levels strikingly elevated the subsequent risk of 
developing schizophrenia,83 a finding that supports an earlier report that 
oxygen deprivation doubled the risk of developing schizophrenia.84 
Certain areas of the brain are very sensitive to lowered blood oxygen 
levels, and these areas may be especially susceptible to hypoxia related 
damage around the time of birth.85 In a recent MRI study of 
monozygotic twins who had a history of birth complications but who 
were discordant for schizophrenia,86 the ill twins had smaller 
hippocampi and enlarged ventricles, findings frequently found in 
Schizophrenia: A Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
136, 136 (1986) (finding that "schizophrenics had significantly smaller frontal lobes, as 
well as smaller cerebrums and craniums"); Alan Breier et al., Brain Morphology and 
Schizophrenia: A Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of Limbic, Prefrontal Cortex and 
Caudate Structures, 49 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 921, 921 (1992); Hilleke E. 
HulshoffPol et al., Volume Changes in Gray Matter in Patients with Schizophrenia, 159 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 244, 244 (2002) (concluding that "smaller brains of the patients with 
schizophrenia can be explained by decreases in gray matter volume," especially pre-
frontal gray matter); Philip R. Szeszko et al., Neuropsychological Correlates of 
Hippocampal Volumes in Patients Experiencing a First Episode of Schizophrenia, 159 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 217, 221-23 (2002) (noting the relationship between loss of tissue in 
a portion of the brain usually associated with memory functioning and executive 
functioning suggests defect in linkage of brain regions); Wright et al., supra note 80, at 
23 ("Regional volume reductions ... were particularly marked in the bilateral medial 
temporal lobe regions."). 
82. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 939. See generally Thomas F. McNeil et al., 
Relationship of Obstetric Complications and Differences in Size of Brain Structures in 
Monozygotic Twin Pairs Discordant for Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 203 
(2000) (citing studies). 
83. Gwen L. Zomberg et al., Hypoxic-Ischemia-Related FetallNeonatal Complications 
and Risk of Schizophrenia and Other Nonaffective Psychoses: A 19-Year Longitudinal 
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 196, 196-97 (2000). 
84. Stephen L. Buka et al., PregnancylDelivery Complications and Psychiatric 
Diagnosis: A Prospective Study, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 151, 156 (1993). 
85. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 938 (mentioning the hippocampus and 
neocortex as especially vulnerable areas). 
86. That is, only one twin had the disorder. 
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schizophrenia,87 and a pattern of complications implying that labor or 
delivery trauma was importantly associated with the development, 
decades later, of schizophrenia.88 A recent study of minor physical 
anomalies (slight deviations in a person's physical characteristics that 
reflect disruptions in fetal development)89 showed that in a group of 
children at risk for developing mental illness, those who had a higher 
number of such anomalies "developed schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
significantly more often than they developed a no mental illness 
outcome."90 
e. Characteristic Cognitive Impairment 
Fifth, schizophrenia is associated with a variety of impairments in 
cognitive functioning that are predictive of poor outcome and long-term 
disability.91 The most commonly investigated impairments are deficits 
in information processing that, in some cases, have been localized to 
dysfunction in particular areas of the cortex.92 As psychiatrist Jeffrey 
87. See supra Part II.A.3.c (citing studies). 
88. McNeil et aI., supra note 82, at 203. 
89. See Baher Ismail et aI., Minor Physical Anomalies in Schizophrenia: 
Cognitive, Neurological and Other Clinical Correlates, 34 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 45 
(2000). 
90. Jason Schiffman et aI., Minor Physical Anomalies and Schizophrenia Spectrum 
Disorders: A Prospective Investigation, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 238, 238 (2002); see 
also John McGrath et aI., Minor Physical Anomalies and Quantitative Measures of the 
Head and Face in Patients with Psychosis, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 458 (2002) 
(having head abnormalities increased odds of having a nonaffective psychotic disorder, 
that is, schizophrenia). 
91. Philip D. Harvey & Richard S.E. Keefe, Studies of Cognitive Change in 
Patients with Schizophrenia Following Novel Antipsychotic Treatment, 158 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 176, 176 (2001). 
Cognitive functioning is a correlate of global and specific functional outcome 
in schizophrenia. Cognitive impairments consistently account for significant 
variance in measures of functional status, such as social and occupational 
disability, and are more strongly related to functional outcome than other 
aspects of the illness such as positive symptom severity. 
!d.; see also Stanley R. Kay & Lisa M. Murrill, Predicting Outcome of Schizophrenia: 
Significance of Symptom Profiles and Outcome Dimensions, 31 COMPREHENSIVE 
PSYCHIATRY 91, 97 (1990) (finding that thought disturbance predicts poor functional 
outcome). 
92. See, e.g., Esther F. Rabinowicz et aI., Auditory Sensory Dysfunction in 
Schizophrenia: Imprecision or Distractibility?, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1149, 
1153 (2000) (finding that tone matching deficits appear to be caused by dysfunction at 
the level of the auditory sensory cortex); Daniel R. Weinberger et aI., Physiologic 
Dysfunction of Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex in Schizophrenia: I. Regional Cerebral 
Blood FlolV Evidence, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 114, 114 (1986) (finding that 
persons with schizophrenia fail to activate the prefrontal cortex during a Wisconsin Card 
Sort procedure). In recent years, most issues of the American Journal of Psychiatry have 
contained at least one illustration that depicts a connection between localized brain 
activity and some feature of schizophrenic psychopathology. See, e.g., Tamara A. 
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Lieberman explained: "The average schizophrenic patient in the fIrst 
episode of psychosis performs a full standard deviation below the 
normal mean. This translates to a reduction in cognitive performance to 
the seventeenth percentile or an IQ score-equivalent of 85.'.93 The onset 
of this reduction appears to begin before persons develop full-blown 
symptoms of schizophrenia.94 
f. Mechanism of Antipsychotic Drug Action 
Sixth, all antipsychotic medications have a consistent property; they 
block the dopamine-D2 receptor.95 Dopamine is one of many brain 
chemicals dubbed "neurotransmitters" because of its role in transmitting 
signals between nerve cells.96 At least fIve major types of dopamine 
receptors97 can be found in various locations in the brain,98 and all 
Russell et al., Exploring the Social Brain in Schizophrenia: Left Prefrontal 
Underactivation During Mental State Attribution, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2040, 2041 
(2000) (comparing activation of brain areas in healthy persons and patients with 
schizophrenia that were asked to describe the mental state reflected in photographs of 
persons' eyes). 
93. Lieberman, supra note 80, at 733. 
94. Rebecca Fuller et al., Longitudinal Assessment of Premorbid Cognitive 
Functioning in Patients with Schizophrenia Through Examination of Standardized 
Scholastic Test Perjonnance, 159 Am. J. Psychiatry 1183, 1186 (2002) (stating that 
lower grade 11 Iowa Test scores support "previous findings that children who later 
develop schizophrenia manifest intellectual differences from peers before illness onset"). 
In addition, teenagers who do not yet show characteristic signs and symptoms of 
schizophrenia, but who later go on to develop that disorder, have more signs of impaired 
functioning and higher rates of psychiatric disorders. Mark Weiser et al., Association 
Between Nonpsychotic Psychiatric Diagnoses in Adolescent Males and Subsequent 
Onset of Schizophrenia, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCIDATRY 959, 959 (2001). 
95. Philip Seeman, Atypical Antipsychotics: Mechanism of Action, 47 CANADIAN J. 
PSYCIDATRY 27, 27 (2002). 
96. "Neurotransmitters, the key information molecules of the brain, mediate the 
actions of all known psychoactive drugs." Solomon H. Snyder & Christopher D. Ferris, 
Novel Neurotransmitters and Their Neuropsychiatric Relevance, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1738, 1738 (2000). Snyder and Ferris provide an excellent (though highly technical) 
review of how current knowledge of neurotransmitters developed in the last half of the 
twentieth century. Concerning the role of dopamine in the brain and the impact of D2 
blockers on dopamine transmission, see HYMANET AL., supra note 9, at 12-14. 
97. A receptor is "a molecular structure within a cell or on the surface 
characterized by (1) selective binding of a specific substance and (2) a specific 
physiologic effect that accompanies the binding." DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 1539. 
98. Anibal Cravchik & David Goldman, Neurochemical Individuality: Genetic 
Diversity Among Human Dopamine and Serotonin Receptors and Transporters, 57 
ARCmvES GEN. PSYCmATRY 1105, 1105-08 (2000). Dopamine receptors transduce 
signals within cells by coupling with specialized proteins on nerve cell membranes. Id. 
at 1106-07. 
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currently available antipsychotic medications prevent or alter the way 
that dopamine binds to a specific type of site, the dopamine-D2 receptor, 
on neurons.99 The D2 receptor blockade is directly correlated with the 
potency of conventional antipsychotic drugs. 100 The ability of 
psychoactive drugs to quell some symptoms of psychosis is another 
powerful argument in favor of regarding schizophrenia as a disorder of 
brain dysfunction. 
g. Drugs Can Induce Psychoses 
Seventh, drugs can induce behavior and symptoms similar to those 
experienced by persons with schizophrenia. Although the brain's responses 
to particular pharmacological agents have sometimes led to simplistic 
hypotheses about the nature of spontaneously occurring psychoses, 101 
recent studies have shown that, for example, specific neurocognitive 
deficits in schizophrenia can be replicated in healthy persons by administering 
medications that block specific brain receptors. 102 Moreover, these 
medications produce abnormal brain activation patterns that resemble the 
brain activity abnormalities exhibited by persons with schizophrenia. 103 
99. Shitij Kapur et aI., A Positron Emission Tomography Study of Quetiapine in 
Schizophrenia: A Preliminary Finding of an Antipsychotic Effect with Only Transiently 
High Dopamine D2 Receptor Occupancy, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 553, 553 
(2000); Shitij Kapur et aI., Clinical and Theoretical Implications of 5-HTz and D2 
Receptor Occupancy of Clozapine, Risperidone, and Olanzapine in Schizophrenia, 156 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 286, 286 (1999). 
100. Ian Creese et aI., Dopamine Receptor Binding Predicts Clinical and 
Pharmacological Potencies of Antischizophrenic Drugs, 192 SCIENCE 481, 481-483 
(1976); P. Seeman et a\., Antipsychotic Drug Doses and Neuroleptic/Dopamine 
Receptors, 261 NATURE 717, 717-719 (1976); P. Seeman & T. Lee, Antipsychotic 
Drugs: Direct Correlation Between Clinical Potency and Presynaptic Action on 
Dopamine Neurons, 188 SCIENCE 1217, 1218 (1975). For a recent discussion on how 
assay methods may be responsible for what appear to be exceptions to this rule of 
proportionality, see Philip Seeman & Teresa Tallerico, Rapid Release of Antipsychotic 
Drugs from Dopamine D2 Receptors: An Explanation for Low Receptor Occupancy and 
Early Clinical Relapse upon Withdrawal of Clozapine or Quetiapine, 156 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 876, 876 (1999) (stating that the "rapid release of clozapine and quetiapine 
from D2 receptors by endogenous dopamine may contribute to [apparent] low D2 
receptor occupancy" in binding studies). 
10 1. See also infra Part III.B. 
102. For example, the drug ketamine, see discussion infra Part III.B, blocks the N-
methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDAR). Daniel Umbricht et aI., Ketamine-Induced 
Deficits in Auditory and Visual Context-Dependent Processing in Healthy Volunteers, 57 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1139, 1142 (2000). Recently, Umbricht and colleagues 
showed that ketamine, administered to healthy volunteers, could produce deficits in tone 
matching ability, electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, and attention that 
mimicked the deficits in persons with schizophrenia. Id. at 1142-44. "The similarity of 
ketamine-induced deficits thus suggests that NMDAR-related dysfunction may 
contribute to the observed deficits in schizophrenia." Id. at 1146. 
103. Alan Breier et aI., Association of Ketamine-Induced Psychosis with Focal 
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The ability to chemically induce the specific neurocognitive deficits 
characteristic of schizophrenia suggests that the neurons affected by 
those chemicals have abnormalities that produce the manifold problems 
exhibited by persons with the disorder. 
h. Functional Brain Imaging 
Finally, currently available imaging techniques allow neuroscientists 
to watch the brain as it functions and to observe activation patterns that 
are distinctive to schizophrenia. For several years, psychiatrists have 
used information from functional imaging studies to document decreased 
metabolism and blood flow in the prefrontal regions of persons with 
schizophrenia.104 Recently, scientists have used these methods to find 
correlations between specific psychotic symptoms and patterns of brain 
activity. For example, Shergill and colleagues recently used a radiographic 
technique called functional magnetic resonance imaging105 to look at 
what regions of the brain are activated during periods when persons with 
schizophrenia hear voices, that is, experience verbal speech in the 
absence of external sensory input They found that activation in an extensive 
network of brain areas was "associated with auditory hallucinations.,,106 
This activation pattern was, in some respects, "remarkably similar to that 
seen when healthy volunteers imagine another person talking to 
them,,,107 but differed in two important respects: (1) an area of the brain 
associated with self-awareness was not activated, and (2) an area of the 
Activation of the Prefrontal Cortex in Healthy Volunteers, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 805, 
805 (1997). 
104. Daniel R. Weinberger & Karen Faith Bennan, Speculation on the Meaning of 
Cerebral Metabolic Hypofrontality in Schizophrenia, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 157, 157 
(1988). For a recent study and discussion, see Steven G. Potkin et al., A PET Study of 
the Pathophysiology of Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
227,227 (2002) (finding a lower prefrontal metabolic rate in patients with predominantly 
negative symptoms and stating: "A consistent finding ... is a lower level of prefrontal 
cortical metabolism in schizophrenic subjects .... "). 
1 05. A full discussion of this technique lies far beyond the scope of this Article, but 
it involves the use of very powerful magnets to detect changes in localized blood 
oxygenation, which is an index of neural activity. See generally S. Ogawa et al., Brain 
Maglletic Resonance Imaging with Contrast Dependent on Blood Oxygenation, 87 PROC. 
NAT'LACAD. SCI. U.S. 9868 (1990). 
106. Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Mapping Auditory Hallucinations in 
Schizophre1lia Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1033, 1034 (2000). 
107. [d. at 1035. 
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brain associated with unexpected stimuli was activated. 108 This pattern 
of activation provides confirmation for the idea that auditory verbal 
hallucinations "arise through the disruption of normal cognitive 
processes, such as monitoring of self-generated verbal material," and it 
also "makes it easier to appreciate why patients often describe the 
experiences as indistinguishable from 'real' auditory perceptions.,,109 
The authors also note that their findings elucidate the biological 
underpinnings for what patients experience and explain why certain 
psychological and biological treatments may be helpful. 110 In another 
recent study correlating symptoms with specialized areas of brain 
activity, Kircher and colleagues found that the severity of disordered 
thinkinglll induced when schizophrenic patients commented on 
Rohrschach inkblots "was inversely correlated with the level of activity 
in the Wernicke area, a region implicated in the production of coherent 
speech.,,1l2 
4. Conceptualizing Schizophrenia 
The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that physicians 
and scientists know what the cause of schizophrenia is in the way that 
doctors know that a specific type of bacterium is the pathogen involved 
in pneumococcal pneumonia. Nor are they sure why observed disturbances 
in brain function or morphology lead to the problems exhibited by 
persons with schizophrenia. However, an emerging consensus about the 
disorder holds that the clinical signs and symptoms of schizophrenia, 
whether they be florid, "positive" symptoms,ll3 such as crazy beliefs 
(delusions1l4) and hearing voices (auditory hallucinations1l5), or "negative" 
108. These areas are the supplementary motor area and the left parahippocampal 
region, respectively. !d. at 1036. 
109. !d. at 1037. 
110. Id. 
111. The authors looked specifically at manifestations of positive formal thought 
disorder, or the "incoherence, use of peculiar words, and distractibility" that is "one of 
the core features of schizophrenia." Tilo T. J. Kircher et aI., Neural Correlates of 
Formal Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia: Preliminary Findings From a Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 769, 769 (2001). 
112. Id. 
113. Positive symptoms involve the presence of abnormal clinical findings or 
"distortions of normal functioning." Samuel J. Keith, Pharmacologic Advances in the 
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 851, 851 (1997). 
114. A delusion is: 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is 
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The 
belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture 
or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 821. 
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symptoms,1I6 such as social withdrawal and apathy, reflect an 
"underlying disruption in functional neural circuitry."l17 Symptoms of 
schizophrenia occur in persons who have hereditary and congenital 
vulnerabilities to the disorder and who may also be exposed to 
environmental stressors ranging from drugs of abuse to social 
disappointments. While these symptoms vary enormously both among 
persons diagnosed with the disorder and within such persons over the 
course of their illness, persons with schizophrenia typically display 
distinctive abnormalities in visual tracking of moving objects, ability to 
filter out interfering stimuli, information processing and attention, and 
working memory. liS 
Recently, Dr. Andreasen and colleagues have suggested that these 
difficulties reflect disruptions in neuronal circuits that are responsible for 
coordinating sequences of motor activity and thought "that are the 
hallmark[s] of normal cognition.,,119 Persons with schizophrenia suffer 
from misconnected brain circuitry, because of which they cannot make 
normal associations among mental ideas and cannot distinguish between 
their own thoughts and those of others. They cannot suppress "[t]he 
multiple stimuli that bombard our consciousness" and have trouble 
ignoring trivial matters and paying attention to what is important.120 
When they experience hallucinations, it is because they interpret 
"internal representations," which are their own thoughts, as coming from 
outside themselves. When they experience delusions, it is because their 
misfunctioning circuitry has made erroneous or inappropriate connections 
115. A hallucination is "[a] sensory perception that has the compelling sense of 
reality of a true perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant 
sensory organ." Id. at 823. 
116. Negative symptoms involve the absence of normal findings or "the loss of 
normal functioning." Keith, supra note 113, at 851. 
117. Andreasen, supra note 60, at 782. 
118. Id. at 783-84. 
Working memory is a multicomponent cognitive system that serves to 
hold briefly a limited amount of information 'online' and to manipulate that 
information so that it is available for further cognitive processing or to guide 
response selection. . .. [T]his elementary capacity is generally thought to be 
necessary for a wide range of complex cognitive functions such as language 
comprehension, learning, reasoning, and planning. 
Cenk Tek et al., Visual Perceptual and Working Memory Impairments in Schizophrenia, 
59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCIllATRY 146, 146 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
119. Andreasen, supra note 60, at 783-84. 
120. /d. at 785. 
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between mental phenomena. 121 Disorganized thinking and speech is a 
reflection of faulty "[o]n-line monitoring," poorly coordinated and 
mistimed brain activity being a few examples. Similarly, social ineptitude, 
aggression, inactivity, and even catatonia may represent results of what 
happens when neurons improperly match each others' signals, mistime 
messages, or send transmissions to the wrong locations. 122 
This description of Andreasen and colleagues' interpretation of 
schizophrenia is not an endorsement of all aspects of its specific 
content. 123 It is valuable to a legal audience because it typifies 
psychiatrists' and neuroscientists' current theories about the nature of 
schizophrenia. The theory is an exemplar of the explanatory paradigms 
used in most current theories about schizophrenia. These theories all 
share the view that schizophrenia is not fundamentally a syndrome of 
irrational perceptions, beliefs, or actions.124 A person with schizophrenia 
does not act irrationally or behave oddly because he believes things that 
are bizarre, impossible, maladaptive, unusual, socially inappropriate, 
politically unpopular, or in some other way "sick." Schizophrenia is 
manifested in disturbances of what, in ordinary language, we call 
thinking and behavior. Yet, the core pathological processes that are the 
current focus of scientific investigation are not impairments in thinking, 
behavior, or some other aspect of the individual's psychology, but are 
instead malfunctioning brain circuitry.125 
This type of explanation differs from how, using ordinary language 
explanations, we describe the utterances and actions of persons. Our 
121. /d. 
122. [d. 
123. For another, equally elegant conceptualization of neuropathology in 
schizophrenia, see generally Thomas H. McGlashan & Ralph E. Hoffman, Schizophrenia 
as a Disorder of Developmentally Reduced Synaptic Connectivity, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 637 (2000) (describing computer simulations of elimination of connections 
between neurons, and explaining how this process accounts for the unique symptoms, 
course, age of onset, neurodevelopmental deficits, limited neurodegenerative 
progression, and sex differences in schizophrenia). 
124. "Psychotic symptoms are probably the least specific aspects of the 
schizophrenia syndrome, and [yet] traditionally, ... they have been the symptoms that 
we emphasize. I think neuroimaging and genetics will eventually lead us to SUbtype 
patients into categories that are more biologically valid." Donald C. Goff, A 23-Year-
Old Man With Schizophrenia, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3249, 3256 (2002). 
125. The symptoms and signs of schizophrenia are very diverse, and they 
encompass the entire range of human mental activity. . .. These symptoms 
and signs occur in patterns that may not overlap; one patient may have 
hallucinations and affective flattening, whereas another has disorganized 
speech and avolition [lack of motivation]. The diversity and nonoverlapping 
pattern of symptoms and signs suggest a more basic and unifying problem: 
abnormalities in neural circuits and fundamental cognitive mechanisms. 
Nancy C. Andreasen, Understanding the Causes of Schizophrenia, 340 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 645, 646 (1999). 
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ordinary language explanations of behavior are grounded in the 
assumption that persons are practical reasoners whose beliefs and desires 
account for what they dO. 126 By contrast, current theories that attempt to 
account for the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia, as well as for 
many other biologically conceptualized psychiatric disorders, are 
materialist127 and are structurally similar to how we explain the output of 
a malfunctioning computer. We do not explain a computer's misfunction by 
referring, for example, to a scramble of lines or symbols on a monitor, 
although these might provide evidence that so~ething is wrong with the 
computer. Instead, we interpret a scrambled screen as an indication of 
malfunctioning at a more fundamental level, such as a problem with the 
computer's microcircuitry or with how its software was controlling that 
microcircuitry. Similarly, proposed explanations of schizophrenia no 
longer attribute patients' disorganized thinking and delusional statements to 
erroneous beliefs, reactions to others, or emotional conflicts. Instead, 
neuroscientists' explanations are efforts to describe how disruptions in 
the brain's computational processes may produce failures in basic 
cognitive functions that in turn lead to the observed craziness and 
irrationality of persons that suffer from the illness.128 
126. For a superb explanation of the explanatory paradigm that underlies most 
everyday discussions of behavior and the paradigm that the law uses to describe actions, 
see MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP, 67-90 
(1984). The connection between this paradigm, our conception of criminal 
responsibility, and the insanity defense is cogently summarized in Stephen J. Morse, 
Craziness and Criminal Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 147 (1999). 
127. To give even a short description of the philosophical issues raised by this 
explanation approach would be far beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent 
explanation of the kind of philosophical eliminative materialism to which neuroscientists 
may be implicitly committed, see generally PAUL S. CHURCHLAND, A 
NEUROCOMPUTATIONALPERSPECTIVE (1989). A recent, clever, and accessible discussion 
of dualist, materialist, and functionalist explanatory perspectives is found in Kenneth S. 
Kendler, A Psychiatric Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
989 (2001). 
128. "Schizophrenia is a disease of the brain that is expressed clinically as a disease 
of the mind.... The working hypothesis shared by most investigators is that 
schizophrenia is a disease of neural connectivity caused by multiple factors that affect 
brain development." Andreasen, supra note 125, at 646. For a description of the 
neuropathological processes that might generate the disturbance of neural connectivity, 
see Bryan T. Woods, Is Schizophrenia a Progressive Neurodevelopmental Disorder? 
Toward a Unitary Pathogenetic Mechanism, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1661, 1666 (1998) 
(stating that the underlying disease process begins before birth and leads to progressive 
loss of brain volume). For the classic exposition of how gross mental functioning is 
comprised of many smaller functions, see MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 
(1985). 
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B. The Diagnosis of Schizophrenia 
Notwithstanding the last quarter century's neuroscientific advances, 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia remains a "low tech," clinical process. 
That is, the major activities in the diagnostic process involve interviewing the 
patient concerning his problems, symptoms, and history. Interview 
findings are often supplemented with information from medical records 
and from other persons, including family members, that know about the 
patient's situation, recent behavior, and background. I29 The most recent 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual I30 
states that a diagnosis of schizophrenia may be rendered when the 
following clinically ascertained criteria are met: 
(A) For a significant portion of time during a one month 
period, the individual has had two or more of the 
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. These include 
positive symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, 
disorganized speech, and grossly disorganized or 
catatonic behavior. 131 Also factored in are the presence of 
abnormal clinical findings or negative symptoms, such as 
lack of emotional expression,132 speech that is a 
diminished amount or that conveys little information,I33 or 
an inability to initiate and sustain important activities such 
as work or self-care. 134 
(B) The individual has experienced marked deterioration in 
ability to work, interpersonal relations, or ability to take 
care of himself. 
(C) The disturbance has lasted at least six months, during 
which the (A) criteria have lasted at least one month 
(unless successfully treated). 
(D) The (A) criteria symptoms are not accompanied by severe 
mood disturbances. 135 
129. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 929-31, 945-48. 
130. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 312. 
131. Id. at 820-21 (listing "[m]arked motor abnormalities induding. .. immobi/ity[,] 
. .. certain types of excessive motor activity[,] ... apparent motiveless resistance to instructions 
or attempts to be moved," and other movement and speech disturbances). 
132. Psychiatrists term this "blunted affect." !d. at 819. 
133. Psychiatrists term this diminished production of speech "alogia." See id. at 
820. 
134. The psychiatric term for this deficit is "avolition." !d. 
135. Were severe mood symptoms present, the individual's mental disturbance 
might be better diagnosed as an instance of schizoaffective disorder, see id. at 319-23, or 
as an episode of mood disorder with psychotic features, see id. at 411-17. Psychotic 
symptoms may form part of major depressive episodes, manic episodes, and "mixed" 
episodes, in which manic and depressive symptoms appear together. Id. at 411-17. 
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(E) The (A) criteria symptoms are not due to a medication, 
drug of abuse, or a general medical condition. 136 
The next step in diagnostic classification is to categorize an 
individual's syndrome as falling into one of the following subtypes of 
schizophrenia: 
Paranoid Type: The individual is preoccupied with one or more 
delusions or frequent auditory hallucinations but does not display other 
prominent active phase symptoms (catatonia, disorganized behavior or 
speech, flat or inappropriate affect).137 
Disorganized Type: The individual displays disorganized speech, 
disorganized behavior, and flattened or inappropriate affect, but no 
catatonia. 138 
Catatonic Type: The individual is immobile or displays excessive, 
purposeless motor activity. The individual resists all instructions; maintains a 
rigid or bizarre posture; and will not speak, holds himself bizarrely, makes 
repetitive movements, or repeats the words or movements of others. 139 
Undifferentiated Type: The individual's problems do not fit the 
paranoid, disorganized, or catatonic subtypes.140 
Residual Type: Although the individual does not exhibit prominent 
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized behavior, or 
catatonic behavior, either (1) negative symptoms are present, or (2) at 
least two of the symptoms listed above in paragraph (A) appear in 
attenuated form. 141 
Finally, when the illness has been present for at least a year after the 
onset of active phase symptoms, the diagnostician may summarize the 
disorder's "longitudinal course" using a variety of "specifiers." The specifiers 
briefly characterize the illness, stating whether the individual has 
136. For a summary of the decision process for differentiating schizophrenia from 
other disorders that may cause psychotic symptoms, see id. at 750-51. For a decision 
tree that outlines how schizophrenia can be distinguished from the many other 
psychiatric conditions that present with psychotic symptoms, see id. A partial list of 
these conditions includes: psychotic disorders caused by general medical conditions, id. 
at 334-38, psychotic disorders induced by medications or intoxicants, id. at 338-43, 
schizophreniform disorder, id. at 317-19, schizo affective disorder, id. at 319-23, mood 
disorders with psychotic features, id. at 411-17, delusional disorder, id. at 323-29, and 
brief psychotic disorder, id. at 329-32. 
137. [d. at 313-14. 
138. [d. at 314-15. 
139. Id.at315-16. 
140. [d. at 316. 
14l. [d. at 316-17. 
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suffered one or more episodes of the (A) criteria symptoms, and whether 
he recovered partially or fully after or between episodes of (A) criteria 
symptoms. 142 
Having completed a short summary of modem psychiatry's current 
understanding and diagnosis of schizophrenia, this Article now turns to 
psychiatrists' principal means for helping patients cope with the 
disorder-antipsychotic medication. 
III. ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 
A. The Benefits and Impact of Antipsychotic Drugs 
Antipsychotic drugs are the mainstay of modem medical treatment for 
schizophrenial43 and are frequently used to treat persons that suffer from 
several other mental disorders l44 that include psychotic symptoms. 145 
Although the symptoms of psychotic disorders have been recognized 
since antiquity,146 effective and specific pharmacological treatments for 
142. Examples of longitudinal course specifiers are "episodic with interepisode 
residual symptoms," "continuous ... with prominent negative symptoms," and "single 
episode in partial remission." Id. at 312-13. 
143. "Antipsychotic medications are indicated for nearly all acute psychotic 
episodes in patients with schizophrenia. . .. [P]sychiatrists should avoid withholding 
medications for [more than a period of several days] ... as this may delay the patient's 
recovery and place the patient at risk of suicide and other dangerous behaviors .... " 
Marvin I. Herz et aI., Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2 (Supp. Apr. 1997). The coding of the 
guideline indicates that this recommendation is made "with substantial clinical 
confidence." Id. The guideline expresses the same level of confidence concerning 
continuation of antipsychotic medication during the first six months after recovery from 
acute psychosis, and for longer periods to reduce the risk of relapse. Id. at 4. 
144. Other psychotic disorders for which antipsychotic drugs are indicated include 
acute manic episodes, depression with psychotic features, delusional disorders, and some 
instances of delirium. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 14-22. 
145. For several years, courts have recognized the central importance of 
antipsychotic medication in treating schizophrenia. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. 
Supp. 1131, 1137-38 (D.N.J. 1978) ("[N]o other treatment modality has achieved equal 
success in the treatment of schizophrenics. . .. [P]sychotropic drugs are widely accepted 
in present psychiatric practice. . .. They are the treatment of choice for schizophrenics 
today."), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), 
vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). 
146. For example, the Bible describes a successful effort to feign a severe mental 
disorder. After David learned that King Saul wanted him killed, he fled to the court of 
King Achish of Gath. The courtiers recognized him, however. I Samuel 21 : 11-22: 1. 
So he [David] concealed his good sense from them; he feigned madness for 
their benefit. He scratched marks on the doors of the gate and let his saliva run 
down his beard. And Achish said to his courtiers, "You see the man is raving; 
why bring him to me? Do I lack madmen that you have brought this fellow to 
rave for me? Should this fellow enter my house?" 
TANAKH-THE HOLY SCRIPTURES: THE NEW JPS TRANSLATION ACCORDING TO THE 
TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 453-54 (1985) (footnotes omitted). David's ruse worked, 
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these conditions only became available in the 1950s, following the 
discovery that chlorpromazine147 could reduce or eliminate hallucinations 
and delusions in many individuals with schizophrenia.148 The success of 
chlorpromazine led, within a few years, to the development of several 
other phenothiazine derivatives149 including fluphenazine,150 perphenazine,151 
thioridazine,152 and trifluoperazine,153 as well as other compounds that 
had different chemical structures but very similar abilities to quell 
psychotic symptoms.154 
Because appellate court decisions and other legal publications often 
emphasize the adverse effects of older antipsychotic drugs, it is worth 
pausing to consider what life for psychotic patients was like before the 
advent of chlorpromazine and other antipsychotic drugs. "Before the 
introduction of chlorpromazine in 1953, most individuals with 
and he escaped to the cave of Adullam. [d. at 454. The story implies that madness (not 
to mention malingering) was recognized during the time of Saul, or at the latest by the 
time that the books of Samuel were set down. Current biblical scholarship places Saul's 
reign in the latter half of the 11th century B.C.E., 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA 475 (15th ed. 1998), and places the writing of I Samuel in the 6th century 
B.C.E., id. at 381-82. 
147. Chlorpromazine is the nonproprietary name for the antipsychotic compound 
that probably is best known by the trade name Thorazine®, under which it is marketed 
by GlaxoSmithKline. PDR, supra note 49, at 1656. At least three other pharmaceutical 
firms (Elkins-Sinn, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, and Roxane Laboratories) also market 
chlorpromazine in the United States. [d. at 107. 
148. For a fascinating account of the success, impact, and marketing of 
chlorpromazine in the 1950s, see ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH 
ABoUTDElNSITUTIONALIZATION 40-52 (1990). 
149. Phenothiazine antipsychotic drugs all share a basic three-ring structure; their 
primary chemical differences arise from various moiety substitutions at the nitrogen 
atom in the middle ring. HYMAN Ef AL., supra note 9, at 5-7. 
150. Fluphenazine is best known by the trade name Prolixin®, id. at 6, and 
currently is marketed in the U.S. as a generic drug by at least five firms, PDR, supra note 
49, at 112. 
151. Perphenazine is marketed in the U.S. under the brand names Trilafon® and 
Etrafon®, PDR, supra note 49, at 123. 
152. Thioridazine is best known by the trade name Mellaril®, HYMAN Ef AL., supra 
note 9, at 6, and currently is marketed in the U.S. as the generic drug by four firms, PDR, 
supra note 49, at 129. 
153. Trifluoperazine is marketed as Stelazine® by GlaxoSmithKline, and generically by 
two other firms, PDR, supra note 49, at 130. 
154. In the mid-1990s, commonly prescribed nonphenothiazine antipsychotic 
compounds included haloperidol (Haldol®), loxapine (Loxitane®), molindone 
(Moban®), and thiothixene (Navane®). HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6-8. The older 
antipsychotic drugs differ at least fifty-fold in their potency, and therefore the dosages of 
these drugs differ greatly. However, "each of these agents has been found to be equally 
effective in treating psychotic disorders." [d. at 7. 
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schizophrenia were destined to spend their entire adult lives within large, 
often remote psychiatric hospitals.,,155 By 1955, U.S. state mental 
hospitals housed more than one-half million persons,156 many of whom 
suffered from psychotic disorders; patients often spent years and decades 
living in horrifying, wretched conditions. Writes Ann Braden Johnson: 
If you have ever spent time with a floridly psychotic person who is expressing 
himself in behavior that was supposed to have been extinguished in childhood, 
you will never forget how terrifying it is to see someone so utterly out of 
control. But now imagine yourself in a huge, old building that is visibly falling 
apart, in charge of sixty to eighty adults, all acting like one-, two-, and three-
year-olds in mid-tantrum-such were the patients that the state hospitals, alone 
and unaided, kept in their wards for over a hundred years [from the mid-19th to 
the mid-20th centuries]. A doctor from that era described a women's ward at 
New York's Pilgrim State Hospital before the introduction of phenothiazines: 
[They were] so wild I couldn't keep them decent. They'd soil themselves, 
tear their clothes off, smash the windows, and gouge the plaster out of the 
walls. One of them would even rip radiators right off he wall. We'd 
sometimes have to surround them with mattresses in order to give them 
sedative injections, and these would help for a while, but then they'd get 
addicted to the sedative and we'd have to take them off it. 
... [T]he new drugs made the wholesale removal of patients from hospitals 
imaginable and then possible, which in the end became one of the most 
effective selling points of the new medications. 157 
The long-term course for persons with schizophrenia is not necessarily 
one of inevitable deterioration, even when those with the disorder do not 
155. Goff, supra note 124, at 3253-54. 
156. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons With Severe Mental Illness 
in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 486 (1998) (stating that 
559,000 patients were in state psychiatric hospitals in 1955). By contrast, in 1998, there 
were just 63,525 hospital beds in the nation's state and county psychiatric hospitals. Liz 
Lipton, Few Safeguards Govern Elimination of Psychiatric Beds, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, 
Aug. 3, 2001, at 9, http://pn.psychiatryonline.orglcgi/contentlfull/36115/9. Many 
psychiatrists attribute the decline in state hospital beds solely to antipsychotic 
medication. See JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 38-39. But according to Ronald 
Manderscheid, Chief of the Survey and Analysis Branch, Division of State and 
Community Systems Development, for the federal Center for Mental Health Services: 
One key reason for this decline is that, because of the federal Institution 
for Mental Diseases ... exclusion [in Medicaid law], Medicaid does not pay 
for the hospitalization of persons between the ages of 21 and 64 in state and 
county facilities. Thus, these patients were sent to community and general 
hospitals, which could be reimbursed .... 
. . . [Other reasons are] the development of new treatment approaches and 
new psychiatric medications including the introduction of the antipsychotic 
thorazine in 1954, the effort by states to save money by moving patients out of 
state hospitals to other forms of care, and the effort to move people into the 
community .... 
Lipton, supra, at 9 (quoting Dr. Manderscheid) (alteration in original). 
157. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 45-46 (alteration in original) (quoting Morton M. 
Hunt, Pilgrim's Progress, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30,1961, at 71). 
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take antipsychotic drugs or take them erratically.15S Yet, the value and 
importance of antipsychotic medication is unmistakable. By virtue of 
their ability to control psychotic symptoms, chlorpromazine and subsequently 
developed drugs contributed importantly to the deinstitutionalization of 
mental illness, and a ninety percent decrease in the number of patients 
held in state hospitals.159 To anyone familiar with the conditions under 
which hospitalized patients existed before effective antipsychotic 
medication became available, it is hard to disagree with the 1961 report 
of the Joint Commission on Mentallllness and Health: "Unquestionably, 
the drugs have delivered the greatest blow for patient freedom, in terms 
of nonrestraint, since Pinel struck off the chains of the lunatics in the 
Paris asylum 168 years ago.,,160 
158. Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, Sustained Remission in Drug-
Free Schizophrenic Patients, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1306, 1306 (1987); Thomas H. 
McGlashan, A Selective Review of Recent North American Long-Term Followup Studies 
of Schizophrenia, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 515, 515 (1988). However, many 
psychiatrists are convinced that early pharmacological intervention in schizophrenia can 
improve the long-term course of the disorder, and some psychiatrists even propose 
treating persons who merely have prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia. For a 
discussion of this idea, see Thomas H. McGlashan, Psychosis Treatment Prior to 
Psychosis Onset: Ethical Issues, 51 SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. 47, 47 (2001) ("Compelling but 
tentative evidence suggests that early treatment may improve course and prognosis, and 
this has initiated a paradigm shift in thinking about the risks and benefits of early 
intervention."). Also, some psychiatrists have used novel agents to reverse cognitive 
deficits in nonpsychotic relatives of persons with schizophrenia. See Ming T. Tsuang et 
aI., Treatment of Nonpsychotic Relatives of Patients with Schizophrenia: Four Case 
Studies, 45 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1412, 1412 (1999) (finding that risperidone 
produced "reductions in negative symptoms, and ... substantial improvements on some 
tests of attention and working memory"); see also infra notes 206-07 and accompanying 
text. 
159. See Timothy A. Kelly, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1522: A 
Policymaker's Guide to Mental Illness, Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage. 
orglResearchlHealthCarelBG1522.cfm (Mar. 7, 2002): 
In the early 20th century, asylums became "mental hospitals," and the numbers 
of Americans committed within their walls grew substantially, reaching a high 
of nearly 560,000 in 1955 .... 
In the rnid-1950s, the discovery of antipsychotic medications such as 
chlorpromazine sparked a revolution in mental hospitals. These new 
medications controlled psychotic symptoms, and for the first time, people with 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders could be discharged and returned 
to their home communities. The census of mental hospitals began a dramatic 
drop in their rolls, which now stand at just over 55,000. 
160. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 46 (quoting JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS 
AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 39 (1961)). 
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B. How Antipsychotic Drugs Work: A Puzzle 
Although medical scientists had no trouble recognizing and demonstrating 
that these first antipsychotic drugs were useful, it took several years 
before they could be sure what these compounds did. In 1963, Carlsson 
and Lindqvistl61 offered what came to be termed the "dopamine 
hypothesis" of schizophrenia, which in its most simplistic form 
suggested that schizophrenia resulted from an excess of dopamine. 162 
The dopamine hypothesis drew support from observations that hallucinations 
and delusions could be induced by high doses of amphetamines and 
other drugs that increase brain levels of dopamine163 and from the 
finding that the potency of all then available antipsychotic drugs was 
directly proportional to their ability to block the dopamine-D2 receptor. 164 
By the 1980s, many lines of evidence had made it clear that the 
simplistic excess dopamine hypothesis was inadequate to explain the 
causes and phenomena of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. 
For example, compounds such as phencyclidine (PCP) and the anesthetic 
ketamine can cause florid psychoses even though they have little direct 
effect on brain dopamine activity.165 Also, it was recognized that in 
161. See Arvid Carlsson & Margit Lindqvist, Effect of Chlorpromazine and 
Haloperidol on Formation of 3-Methoxytyramine and Normetanephrine in Mouse Brain, 
20 ACTA PHARMACOLOGICA ET TOXICOLOGICA 140 (1963) (finding that after 
administration of antipsychotic drugs, extracellular dopamine was not increased, but its 
metabolites were, which suggested that the drugs blocked dopamine receptors and 
activated feedback pathways). 
162. GOODMAN AND GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 
389 (7th ed. 1985). 
163. Id. at 168, 553-54; see Yoshimoto Sekine et aI., Methamphetamine-Related 
Psychiatric Symptoms and Reduced Brain Dopamine Transporters Studied With PET, 
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1206 (2001) (discussing the long-term impact of 
methamphetamine on dopamine transporter density, and its relationship to psychotic 
symptoms). 
164. See supra Part 1I.A.3.f. For a recent description of still valid aspects of the 
dopamine hypothesis and confirmatory findings from brain imaging studies, see Anissa 
Abi-Dargham et aI., Increased Baseline Occupancy of Dz Receptors by Dopamine in 
Schizophrenia, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8104, 8104, 8109 (2000) (also showing 
"direct in vivo evidence that schizophrenia is associated with excessive stimulation of Dz 
receptors by dopamine [as opposed to excess dopamine simpliciter], and that this 
dysregulation is predictive of good treatment response to antipsychotic drugs"). 
165. In 1979 the ability of ketamine and phencyclidine to mimic psychoses was 
found to be related to interaction by the drugs with a unique receptor; once bound to this 
receptor, phencyclidine is not displaced by dopamine or other chemically similar 
neurotransmitters. J.P. Vincent et aI., Interaction of Phencyclidine ("Angel Dust") with 
a Specific Receptor in Rat Brain Membranes, 76 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4678, 
4678 (1979); S.R. Zukin & R.S. Zukin, Specific {3H1Phencyclidine Binding in Rat 
Central Nervous System, 76 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5372, 5372 (1979). For this 
reason, the psychotic symptoms induced by phencyclidine are not reversed by 
antipsychotic drugs. For a recent explanation of the effects of ketamine and 
phencyclidine, see generally Ilana Zylberman et aI., Phencyclidine Use Disorders, ill I 
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many cases, the hallmark symJ?toms of schizophrenia that are mimicked by 
overdoses of dopaminergic166 drugs, including hallucinations and 
delusional thinking, often could be alleviated without having much 
impact on a patient's functioning. Increasingly, psychiatrists recognized 
that the positive symptoms could be less devastating to a person's 
functioning and long-term outcome than the negative symptoms that 
afflict many persons with schizophrenia. 167 Some evidence suggested 
that negative symptoms such as deficits in a patient's interest in 
surroundings, volume of communication, and social relationships, might, 
in fact, be related to a dearth of dopaminergic activity in certain areas of 
the brain. 168 
PSYCHIATRY 827 (Allan Tasman et al. ed., 1997). 
166. That is, "activated or transmitted by dopamine ... pertaining to tissues or 
organs affected by dopamine." DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 540. 
167. See Nancy C. Andreasen et al., Positive and Negative Symptoms in 
Schizophrenia: A Critical Reappraisal, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 615, 615 (1990) 
(affirming the validity of the negative subtype of schizophrenia, which "may be 
characterized by a variety of hypothesized correlates of structural brain abnormality, 
including ... poor response to treatment"); Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, 
Antecedents, Symptom Progression, and Long-Term Outcome of the Deficit Syndrome in 
Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 351 (1994) ("[D]eficit syndrome was 
associated with a very high risk of poor outcome and long-term disability."); Wayne S. 
Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, Natural History of Schizophrenia Subtype: II. Positive 
and Negative Symptoms and Long-Term Course, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 978, 
978 (1991) (having "many negative symptoms was associated with poor premorbid 
functioning, insidious onset, partial or no remissions during the first several years of 
illness, and in most cases a progressive course leading to permanent disability"). 
''Positive schizophrenia is characterized by prominent delusions, hallucinations, positive 
formal thought disorder, and persistently bizarre behavior; negative schizophrenia, by 
affective flattening, alogia, avolition, anhedonia, and attentional impairment." Nancy C. 
Andreasen & Scott Olsen, Negative v. Positive Schizophrenia, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 789, 789 (1982). 
168. See David Pickar et al., Neurochemical and Neural Mechanisms of Positive 
and Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, in 24 MODERN PROBLEMS OF 
PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY 124-51 (Nancy C. Andreasen ed., 1990) (linking deficit 
symptoms to functional frontal dopamine dysfunction); Terry E. Goldberg et al., 
Cognitive and Behavioral Effects of the Coadministration of Dextroamphetamine and 
Haloperidol in Schizophrenia, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 78, 78 (1991) (finding that the 
addition of amphetamine, a dopaminergic drug, to schizophrenic patients' medication 
regimen improved some aspects of cognition, motivation, and affect); Jonathan D. Cohen 
& David Servan-Schreiber, A Theory of Dopamine Function and Its Role in Cognitive 
Deficits in Schizophrenia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 85, 85 (1993) (noting that a 
computer model suggested that dopamine deficiency is responsible for cognitive deficits 
observed in persons with schizophrenia); Kenneth L. Davis et al., Dopamine in 
Schizophrenia: A Review and Reconceptualization, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1474, 1474 
(1991) (suggesting "that schizophrenia is characterized by abnormally low prefrontal 
dopamine activity (causing deficit symptoms) leading to excessive dopamine activity in 
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C. Problems Associated with Older Drugs 
Although the D2 blockers that were available before 1990 were clearly 
beneficial, they had serious limitations and drawbacks. They reduced 
many patients' psychotic symptoms but they did not help all patients that 
suffered from schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders. Studies 
reviewing the effectiveness of older antipsychotic drugs in schizophrenia 
typically reported that fifty to seventy-five percent of patients have "a 
moderate to excellent response and up to ninety percent of patients 
show[] some response,"169 which implies that ten to fifty percent of 
patients show no response or only a partial one. Many patients who do 
respond to older antipsychotic agents experience noticeable, but only 
partial, reduction in their positive symptoms l70 and little improvement in 
their cognitive impairments and negative symptoms. 171 
Pre-1990s antipsychotic drugs also consistently cause a constellation 
of side effects known as "extrapyramidal symptoms,,,172 including 
stiffness, diminished facial expression, tremors, and restlessness. 173 
Indeed, the pronounced effects of these drugs on many aspects of the 
nervous system led to their being termed "neuroleptics," a combination 
of the Greek words ve6pou (nerve) and "l1'1't<; (to take hold). 174 Patients 
often will quit taking their medication because these side effects are 
esthetically unappealing and intensely unpleasant to experience.175 As 
Dr. Samuel Keith noted, "[ e ]stimates of 40 percent rates of noncompliance 
mesolimbic dopamine neurons (causing positive symptoms)"). 
169. Daniel P. Van Kammen & Stephen R. Marder, Dopamine Receptor 
Antagonists, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRyNI, at 1987 (Harold I. 
Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 6th ed. 1995). 
170. HYMAt'l ET AL., supra note 9, at 16. 
171. Lisa B. Dixon et aI., Conventional Antipsychotic Medications for 
Schizophrenia, 21 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 567,572 (1995); Herbert Y. Meltzer & Susan 
R. McGurk, The Effects of Clozapine, Risperidolle, alld Olanzapine on Cognitive 
Function ill Schizophrenia, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 233, 235 (1999) (seeing "some 
evidence" that neuroleptics "cause selective impairment of some cognitive functions"). 
172. The term "extrapyramidal" refers to those neurons involved in controlling 
movements that lie outside the "pyramidal tracts." DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 638. 
The pyramidal tract "provides for direct cortical control and initiation of skilled 
movements, especially those related to speech and involving the hand and fingers." [d. 
at 1861. "Extrapyramidal system" is "an imprecise term referring to a functional rather 
than an anatomical part of the central nervous system[;]... it includes... [brain 
structures that] control and coordinate especially the postural, static, supporting, and 
locomotor mechanisms." Id. at 1776. 
173. Keith, supra note 113, at 851. 
174. DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 1210. The French psychiatrists Delay and 
Deniker coined the term "neuroleptic" in 1955. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 40. 
175. The classic study on this topic is Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic 
Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 70 (1974) 
(stating that antipsychotic noncompliance is strongly associated with extrapyramidal 
involvement, especially akathisia, the subjective experience of restlessness). 
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among patients treated with [older] antipsychotic agents were not 
unusual; when noncompliance was combined with the therapeutic 
limitations of the drugs, rates of relapse were quite high.,,176 In addition, 
many patients who take neuroleptics develop permanent and sometimes 
disabling neuromotor syndromes such as tardive dyskinesia (TD) , 177 and 
a small fraction of patients develop a severe and sometimes fatal 
reaction to these drugs called "neuroleptic malignant syndrome.,,178 
D. "Novel" Agents: A New View of Treatment 
1. Clozapine 
Although U.S. psychiatrists did not begin prescribing atypical antipsychotic 
agents extensively until the mid-1990s, the FDA's approval of c10zapine 
in late 1989179 paved the way for this change in psychiatrists' practices. 
176. Keith, supra note 113, at 851; see also Van Putten, supra note 175, at 67 
(commenting that forty-six percent of patients took less medication than was prescribed, 
probably to avoid distress related to extrapyramidal side effects); Joyce A. Cramer & 
Robert Rosenheck, Compliance with Medication Regimens for Mental and Physical 
Disorders, 49 PSYCHIA1RIC SERVICES 196, 196 (1998) (analysis of twenty-four reports on 
antipsychotic drug compliance yielded an average rate of fifty-eight percent, with a 
range of twenty-four to ninety percent). 
177. See supra note 9 (describing TD). TD rarely occurs in young individuals who 
have been exposed to neuroleptics for fewer than three months. HYMAN ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 35. Approximately one-fifth of patients undergoing long-term treatment 
develop TD; current estimates place the risk of developing TD at approximately five 
percent per year of neuroleptic exposure. Dilip V. Jeste and Michael J. Caligiuri, 
Tardive Dyskinesia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 303 (1993) (''The overall mean prevalence 
of TD among chronically neuroleptic-treated patients is approximately 24 percent. The 
annual incidence in younger adults is 4 to 5 percent."). The risk for elderly patients in 
much higher in their initial year of treatment. See, e.g., Robert A. Sweet et al., Duration 
of Neuroleptic Treatment and Prevalence of Tardive Dyskinesia in Late Life, 52 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 478, 478 (1995) (noting a twenty-nine percent risk with 
three to twelve months of drug exposure). 
178. This syndrome occurs in one-tenth to one percent of persons receiving 
neuroleptics, and "is characterized by the development of fever, rigidity, autonomic 
instability, altered consciousness, ... [elevated cardiac enzymes,] and raised WBC 
[white blood cell] count." Herbert Y. Meltzer & S. Hossein Fatemi, Treatment of 
Schizophrenia, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PREss TExTBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
760-61 (Alan F. Schatzberg & Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 2d ed. 1998); see also HYMAN 
ET AL., supra note 9, at 34. 
179. FDA Approves Clozapine for Treatment of Schizophrenia; Careful Monitoring 
Required, 40 Hosp. COMTY. PSYCillATRY 1310, 1310 (1989) (requiring FDA approval); 
Stuart L. Nightingale, Approval of Clozapine for Refractory Schizophrenia, 263 J. AM. 
MED. ASS'N 202, 202 (1990) (requiring FDA approval); F.D.A. Approves a Backup 
Therapy for Severe Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at A24 (reporting FDA 
approval). 
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Clozapine was the first truly novel antipsychotic medication to become 
available in thirty-five years, and was dubbed "atypical" because it could 
alleviate psychotic symptoms without inducing the extrapyramidal side 
effects that were the typical, expected accompaniments to therapy with 
conventional D2 blockers. ISO Moreover, clozapine works better than 
conventional neuroleptics. Thirty to sixty percent of schizophrenic 
patients who do not respond to the older drugs improve when they take 
clozapine, lSI and clozapine may also be better at reducing negative 
symptoms than the conventional antipsychotic drugS. IS2 Clozapine 
achieves these superior therapeutic results with a much lower likelihood 
of extrapyramidal symptoms and the damaging neuromotor syndromes 
that are associated with neuroleptic drugS. IS3 
Patients who take clozapine for extended periods incur a small risk of 
developing agranulocytosis,ls4 a potentially fatal side effect in which the 
180. Michael J. Owens & S. Craig Risch, Atypical Antipsychotics, in THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, supra note 178, at 
323, 333. In 1993, psychiatrist Jeffrey Lieberman proposed what many clinicians now 
regard as the defining characteristics of an atypical antipsychotic drug. These include 
"pre-clinical" (that is, laboratory findings often worked out in animals) evidence of 
efficacy and nontoxicity, and the following three "clinical" criteria: (1) effectiveness in 
reducing psychotic symptoms, (2) little or no induction of extrapyramidal symptoms and 
tardive dyskinesia, and (3) no elevation of prolactin (a hormone involved in breast milk 
production, secretion of which is increased in men and women who take typical 
antipsychotics). Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Understanding the Mechanism of Action of 
Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs: A Review of Compounds in Use and Development, 163 
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 7, 7-18 (Supp. 22, 1993). 
181. For the landmark study reporting clozapine's efficacy in patients who had 
failed to benefit from neuroleptics, see John Kane et aI., Clozapine for the Treatment-
Resistant Schizophrenic: A Double-Blind Comparison with Chlorpromazine, 45 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 789, 789-96 (1988) (demonstrating improvement in thirty 
percent of previously refractory patients over a six-week period, compared with just four 
percent of patients who received chlorpromazine). Subsequent studies looking at treatment 
refractory patients treated with clozapine for longer periods have yielded higher 
estimated rates of improvement. See, e.g., John M. Kane et aI., Clozapine and 
Haloperidol in Moderately Refractory Schizophrenia: A 6-Month Randomized and 
Double-Blind Comparison, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 965, 965 (2001) (showing a 
fifty-seven percent response rate); Jeffrey A. Lieberman et aI., Clinical Effects of 
Clozapine in Chronic Schizophrenia: Response to Treatment and Predictors of Outcome, 
151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1744, 1744 (1994) (showing a fifty percent response rate in 
treatment-refractory patients). 
182. David Pickar et aI., Clinical and Biologic Response to Clozapine in Patients 
with Schizophrenia: Crossover Comparison with Fluphenazine, 49 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 345, 348 (1992). 
183. Daniel E. Casey, Effects of Clozapine Therapy in Schizophrenic Individuals at 
Risk for Tardive Dyskinesia, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 31-37 (Supp. 3, 1998); 
Herz, supra note 143, at 17, 19. 
184. "Clozapine was first tested in the 1960s but was withdrawn from general use" 
because of this problem. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 29. Initial estimates placed the 
risk of agranulocytosis at one percent. Id. A more recent estimate sets the risk at only 
thirty-eight hundredths of a percent. Gilbert Honigfeld, Effects of the C/ozapine 
National Registry System on Incidence of Deaths Related to Agranulocytosis, 47 
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bone marrow stops making the white blood cells responsible for fighting 
bacterial infections.IS5 Due to this risk, patients who take clozapine must 
be monitored with frequent blood tests. When clozapine was initially 
released, it was "bundled,,186 by its manufacturer, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, 
with a mandatory "Clozaril Patient Management System" (CPMS) that 
required weekly blood tests to be performed by Caremark, a home health 
care division of Baxter International InC. IS7 The cost of the monitoring 
was built into the cost of drug and was estimated to run around $9,000 a 
year. ISS Even after clozapine therapy was "unbundled"IS9 to allow 
testing by a broader variety of agencies, psychiatrists recommended that 
the blood tests should be performed weekly for as long as a patient took 
clozapine and more frequently if tests suggested an abnormality might 
be developing. By the mid-1990s, it was recognized that if a patient 
taking clozapine was going to develop agranulocytosis at all, this 
complication usually would occur during the first six months of 
exposure to the drug. Currently, therefore, blood tests are performed 
each week for the first six months of therapy and every two weeks 
thereafter. Clozapine remains available only through monitoring 
protocols under which pharmacists do not dispense the medication until 
they have determined that a patient's blood has been tested and that the 
laboratory values are satisfactory.190 
Factors such as inconvenience to patients, medical risks,191 the costs of 
PSYClllAlRIC SERVICES 52, 56 (1996). 
185. DORLAND'S, supra note 3, at 40,984; Philip A. Pizzo, The Compromized Host, 
in 2 CECIL TExTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1571 (Lee Goldman & J. Claude Bennet eds., 21st 
ed.2000). 
186. The initial bundling of clozapine raised antitrust issues. See Sanzo, supra note 33, 
at 1224-25; Swidler, supra note 33, at 666-72; and Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1215-20. 
187. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 29; Carl Salzman, Mandatory Monitoring for 
Side Effects: The "Bundling" of Clozapine, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827, 827 (1990); 
Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1190. 
188. Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1190; Daniel Goleman, Outcry Grows Over Method 
of Selling New Drug, N.Y. 'TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1990, at B9 (annual cost of bundled 
treatment was $8944). 
189. Because Sandoz's bundling made the drug very expensive in the United States, 
the program was assailed by physicians, patient advocacy groups, and Congress. Milt 
Freudenheim, Maker of Schizophrenia Drug Bows to Pressure to Cut Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 1990, at AI. 
190. PDR, supra note 49, at 2320. 
191. Several other serious medical problems may be associated with clozapine 
therapy. The potential to develop seizures was well recognized when the drug was 
released in the U.S., as were other less serious but potentially troublesome problems (for 
example, sedation and drooling). The Medical Letter, Inc., Clozapine for Schizophrenia, 
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blood testing, the high price of the drug itself,192 FDA restrictions on 
approved indications for clozapine's use,193 and the initial reluctance of 
third party payers to support such expensive therapyl94 led psychiatrists 
32 MED. LEITER DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 3, 3-4 (1990). Potential for weight gain and 
associated medical problems (for example, diabetes mellitus, and hyperlipidemia) were 
better appreciated after several years of the drugs' use. Michael Davidson, Risk of 
Cardiovascular Disease and Sudden Death in Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 5, 6-8 (Supp. 9, 2002) (summarizing the results of studies); Bruce D. 
Gaulin et aI., Clozapine-Associated Elevation in Serum Triglycerides, 156 AM. 1-
PSYCHIATRY 1270 (1999) (reporting that men treated with clozapine have higher foIIow-
up serum triglyceride concentrations in blood); David C. Henderson et al., Clozapine, 
Diabetes Mellitus, Weight Gain, and Lipid Abnonnalities: A Five-year Naturalistic 
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 975, 979 (2000) (reporting high rates of weight gain, 
diabetes, and hyperlipidemia in patients who took clozapine for extended periods); Brian 
C. Lund et aI., Clozapine Use in Patients with Schizophrenia and the Risk of Diabetes, 
Hyperlipidemia, and Hypertension: A Claims-Based Approach, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1172, 1174 (2001) (reporting that clozapine appears not to directly cause 
diabetes or hyperlipidemia, but may make people more susceptible to these disorders by 
inducing weight gain); Prakash Masand & Sanjay Gupta, Long-Tenn Adverse EfJects of 
Novel Antipsychotics, 6 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 299,301-04 (2000). 
192. In 1997, Keith estimated the cost of clozapine to be "about $6,000 a year at 
[his] institution-and the additional cost of the weekly blood monitoring [was] about 
$1,000 a year." Keith, supra note 113, at 852. In a study conducted at VA facilities, per 
capita pharmacy costs in clozapine-treated patients were $3199 a year. Robert 
Rosenheck et aI., A Comparison of Clozapine and Haloperidol in Hospitalized Patients 
with Refractory Schizophrenia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 809, 812 (1997). 
193. Clozapine had been available in some European countries for many years, 
during which its potentially fatal association with agranulocytosis had become apparent. 
Thus, the FDA's requirements for approving clozapine were quite stringent. The FDA 
"required a demonstration of efficacy in patients whose disease was refractory to 
treatment with standard antipsychotic drugs. No other antipsychotic drug had ever been 
required to meet such a standard." Keith, supra note 113, at 852. 
The Physicians' Desk Reference still contains a warning, in boldfaced capital letters, to 
reserve clozapine therapy for "severely iII schizophrenic patients who fail to show an 
acceptable response to adequate courses of standard antipsychotic drug treatment." 
PDR, supra note 49, at 2319. "However, ongoing clinical research investigations 
suggest the clinical utility of clozapine, alone or in combination with other 
psychotropics, in patients with schizo affective disorder and refractory bipolar disorder 
(manic or depressed), as weIi as during the early stages ... of schizophrenia." Owens & 
Risch, supra note 180, at 333; see also Susan L. McElroy et aI., Clozapine in the 
Treatment of Psychotic Mood Disorders, SchizoafJective Disorder and Schizophrenia, 52 
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 411, 411 (1991). Successful, safe use of clozapine has also 
been reported in self-mutilating, but not psychotic, patients with borderline personality 
disorder. See Frances R. Frankenburg & Mary C. Zanarini, C/ozapine Treatment of 
Borderline Patients: A Preliminary Study, 34 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 402 (1993); 
K. N. Roy Chengappa et aI., Clozapine Reduces Severe Self-Mutilation and Aggression 
in Psychotic Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
477,483 (1999). 
194. The expense of this new treatment caused some state Medicaid programs to be 
reluctant to financiaIiy support clozapine therapy. In two of the first published cases 
involving clozapine, courts ruled that Medicaid programs were obligated to make 
clozapine available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug was medicaIiy 
necessary. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); Alexander L. v. 
Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1991). 
1072 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1073 2002
[VOL. 39: 1033,2002] Unbuckling the Straitjacket 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
to prescribe clozapine only to patients who clearly could not benefit 
from, or who could not tolerate, other available antipsychotic drugs. In 
the early 1990s, these drugs included only conventional neuroleptics, so 
psychiatrists continued to view the older D2 blockers as the "first-line" 
therapy for their psychotic patients. Nonetheless, clozapine signified 
both to psychiatrists and to patients that the potential benefits from 
antipsychotic drugs might be far greater than had been the case during 
the preceding decades. 
2. Novel Agents for "First-Line" Use 
The January 1994195 entrance of risperidone196 into the U.S. 
pharmacopeia dramatically altered treatment prospects for patients with 
psychotic disorders and initiated a change in the drugs that U.S. 
psychiatrists selected to treat psychoses. After the release of risperidone, 
U.S. psychiatrists could offer a novel antipsychotic agent as initial 
therapy for schizophrenia. Risperidone, and the more recently released 
0lanzapine,197 quetiapine,198 and ziprasidone199 are not associated with a 
substantial risk of agranUlocytosis, and the recipients of these drugs do 
not require any special medical monitoring.2oo Olanzapine, quetiapine, 
risperidone, and ziprasidone all appear to have several advantages over 
older neuroleptics: (1) The novel agents all treat positive symptoms at 
least as effectively as conventional neuroleptics, but they accomplish 
this with a much lower frequency and intensity of the noxious 
neuromotor side effects caused by the older D2 blockers.201 It appears 
195. Reuters, Johnson & Johnson Drug for Schizophrenia Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 1994, at D5. 
196. Risperidone is the nonproprietary name for the product marketed as 
Risperdal® by Janssen Pharmaceutica. PDR, supra note 49, at 1796. 
197. Olanzapine is marketed as Zyprexa® by Eli Lilly & Company. PDR, supra 
note 49, at 1973. It was approved for general use in October 1996. Associated Press, A 
New Drug for Schizophrenia Wins Approval from the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, 
atA21. 
198. Quetiapine received FDA approval in 1997. Zeneca Given FDA Go-Aheadfor 
Seroquel, INDEP. (London), Aug. 2, 1997, at 19. The drug is marketed as Seroquel® by 
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP. PDR, supra note 49, at 684-85. 
199. Ziprasidone, marketed by Pfizer Inc. as Geodon®, is the most recent novel 
agent to receive FDA approval; it was introduced in the U.S. in early 2001. PDR, supra 
note 49, at 2688, 2692; Scott Hensley, Schizophrenia Drug from Pfizer WillS FDA's 
Approval, WALL STREET J., Feb. 6, 2001, atB21. 
200. Herz, supra note 143, at 20-23. 
201. See Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 223 (graphically summarizing the 
advantages, in terms of neuromotor side effects). The details of studies are reported in 
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that the aripiprazole, a not-yet-approved novel agent, derives its 
atypicality from being a mixed agonist-antagonist of the dopamine-D2 
receptor?02 (2) Not only is the level of extrapyramidal side effects much 
lower with newer agents, but the risk of developing tardive dyskinesia is 
numerous articles. See Richard L. Borison et aI., ICI 204,636, an Atypical 
Antipsychotic: Efficacy and Safety in a Multicenter, Placebo-Controlled Trial in Patients 
with Schizophrenia, 16 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 158, 169 (1996) (reporting 
that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence of 
extrapyramidal side effects); Guy Chouinard et aI., A Canadian Multicenter Placebo-
Controlled Study of Fixed Doses of Risperidone and Haloperidol in the Treatment of 
Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 13 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 25, 25 (1993) 
(reporting that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence 
of extrapyramidal side effects); Donald C. Goff et aI., An Exploratory Haloperidol-
Controlled Dose-Finding Study of Ziprasidone in Hospitalized Patients with 
Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder, 18 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 296, 
296 (1998) (reporting that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower 
incidence of extrapyramidal side effects); Gary D. Tollefson et aI., Olanzapine Versus 
Haloperidol in the Treatment of Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective and 
SchizophreniJorm Disorders: Results of an International Collaborative Trial, 154 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 457, 457 (1997) (reporting that olanzapine is at least as effective as 
haloperidol with far lower incidence of extrapyramidal side effects). 
These studies all compared the newer drugs to haloperidol well above patients' 
neuroleptic threshold, that is, the minimum dose needed to produce modest 
extrapyramidal side effects. For an important study of the neuroleptic threshold and its 
dosing implications, see Joseph P. McEvoy et aI., Optimal Dose of Neuroleptic in Acute 
Schizophrenia: A Controlled Study of the Neuroleptic Threshold and Higher Haloperidol 
Dose, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 739, 739-45 (1991). Some writers believe the 
side effect evidence might have been less favorable toward the novel drugs had the 
studies used lower haloperidol doses. Shitij Kapur et aI., supra note 99, at 291-92. See 
also discussion infra Part N.B.l (discussing the impact of neuroleptic dosing on 
apparent advantages of the newer drugs). 
Despite this, most psychiatrists agree that the new drugs are an enormous boon to 
patients, their families, and clinicians. Meltzer & Fatemi, supra note 178, at 769. For a 
meta-analytic summary of the properties and advantages of the new drugs, see S. Leucht 
et aI., Efficacy alld Extrapyramidal Side-Effects of the New Alltipsychotics Olallzapine, 
Quetiapine, Risperidolle, alld Sertindole Compared to Conventional Antipsychotics and 
Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. 51, 
51 (1999) ("All new antipsychotic are associated with less frequent use of antiparkinson 
[side-effect moderating] medication than haloperidol, with risperidone appearing to have 
a slightly less favourable EPS-profile than the other new antipsychotics."). 
Why novel anti psychotics are novel, that is, why they do not cause extrapyramidal side 
effects at nearly the frequency of the older drugs, is not clear. One explanation of 
atypical agents' properties may inhere in the "fast dissociation [of atypical agents] from 
the D2 receptor [that] makes an antipsychotic more accommodating of physiological 
dopamine transmission, permitting an antipsychotic effect without motor side effects, 
prolactin elevation, or secondary negative symptoms." Shitij Kapur & Philip Seeman, 
Does Fast Dissociationfrom the Dopamine D2 Receptor Explain the Action of Atypical 
Antipsychotics?: A New Hypothesis, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 360, 360 (2001); see also 
Seeman, supra note 95, at 27 (further describing the "fast-off-D2" theory, in which rapid 
dissociation from D2 receptors explains why novel antipsychotics cause fewer side 
effects). 
202. See Stephen M. Stahl, Dopamine System Stabilizers, Aripiprazole, and the 
Next Generation of Antipsychotics, Part I: "Goldilocks" Actions at Dopamine 
Receptors, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 841, 841-42 (2001). 
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lower as welI?o3 (3) Available evidence suggests that patients who need 
antipsychotic medication prefer the novel agents204 and may be better off 
taking them than the older D2-blockers.205 (4) One reason for this 
preference may be that atypical agents leave patients less burdened with 
negative symptoms than they would be were they to take neuroleptics, 
possibly because the newer drugs induce less motor slowing?06 (5) A 
growing number of studies suggest that the atypical antipsychotics are 
better than the older drugs at ameliorating cognitive deficits that 
characterize schizophrenia.207 (6) Some psychiatrists believe that the 
203. Stanley N. Caroff et al., Movement Disorders Associated with Atypical 
Antipsychotic Drugs, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 13-16 (Supp. 4, 2002) (summarizing 
findings from studies); Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 224; Masand & Gupta, supra 
note 191, at 304-05. Because novel antipsychotics have lower rates of acute neuromotor 
side effects, "it has been suggested that atypical antipsychotics are less likely to cause 
NMS [neuroleptic malignant syndrome] than conventional antipsychotics. This remains 
unproven, and cases of NMS associated with cIozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, and 
quetiapine have been reported." Carie D. Hatch et al., Failed Challenge with Quetiapine 
After Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome with Conventional Antipsychotics, 21 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1003, 1003 (2001). 
204. Shitij Kapur & Gary Remington, Atypical Antipsychotics: Patients Value the 
Lower Incidence of Extrapyramidal Side Effects, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1360 (2000); Piper 
S. Meyer et al., Comparison Between the Effects of Atypical and Traditional 
Antipsychotics on Work Status for Clients in a Psychiatric Rehabilitation Program, 63 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 108,114 (2002). 
205. A. George Awad & Lakshmi N.P. Voruganti, Quality of Life and New 
Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia: Are Patients Better Off?, 45lNT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 
268, 268 (1999). 
206. Steven R. Hirsch et al., A 28-Week Comparison of Ziprasidone and 
Haloperidol in Outpatients with Stable Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 516, 
519 (2002) (reporting that in previously stable patients, ziprasidone reduced negative 
symptoms more than did haloperidol); Beng-Choon Ho et al., A Comparative 
Effectiveness Study of Risperidone and Olanzapine in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 60 
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 658, 658 (1999) (reporting that olanzapine and risperidone 
reduced negative symptoms); Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 221. Some authors 
have questioned whether atypicals actually ameliorate the "deficit" negative symptoms 
intrinsic to schizophrenia, or merely the "secondary" negative symptoms caused by 
neuroleptic side effects, lack of social stimulation, or intrusion of positive symptoms. 
William T. Carpenter et al., Patient Response and Resource Management: Another View 
of Clozapine Treatment of Schizophrenia, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827, 827 (1995) 
(''Treatment of primary negative symptoms is not supported by the current experimental 
data."). 
207. Robert M. Bilder et al., Neurocognitive Effects of Clozapine, Olanzapine, 
Risperidone, and Haloperidol in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective 
Disorder, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1018, 1018, 1024 (2002) (finding that clozapine, 
risperidone, and olanzapine improved cognitive functioning in patients previously 
resistant to treatment with neuroleptics and that the atypicals differed in the types of 
improvements manifested); Robert W. Buchanan et al., The Comparative Efficacy and 
Long-Term Effect of Clozapine Treatment on Neuropsychological Test Performance, 36 
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newer drugs do more than the older drugs towards improving patients' 
long-term social functioning, and that this, rather than short-term 
reduction in positive symptoms, ought to become the basis upon which 
the benefits of antipsychotic therapy are judged?08 
Because the novel antipsychotics appear to represent pharmacologically 
advantageous ways to treat psychoses, many psychiatrists believe that 
these drugs have created a new standard of care for antipsychotic 
therapy. In the mid-1990s, psychiatrists began suggesting that the 
atypical drugs should be psychiatrists' first choice when selecting an 
antipsychotic therapy,209 and within a few years, this view became 
dominant.210 That this view represents a rapid and dramatic change in 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (1994) (reporting that one year's treatment with 
clozapine yielded improvements on several measures of cognitive performance); 
Michael F. Green & David L. Braff, Translating the Basic and Clinical Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Schizophrenia to Dmg Development and Clinical Trials of Antipsychotic 
Medications, 49 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 374, 374 (2001) ("Neurocognitive deficits 
appear to be improved with newer (atypical) antipsychotic medications across a broad 
range of domains in schizophrenia patients."); Michael Foster Green et aI., Does 
Risperidone Improve Verbal Working Memory in Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenia?, 
154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 799, 799 (1997) (reporting improved verbal working memory); 
Corinne Hagger et aI., Improvement in Cognitive Functions and Psychiatric Symptoms in 
Treatment-RefractOlY Schizophrenic Patients Receiving Clozapine, 34 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 702, 702 (1993) (reporting improvement in retrieval from reference 
memory); Meltzer & McGurk, supra note 171, at 233 (reporting that risperidone 
produces "relatively consistent positive effects on working memory, executive 
functioning, and attention"); Scot E. Purdon et aI., Neuropsychological Change in Early 
Phase Schizophrenia During 12 Months of Treatment with Olanzapine, Risperidone, or 
Haloperidol, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 254 (2000) (reporting that olanzapine 
treatment is associated with improved immediate recall and nonverbal fluency); Dawn I. 
Velligan et aI., Does Cognitive Function Improve with Quetiapine in Comparison to 
Haloperidol?, 53 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 239, 239, (2002) (stating that patients taking 
quetiapine improved more than patients taking haloperidol on overall measures of 
cognitive function, including verbal fluency, attention, and verbal memory, which are 
"domains of cognitive performance that have been found to predit role function and 
community outcomes"). 
208. Anthony F. Lehman, Developing an Outcomes-Oriented Approach for the 
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 601. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 30,30 (Supp. 19, 1999); Sandra 
L. Tunis et aI., Changes in Perceived Health and Functioning as a Cost-Effectiveness 
Measure for Olanzapine Versus Haloperidol Treatment of Schizophrenia, 60 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 38, 38 (Supp. 19,1999). 
209. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs as a First-Line Treatment 
of Schizophrenia: A Rationale and Hypothesis, 57 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 68, 68 
(Supp. 11, 1996) (offering "a rationale and hypothesis for the use of atypical 
antipsychotic drugs as a first-line treatment of schizophrenia"). 
210. John A. Chiles et aI., The Texas Medication Algorithm Project: Development 
and Implementation of the Schizophrenia Algorithm, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 69, 72 
(1999); Neil S. Kaye & Thomas J. Reed, Tardive Dyskinesia: Tremors in Law and 
Medicine, 27 1. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (1999); Alexander L. Miller et aI., 
The Texas Medication Algorithm Project (TMAP) Schizophrenia Algorithms, 60 1. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 649, 652 (1999); Rowland Pearsall et aI., A New Algorithm for 
Treating Schizophrenia, 34 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 349,349 (1998) (suggesting 
that the "newer atypical agents may now be the treatment of choice for initiating therapy 
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psychiatrists' thinking about the pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia is 
suggested by noting that, in a 1995 psychopharmacology handbook, the 
discussion of risperidone occupies less than one page in a thirty-eight 
page chapter on antipsychotic medications,zll and the American 
Psychiatric Association's guideline for treating schizophrenia, published 
in April 1997, states that "conventional antipsychotic medications and 
risperidone are all reasonable fIrst-line medications for patients in acute 
phases of schizophrenia ..... ,,212 The next Part of this Article offers 
several reasons why psychiatrists may still choose to prescribe 
neuroleptics as fIrst-line therapies, despite the apparent advantages of 
newer antipsychotic drugs. This Article then describes several possible 
sources of liability that now might arise from using conventional 
neuroleptics, and discusses the potential impact of recent cases on 
courts' thinking about whether use of the older drugs constitutes 
malpractice. 
N. COST ISSUES AND THE USE OF NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTICS AS 
FIRsT-LINE TREATMENTS213 
Psychiatrists in the U.S. think that the newer antipsychotics should be 
the drugs of fIrst choice for patients suffering from their fIrst episode of 
in most clinical situations"); David N. Osser & Carlos A. Zarate, Jr., Consultant for the 
Phannacotherapy of Schizophrenia, 29 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 252, 253 (1999); Steven P. 
Shon et al., Mental Health Care from the Public Perspective: The Texas Medication 
Algorithm Project, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 18 (Supp. 3, 1999); The Expert 
Consensus Guideline Series: Treatment of Schizophrenia 1999, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
12, 12 (Joseph P. McEvoy et al. eds., Supp. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Guideline Series]; see 
also Roger S. McIntyre, Psychotropic Drugs and Adverse Events in the Treatment of 
Bipolar Disorders Revisited, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 15, 15 (Supp. 3, 2002) ("The 
novel antipsychotics are now the antipsychotics of choice in the treatment of bipolar 
disorders."); David N. Osser & Robert Sigadel, Short-Tenn Inpatient Phannacotherapy 
of Schizophrellia, 9 HARv. REv. PSYCHIATRY 89, 89 (2001) ("For initial oral treatment, 
monotherapy with one of the new 'atypical' antipsychotics is favored."); Renee E. Snow 
& Sumer Verma, Late-life Psychosis: It's Efficacy Vs. Cost ill the Tug-of-War over 
Treatment, 1 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 10, 10, 14 (2002) ("In general, atypical antipsychotics are 
considered first-line therapy [for treating psychotic disorders in elderly patients], unless 
there is a compelling reason not to use them in an individual patient."). 
211. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 30. 
212. Herz, supra note 143, at 3. 
213. Portions of this and the following two Parts are adapted from two other articles. 
Douglas Mossman & Douglas S. Lehrer, COllvelltional and Atypical Antipsychotics and the 
Evolvillg Stalldard of Care, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1528 (2000); Douglas Mossman, 
Malpractice Implications of Prescribing Antipsychotic Medications, 19 DlRECTIONS IN 
PSYCHIATRY 311 (1999). 
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schizophrenia and also should be used to treat all patients with 
established diagnoses of schizophrenia unless there is a good reason-a 
patient's personal preference, record of excellent response to an older 
drug, or need for an injectable preparation214-to prescribe a conventional 
agent.2I5 Indeed, given the advantages of the newer drugs summarized 
214. On June 24, 2002, ziprasidone became the first novel antipsychotic available 
in a short-acting injectable form. FDA Approves Pfizer's Schizophrenia Medicine 
Geodon® in Injectable Form; First Atypical Antipsychotic Approved in Intramuscular 
Form to Rapidly Treat Acute Agitation in Patients with Schizophrenia, PR NEWSWIRE, 
June 24, 2002, LEXIS, PR Newswire File; see also Michael D. Lesem et aI., 
Intramuscular Ziprasidone, 2 Mg Versus /0 Mg, in the Short-Term Management of 
Agitated Psychotic Patients, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 12 (2001) (reporting that 
injectable ziprasidone is effective in quelling acute psychosis). Other novel 
antipsychotic agents are available only for oral administration, although research is 
proceeding on injectable forms of these drugs. See, e.g., Alan Breier, A Double-Blind, 
Placebo-Controlled Dose-Response Comparison of Intramuscular Olanzapine and 
Haloperidol in the Treatment of Acute Agitation in Schizophrenia, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 441, 446-47 (2002) (reporting that injections of olanzapine rapidly and 
safely reduce agitation); Karena Meehan et aI., A Double-Blind, Randomized 
Comparison of the Efficacy and Safety of Intramuscular Injections of Olanzapine, 
Lorazepam, or Placebo in Treating Acutely Agitated Patients Diagnosed with Bipolar 
Mania, 21 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 389, 389 (2001); Osser & Zarate, supra 
note 210, at 255. 
Several of the older antipsychotic drugs can be administered by intramuscular 
injection. Two conventional antipsychotic drugs, fluphenazine and haloperidol. are 
available as long acting preparations that can be administered in a single "depot" 
injection every two or four weeks. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 10-11. By 
administering one of the depot preparations, clinicians can be sure that patients are 
receiving their antipsychotic medication. For a discussion of the role of injectable 
antipsychotic therapy, see generally Peter Weiden & William Glazer, Assessment and 
Treatment Selection for "Revolving Door" Inpatients with Schizophrenia, 68 
PSYCHIATRY Q. 377 (1997), and Marcia Valenstein et aI., Adherence Assessments and the 
Use of Depot Antipsychotics in Patients with Schizophrenia, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
545, 545-46 (2001). Concerning patients' feelings about depot medication, see Yuval 
Bloch et aI., Injections of Depot Antipsychotic Medications in Patients Suffering from 
Schizophrenia: Do They Hurt?, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 855, 855 (2001), stating that 
"[dJepot injections are painful." In July 2002, the FDA refused to approve a long acting, 
injectable form of risperidone. Geoff Dyer, J&J Hit by FDA Drug Snub, FIN. TiMES, 
July 2,2002, at 30. 
215. Chiles et aI., supra note 210, at 72; Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331; 
Lieberman, supra note 209, at 70-71 ("[TJhe most opportune time for optimal treatment 
interventions appears to be the first episode of illness. . .. [TJhe greatest benefits from 
the use of atypical antipsychotic drugs ... should be seen in patients close to the onset of 
illness."); Guideline Series, supra note 210, at 12-13,35; Miller et aI., supra note 210. at 
652; Osser & Zarate. supra note 210, at 253 (stating that when treating a patient with 
schizophrenia. "[tJhe first-line recommendation is to select one of the new generation of 
antipsychotic medications"). 
For example. in the Texas Medication Algorithm Project (TMAP) schizophrenia 
algorithm, older neuroleptics are used only after trials of the novel agents have proven 
unsuccessful. Patients may also receive a depot neuroleptic after demonstrating poor 
compliance during their first trial of a novel drug. Miller et aI., supra note 210, at 652; 
Chiles et al.. supra note 210, at 72. The TMAP is an effort by public sector psychiatrists 
to establish a set of "best practices" for the pharmacological treatment of major 
psychiatric disorders. The TMAP receives financial support from several phannaceutical 
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in the previous Part, why would anyone want to take or prescribe the 
older ones? 
A. The Costs of Novel Antipsychotics 
The main reason is the cost charged to pharmacies and other third 
parties that pay for antipsychotic medication?16 Acquisition prices for 
the newer agents are far greater than the cost of equivalent doses of 
generic conventional agents, sometimes seventy to one hundred times 
higher.217 For a patient with schizophrenia, taking a novel antipsychotic 
rather than a conventional agent might entail an added treatment cost of 
$3000 to $4000 per year?18 
If patients purchased medications with their own funds, decisions 
about whether to spend more money to purchase and take the newer 
drugs would be controlled by the persons who consumed the drugs and 
experienced their benefits and risks. Patients could weigh the relative 
advantages of older and newer medications and, after consultation with 
their doctors, decide for themselves whether having a newer medication 
was worth giving up some other item219 on which they were spending 
their money. 
However, for most patients with schizophrenia, money for medication 
comes from managed health insurance dollars or public funds 
administered through state budgets and Medicaid programs. This means 
companies that market novel antipsychotic drugs. Don A Gilbert et al., Texas Medication 
Algorithm Project: Definitions, Rationale, and Methods to Develop Medication 
Algorithms, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 345, 345 (1998); Miller et al., supra note 210, at 
649. For a discussion of the potential impact of pharmaceutical company sponsorship, 
see infra Part IV.B.I. Some clinicians outside the United States take an alternative 
positionon medication choice. See Geddes et al., supra note 20, at 1371 ("Conventional 
antipsychotics should usually be used in the initial treatment of ... schizophrenia unless 
the patient has previously not responded to these drugs or has unacceptable 
extrapyramidal side effects."). 
216. The novel antipsychotic drugs have some side effect disadvantages when 
compared to older drugs; the former seem more prone to cause weight gain and 
associated medical problems. See infra Part IV.B.I. 
217. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1529. 
218. Id. 
219. Most patients with schizophrenia smoke cigarettes. Some recent evidence 
suggests that atypical antipsychotic drugs may promote smoking cessation. Tony P. 
George et al., Nicotine Transdermal Patch and Atypical Antipsychotic Medications for 
Smoking Cessation in Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1835, 1838-40 (2000). 
With cigarettes now costing three dollars to six dollars per pack, a heavy smoker might 
conclude that purchasing a newer antipsychotic and quitting smoking was a cost neutral 
decision (not to mention the many potential short- and long-term health benefits). 
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that administrators of managed care organizations or publicly funded 
treatment programs, rather than individual patients and doctors, must 
decide whether to allocate funds that might be spent on other therapies to 
the newer, more expensive drugs. To appreciate the kinds of decisions 
to be made, consider the potential fiscal impact of newer antipsychotic 
agents at the Ohio public sector hospital where the author works. For 
the more than 300 patients that receive antipsychotic drugs, switching to 
the atypicals might generate an additional pharmacy cost of about 
$1,000,000 per year, which is about half of the total hospital budget for 
paying the psychiatrists that treat patients.22o A recent study of Georgia 
Medicaid patients treated for schizophrenia found that in constant 
dollars, antipsychotic expenditures increased by nine and one half times 
between 1990 and 2002, almost entirely because of the trend to use 
atypicals rather than older antipsychotic drugs. The authors of the study 
noted that "[t]his transition from traditional oral antipsychotics to 
atypicals . . . has a profound effect on drug expenditures for systems 
paying for the care of persons with schizophrenia.,,221 
Courts have ruled that, in some circumstances, state Medicaid 
agencies are obligated to pay for qualified individuals' treatment with 
clozapine,222 and presumably the same obligation would apply to the 
other novel antipsychotics. However, private and public sector agencies 
also must administer psychiatric care within budgetary limits. These 
agencies thus potentially face the fiscal and moral dilemma of deciding 
for their patients whether the benefits of the atypicals are worth the 
added pharmacy expenses. 
B. Pharmacoeconomic Studies 
One way out of this dilemma is suggested by several published 
pharmacoeconomic studies, which assert that using novel antipsychotics 
does not really increase the total cost of treating persons with 
schizophrenia because the drugs allow patients to leave the hospital. If 
220. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1529; see also Carolyn S. Dewa & 
Paula Goering, Lessons Learned from Trends in Psychotropic Drug Expenditures in a 
Canadian Province, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1245, 1246 (2001) (stating that despite 
Ontario's cost control mechanisms, introduction of novel agents quadrupled expenditures 
for antipsychotic agents between 1992 and 1998 and in the latter year, novel agents still 
accounted for only one-third of antipsychotic drug prescriptions). See infra note 259 
(comparing costs of neuroleptic and novel antipsychotic medications for Veterans 
Affairs patients). 
221. Bradley C. Martin et aI., Antipsychotic Prescription Use and Costs for Persons 
with Schizophrenia in the 1990s: Current Trends and Five Year Time Series Forecasts, 
47 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 281, 281 (2001). 
222. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); Alexander L. v. 
Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85,88 (Sup. Ct. 1991). 
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the new drugs reduce patients' need for hospitalization, as some 
interpreters of these studies have suggested,223 then using them is not 
really any more costly than using the older drugs. The money saved 
from reduced hospital use might even produce a net overall savings. 
Whether novel antipsychotic agents really can reduce total treatment 
costs is still unclear. Health outcomes researcher Dennis Revicki 
recently reviewed extant pharmacoeconomic studies and summarized 
their results as follows: 
The evidence, from a variety of studies, indicates that clozapine is a cost-
effective treatment for neuroleptic refractory schizophrenia. Risperidone and 
olanzapine may be cost neutral, or at best slightly cost saving, compared with 
conventional antipsychotics, although they do improve patient clinical 
effectiveness and quality of life outcomes. There is too little data on 
pharmacoeconomic outcomes for sertindole and quetiapine to make any 
conclusions about their cost-effectiveness in treating schizophrenia.224 
The following sections describe several reasons why psychiatrists and 
administrators should maintain a healthy skepticism about claims that 
novel agents reduce total treatment costs. 
1. Possible Skewing of Results 
Many decisionmakers treat pharmacoeconomic studies sponsored by 
drug manufacturers with skepticism "because of the potential bias of 
[the] study sponsors ... :.225 With the novel agents, "a number of the 
223. Christopher G. Fichtner et al., Phannacoeconomic Studies of Atypical 
Antipsychotics: Review and Perspective, 28 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 381, 395 (1998) 
("[F]or patients who continue to take the new treatment, overall medical resource 
utilization is likely to decrease, resulting in lower costs."). 
224. Dennis A. Revicki, The New Atypical Antipsychotics: A Review of 
Phannacoecollomic Studies, 1 EXPERT OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 249, 249 (2000), 
LEXIS, MEDLINE Database. "Neuroleptic refractory schizophrenia" refers to patients 
that suffer from the disorder and do not recover with the help of conventional (pre-1989) 
antipsychotic drugs. 
Sertindole is a novel antipsychotic agent that the manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories, 
withdrew from consideration for FDA approval in early 1998. George Gunset, Abbott 
Withdraws Drug Application, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1998, at Bl; Dolores Kong, Doctors 
Criticize Placebo Testillg: Mentally III Patiellts Worselled After Use, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Mar. 21, 1999, at Al ("serlect (sertindole) ... was withdrawn from consideration after 
an FDA advisory committee questioned its safety"). The drug had been used previously 
in other countries, for example, in the United Kingdom, but the Danish manufacturer 
Lundbeck withdrew it from use in late 1998 because it caused potentially fatal heart 
problems. Geddes et al., supra note 20 at ] 373; Lesley Roberts, Drug Ban as Experts 
Probe Suddell Deaths, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 4, 1999, at 4. 
225. Peter J. Neumann, Methods of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis ill the Evaluatioll of 
1081 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1082 2002
comparative studies that have been published were developed and 
sponsored by the pharmaceutical companies whose medications were 
being evaluated, raising concerns about potential sources of bias in 
experimental design or interpretation of outcomes.,,226 Although no published 
report provides evidence that manufacturer sponsored studies of 
atypicals have been dishonest, three features of these studies may have 
accentuated the newer drugs' advantages. 
First, some studies may have utilized data obtained from a large 
number of treatment resistant patients, that is, individuals who did not 
benefit from treatment with the older drugs.227 If this were the case, it 
would lead investigators to overestimate savings that would occur in 
New Antipsychotics: Implications for Schizophrenia Treatment, 60 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 9, 12 (Supp 3, 1999); see also Peter J. Neumann, Paying the Piper for 
Phannacoeconomic Studies, 18 MED. DECISION MAKING S23, S23 (Supp. 1998). 
"Clinical trials form the basis of effective research and development, but their reliability 
is currently imperilled by three major flaws: conflicts of interest on the part of the 
investigators; inappropriate involvement of research sponsors in their design and 
management; and publication bias in disseminating their results [the tendency to publish 
only results of studies showing that a drug worked]." Jonathan Quick, Maintaining the 
Integrity of the Clinical Evidence Base, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1093, 1093 
(2001). 
226. David A. Lewis, Atypical Antipsychotic Medications and the Treatment of 
Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 177 (2002). Two University of Michigan 
schizophrenia researchers commented: 
[A]ggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies and their pervasive 
involvement in continuing medical education has contributed to some 
confusion among clinicians about how available pharmacologic strategies 
compare and what they can realistically accomplish. Industry-sponsored drug 
trials are the major source of clinical trial information, and because Phase IV 
trials are conducted at least in part for marketing purposes, resulting biases can 
compromise their utility. 
Rajiv Tandon & Michael D. Jibson, Pharmacologic Treatment of Schizophrenia: What 
the Future Holds, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 980, 984 (2001) (citations omitted). 
227. For example, several pharmacoeconomic studies utilize archival data obtained 
during pre-release efficacy studies that were conducted as a prelude to FDA approval. 
Patients in these efficacy studies typically were hospitalized when recruited. See, e.g., 
Charles M. Beasley, Jr. et aI., Olanzapine Versus Placebo and Haloperidol: Acute Phase 
Results of the Nonh American Double-Blind Olanwpine Trial, 14 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
111, 112-13 (1996) (noting that a study required patients to have a minimum level of 
psychopathology and to be inpatients for two weeks); Stephen R. Marder & Richard C. 
Meibach, Risperidone in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 825, 
826 (1994); Joyce G. Small et aI., Quetiapine in Patients with Schizophrenia: a High-
and Low-Dose Double-Blind Comparison with Placebo, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
549, 550 (1997). This means that the subset of patients that were doing well enough in 
the community not to need hospitalization were not represented in these studies, and that 
"tough-to-treat" patients were over-represented. This might also explain why response 
rates for the new drugs were somewhat lower, only forty-five to fifty percent, than the 
seventy percent response rate that is usually reported for conventional antipsychotic 
medications. See Douglas Mossman, A Decision Analysis Approach to Neuroleptic 
Dosing: Insights from a Mathematical Model, 58 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 66,68 (1997) 
(summarizing studies). 
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typical populations of psychotic patients.228 Moreover, although one 
recently published study demonstrated the superior efficacy of atypicals 
in treating patients who had suboptimal responses to neuroleptics, "the 
effects were modest and their clinical significance limited.,,229 
Second, the pharmaceutical manufacturers' . prerelease studies on 
which many pharmacoeconomic studies have relied have compared the 
performance of novel agents to effect of haloperidol dosed at ten to 
twenty milligrams/day. This dose choice was reasonable, since patients 
often receive such doses of haloperidol and equivalently high doses of 
other neuroleptics.23o However, it has been recognized for several years 
that only a fraction of patients benefit from doses above the equivalent 
of haloperidol five milligrams/day.231 Above this dose, side effects 
increase much more than does drug effectiveness,z32 Recent evidence 
suggests that individuals that have never taken a neuroleptic may need 
only one to three milligrams/day.233 Even at low doses, the risk of 
developing tardive dyskinesia is lower with atypicals than with 
haloperidol,234 However, apparent superiority of novel drugs in reducing 
negative symptoms might be less striking if a comparison were 
undertaken with modest doses of haloperidol like two to five 
228. Jan Volavka et al., Clozapine, Olanzapine, Risperidone, and Haloperidol in 
the Treatment of Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder, 159 
AM. J. PSYCIDATRY 255, 260-61 (2002) (stating that in neuroleptics resistant patients, 
atypicals were better at reducing symptoms than haloperidol, but selecting such patients 
for study "would be expected to result in data that tend to show superior efficacy of 
atypical antipsychotics"). 
229. Id. at 261. 
230. Marcia Valenstein et al., Delays in Adopting Evidence-Based Dosages of 
Conventional Antipsychotics, 52 PSYCmATRIC SERVICES 1242, 1244 (stating that between 
1991 and 1995, "15 years after research reports and eight years after review articles 
supported moderate dosages, a troubling proportion of patients were treated with high 
dosages"); James T. Walkup et al., Patients with Schizophrenia at Risk for Excessive 
Antipsychotic Dosing, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCIDATRY 344, 344 (2000) (reporting that 
minority patients are at a higher risk for receiving excessive doses). 
231. McEvoy et al., supra note 201, at 742; Mossman, supra note 227, at 69-70 
(stating that at least eighty percent of patients that can benefit from neuroleptic therapy 
respond at doses at or below the equivalent of haloperidol five milligrams/day). 
232. P. Bollini et al., Antipsychotic Drugs: Is More Worse? A Meta-analysis of the 
Published Randomized Control Trials, 24 PSYCHOLOGICALMED. 307, 307 (1994). 
233. Shitij Kapur et al., Relationship Between Dopamine D2 Occupancy, Clinical 
Response, and Side Effects: A Double-Blind PET Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 
157 M.i. J. PSYCIDATRY 514, 517 (2000). 
234. Dilip V. Jeste et al., Lower Incidence of Tardive Dyskinesia with Risperidone 
Compared with Haloperidol in Older Patients, 47 J. M.1. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 716, 716 
(1999). 
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milligrams/day, rather than the ten to twenty milligrams/day doses that 
were used in prerelease trialS.235 
Third, persons who take the newer antipsychotics are especially 
susceptible to gaining weight and to developing related metabolic 
problems, such as diabetes mellitus?36 Taking the older antipsychotic 
agents also increases a patient's risk of developing these problems, but 
the frequency and severity of these problems are even more pronounced 
in patients that take novel agents.237 In a society that greatly values 
thinness, one must wonder how many patients might prefer a drug with a 
higher risk of tardive dyskinesia to a drug that had a good chance of 
making them fat. Moreover, psychiatrists do not yet know what will be 
the long-term consequences of atypical induced weight gain?38 
235. Kapur et aI., supra note 99, at 292. 
236. "[N]ewer antipsychotic treatments such as clozapine and olanzapine, in 
comparison with typical agents, are associated with adverse effects on plasma glucose 
regulation .... " John W. Newcomer et aI., Abnormalities in Glucose Regulation During 
Antipsychotic Treatment of Schizophrenia, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337, 342 
(2002). See id. at 337-38 (summarizing the results of reports describing the increased 
risk of weight gain and diabetes). 
237. David B. Allison et aI., Antipsychotic-Induced Weight Gain: A Comprehensive 
Research Synthesis, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1686, 1690 (1999) (reporting that more 
weight gain occurred with clozapine, olanzapine, and risperidone than with haloperidol 
or placebo, and that several neuroleptics are associated with weight gain as well, but 
generally less than the novel agents); Davidson, supra note 19I. at 6-8 (summarizing 
studies of metabolic abnormalities associated with neuroleptics and the novel agents); 
Michael J. Semyak et aI., Association of Diabetes Mellitus with Use of Atypical 
Neuroleptics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 561, 561 (2002) 
(noting that after controlling for age, patients who took novel agents were nine percent 
more likely to be treated for diabetes than were patients taking older antipsychotic 
drugs); Brian B. Sheitman et aI., Olanzapine-Induced Elevation of Plasma Triglyceride 
Levels, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1471-72 (1999); Maxwell Sobel et aI., New-Onset 
Diabetes Mellitus Associated with the Initiation of Quetiapine Treatment, 60 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 556, 556-57 (1999); Donna A. Wirshing et aI., Novel AntipsycllOtics: 
Comparison of Weight Gain Liabilities, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 358, 361-62 (1999); 
Donna A. Wirshing et aI., Novel Antipsychotics and New Onset Diabetes, 44 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 778, 778 (1998) (reporting six new-onset cases of diabetes 
mellitus associated with clozapine and olanzapine and that four patients had substantial 
weight gain); Donna A. Wirshing et aI., Risperidone-Associated New-Onset Diabetes, 50 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 148, 148 (2001) (reporting two cases of diabetes); Donna A. 
Wirshing et aI., The Effects of Antipsychotics on Glucose and Lipid Levels, 63 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 856, 863 (2002) (presenting a chart to illustrate a study showing 
elevated glucose levels and triglyceride levels in patients receiving novel agents, and 
recommending that physicians "be more aggressive in monitoring glucose and lipid 
levels in patients treated with these agents"). 
238. Kevin R. Fontaine et aI., Estimating the Consequences of Anti-Psychotic 
Induced Weight Gain on Health and Mortality Rate, 101 PSYCHIATRY RES. 277, 278 
(2001) ("[T]he magnitude of weight gains induced by many antipsychotic agents is likely 
to have important deleterious effects on mortality and health."). 
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2. Findings from Intent-to-Treat Studies 
After clozapine was released, its recipients often were patients who 
had spent great lengths of time in hospitals because they could not 
benefit from the then-available antipsychotic drugs. Initial studies 
comparing total pre- and post-clozapine expenditures for the previously 
refractory patients who took the drug successfully suggested that 
clozapine was a net money saver because patients' reduced use of 
hospitalization more than offset costs of administering the drug to 
them.239 However, so-called intent-to-treat studies, which include 
studies that compare all patients who were offered clozapine with all 
patients offered a comparison medication, have concluded that the 
financial savings from clozapine are modest at best.24o Similarly, two 
intent-to-treat studies of risperidone did not demonstrate any actual 
financial savings241 although studies using mathematical models had 
suggested that the drug would reduce the total cost of care.242 
3. Nonunanimity of Findings 
Some studies have shown that in real life treatment, results with novel 
agents are not necessarily better than results with conventional 
239. Herbert Y. Meltzer et al., Cost Effectiveness of Clozapine in Neuroleptic-
Resistant Schizophrenia, 150 AM. J. PSYCIDATRY 1630, 1636 (1993). 
240. Katherine J. Aitchison & Robert W. Kerwin, Cost-Effectiveness of Clozapine: 
A UK Clinic-Based Study, 171 BRIT. 1. PSYCHIATRY 125, 127-28 (1997); Daniel J. 
Luchins et al., Initiating Clozapine Treatment in the Outpatient Clinic: Service 
Utilization and Cost Trends, 49 PSYCIDATRIC SERVICES 1034, 1036 (1998) (noting that 
the higher cost of clozapine treatment was only partially offset by decreased rate of 
hospitalization); Rosenheck et al., supra note 192, at 812. 
241. Mark J. Schiller et al., Treatment Costs and Patient Outcomes with Use of 
Risperidone in a Public Mental Health Setting, 50 PSYCIDATRIC SERVICES 228, 231-32 
(1999) (noting a trend toward higher costs with risperidone treatment); Gary Viale et al., 
Impact of Risperidone on the Use of Mental Health Care Resources, 48 PSYCIDATRIC 
SERVICES 1153, 1157-58 (1997) (noting a statistically insignificant increase in total 
costs). 
242. Brian S. Nightengale et al., Economic Outcomes of Antipsychotic Agents in a 
Medicaid Population: Traditional Agents Vs. Risperidone, 34 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
BULL. 373, 380-81 (1998); Dennis A. Revicki, Pharmacoeconomic Studies of Atypical 
Antipsychotic Drugs for the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. S101, 
S107 (Supp. 1999) (noting that clozapine is cost saving for treatment refractory patients 
and as standard therapy, atypical agents appear cost neutral); see also Brian C. Lund & 
Paul 1. Perry, Olanzapine: An Atypical Antipsychotic for Schizophrenia, 1 EXPERT 
OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 305, 305 (2000) ("[P]harmacoeconomic studies are 
needed to justify the large acquisition cost of olanzapine compared to typical agents."). 
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antipsychotics. In a study involving matched schizophrenic patients that 
received either risperidone or conventional agents, Schiller and 
colleagues found that costs and effectiveness did not differ?43 A report by 
Binder and colleagues states that seventy-one percent of patients whose 
doctors had prescribed risperidone for them had stopped taking the 
medication two years later because of noncompliance, poor response, or 
side effects.244 Another study evaluating the impact of risperidone found 
not only that the drug did not reduce patient readmission rates but also 
that average annual treatment costs for risperidone treated patients were 
nearly double the costs for patients receiving conventional agents.245 
4. How U.S. Healthcare Budgets Work 
Authors in France246 and Australia247 have suggested that if their 
countries switched patients from conventional to atypical agents it would 
generate a net savings in healthcare expenses. Unlike the U.S., these 
countries offer all their citizens government funded medical care, so 
looking at potential system-wide savings is a sensible perspective from 
which to judge healthcare costs. In the multiple payer U.S. system, 
however, cost savings from novel antipsychotics, if indeed savings do 
occur, might not go to the agencies or organizations that pay for those 
drugs?48 Also, the financial benefits of atypicals might not occur within 
the time horizon of healthcare organizations' annual budgets because, 
for many patients, the benefits of new medications and their associated 
cost savings take many months to accrue?49 
243. Schiller et aI., supra note 241, at 231-32. 
244. Renee L. Binder et aI., A Naturalistic Study of Clinical Use of Risperidolle, 49 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 524, 525 (1998). 
245. Kim C. Coley et aI., Effectiveness of Alltipsychotic Therapy ill a Naturalistic 
Settillg: A Comparisoll Betweell Risperidone, Perphellazine, and Haloperidol, 60 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 850, 854 (1999). 
246. Claude Le Pen et aI., Comparaisoll Ecollomiqlle de l'olallzapille Versus 
Haloperidol dans Ie Traitemellt de la Schizophrellie ell Frallce [Ecollomic Comparisoll 
of Olanzapille Versus Haloperidol ill Treatment of Schizophrenia ill Frallce], 25 
ENCEPHALE 281 (1999). 
247. Alison Davies et aI., Risperidolle Versus Haloperidol: II. Cost-Effectivelless, 
20 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 196, 207 (1998). This study was supported by Janssen-
CiIag, a firm that markets risperidone; Alison Davies worked for Janssen-Cilag when the 
article was published. [d. at 211. 
248. For a graphical depiction of the complex funding patterns involved in paying 
for antipsychotic medications and psychiatric care in general, see William Glazer & Ruth 
Dickson, Phannacoeconomics alld Resource Allocatioll: LeSSOIlS from North America. in 
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MOOD DISORDERS: THE NEW DRUG THERAPIES IN PRACTICE 330, 
331 (Peter F. Buckley & John L. Waddington eds., 2000). 
249. Meltzer et aI., supra note 239, at 1636 (cost offset occurred over two years); 
Robert Rosenheck et aI., Cost-Effectivelless of Clozapille ill Patients with High alld Low 
Levels of Hospital Use, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 565, 569 (1999) (noting cost 
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5. Are Calculated Savings Real Savings? 
Although several studies of atypicals have reported cost savings from 
patients' reduced need for hospitalization, those savings have merely 
been calculated. Actual cash savings do not occur unless hospitals close 
wards and layoff clinicians, administrators, and support staff members. 
Over the last fifteen years, lengths of stay in psychiatric hospitals have 
dropped markedly as a result of managed care and other policy decisions,25o 
and treatment agencies may not be able to fully offset increased 
pharmacy expenses through further reductions in hospital use.251 
6. Would "Stepped Care" Generate More Cash Savings? 
Pharmacoeconomic studies have evaluated treatment schemes in 
which patients receive either a conventional neuroleptic or a novel drug 
from the outset. However, two studies suggest that novel antipsychotics 
lower treatment costs mainly for patients who had not benefited from 
neuroleptics or had been unusually high users of hospital services.252 
This suggests that the best money saving strategy may be "stepped 
care."253 Stepped care is a system in which schizophrenic patients first 
receive "older, less expensive antipsychotic[s] in judicious doses, 
undergo conscientious monitoring for adverse effects and clinical 
response, and receive novel agents only if they do not have a good 
savings after one year, but only in previously high users of hospital services). 
250. See, e.g., Susan H. Garritson, Availability and Perfonnance of Psychiatric 
Acute Care Facilities in Califomiafrom 1992 to 1996, 50 PSYCIDATRIC SERVICES 1453, 
1455 (1999) (describing a twenty-six percent reduction in the length of stay in California 
psychiatric hospitals). 
251. Herbert Y. Meltzer, Outcome in Schizophrenia: Beyond Symptom Reduction, 
60 J. CLINICALPSYCIDATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 3,1999). 
252. Rosenheck, supra note 249, at 565; Patrick R. Finley et al., Risperidone: 
Clinical Outcome Predictors and Cost-Effectiveness in a Naturalistic Setting, 34 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 75, 78 (1998). 
253. Other writers have called such strategies "fail-first" policies, derived from the 
notion that patients must first fail to benefit from a cheaper drqg before being offered a 
more expensive drug. See, e.g., Omnibus Mental lllness Recovery Act § 7, http://www. 
nami.orglupdate/omirasec7.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2002) (discussing managed care 
drug formularies); Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Medicaid Fonnulary 
Policies: Access to High-Cost Mental Health Medicatio1lS, at http://www. bazelon.orgl 
formulary.html (Nov. 1999) (Medicaid drug formularies); National Mental Health 
Association, The VA Is Restricting Access to Needed Anti-Psychotic Medication to 
Veterans Across the Country!, at http://www.nmlIa. orglnewsroomlsystemllal.vw. 
cfrn?do=vw&rid=330 (Aug. 21, 2001) ('1 A antipsychotic policy). 
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response to, or ... develop problems from, a ... neuroleptic."254 In some 
settings, first choice use of effective but inexpensive neuroleptics may 
be justified by the need for prudent use of limited financial resources.255 
C. Ethical Issues in Stepped Care 
Of course, a stepped care policy would result in more patients being 
exposed to neuroleptic side effects than would occur if atypicals were 
used as first-line drugs for treating schizophrenia, and this could raise a 
series of practical moral questions for a treatment agency that adopted 
such a policy. A mere listing of the questions is sufficient to suggest 
how complicated and troublesome they might become: (1) Would the 
agency be obligated to tell patients about the policy and its restrictions 
on use of the newer, less risky, more expensive drugs? (2) Would 
patients' family members be entitled to any information?256 (3) How 
explicit should the agency be in describing the financial rationale for 
stepped care? (4) How should the agency disclose such information? 
Would it suffice to distribute written material to patients, or should 
254. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1530. Note that this stepped care 
approach assumes that the novel agents are available for patients who need them and that 
treatment agencies will therefore be willing to pay for them for a portion of the 
individuals they serve. Some healthcare plans restrict patients to only the neuroleptics. 
See Christine Lehmann, Cost Limits Drug Options for Public-Sector Patients, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 18, 2001, at 1, 1 (reporting a patient who desired risperidone 
although her health plan's restricted drug formulary only covered haloperidol and 
chlorpromazine), http://pn.psychiatryonline.orglcgi/contentifull/36/l0/1. See William M. 
Glazer, Accessibility of the New Generation Antipsychotic Medications in the United 
States 9-12 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting the results of 
a survey concerning limited access to novel antipsychotic agents in public and private 
settings and describing various restrictions, including fail-neuroleptics-first policies, 
preferred medications, co-payment schedules, and prior authorization requirements). 
255. Michael L. Zoler, Clozapine's Cost-Benefit Balance Questioned, CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Mar. 1999, at 29, 29 (citing views of VA psychiatrist Robert 
Rosenheck that, for economic reasons, "[t]he best public health approach may not be 
using atypical antipsychotics as first-line drugs for all patients with schizophrenia"), 
http://www.medscape.comllMNG/ClinPsychNews/1999/v27.n03lcpn2703.29.03.html; 
see also Geddes et aI., supra note 20, at 1375. 
256. The issue of disclosure to family members is important because of 
schizophrenic patients' known limitations with regard to treatment decisionmaking. 
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. Ill: 
Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 149, 149 (1995) (finding that compared to depressed patients and patients with 
heart disease, schizophrenic patients had the poorest understanding of treatment 
disclosure, poorest reasoning in decision making regarding treatment, and greatest 
likelihood of not appreciating their illness or potential benefits of treatment); see also 
William T. Carpenter, Jr. et aI., Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in 
Schizophrenia Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 533, 533 (2000). The study by 
Carpenter and his colleagues describes educational interventions that can compensate for 
schizophrenic patients' impairments. Id. at 535-38. 
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patients have to sign forms acknowledging receipt of information about 
the policy? (5) What disclosure obligations would physicians and other 
clinicians employed by the agency, as distinct from the agency itself, 
have toward patients? (6) Could agencies place the responsibility for 
disclosure on physicians? If so, what ought physicians who disagreed 
with stepped care do when discussing the policy with patients? (7) 
Whichever party discloses information about a money saving policy, 
how might such a disclosure change the doctor-patient relationship and 
treatment outcomes? (8) If a patient requested a newer, expensive 
antipsychotic drug before having tried a less expensive neuroleptic, how 
should the agency and treating psychiatrist respond? (9) How would 
agencies establish criteria for deciding what symptoms or problems a 
neuroleptic treated patient would need to experience before being 
changed to a more expensive atypical agent? 
These questions, one must recognize, would not be new ones for 
psychiatry. Accrediting agencies require state financed facilities to meet 
minimum standards, but these facilities typically do not provide the 
fanciest care available. State hospitals typically offer psychiatric care in 
buildings that cost less to operate than private sector facilities. Private 
sector facilities that, unlike state hospitals, must compete for patients, 
are better staffed and more pleasant than public sector facilities. In the 
author's experience, it is extremely unusual for psychiatrists who work 
in government funded facilities to talk with patients about how public 
sector institutions differ from private ones. 
Nor would these questions be unique to psychiatry. In an effort to 
control costs, managed care organizations routinely designate "preferred 
provider" panels of physicians for their covered patients, and specify 
"formularies," lists of medications that cost patients less out-of-
pocket.257 Physicians, and sometimes patients, rail against these 
practices,258 but they are widespread and are not fundamentally different 
than a stepped care plan for new, but expensive, antipsychotic agents. 
257. For an overview of these practices as they apply to psychiatric care, see 
generally Jesse A. Goldner, Managed Care and Mental Health: Clinical Perspectives 
alld Legal Realities, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1437 (1999). 
258. The most prominent psychiatrist to do so is William M. Glazer, M.D., an 
associate clinical professor of psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. See, 
e.g., William Glazer, What Call Clinicians Do About Restrictive Treatment Policies?, at 
http://medaccess.g1azmedsol.comlarticles!g1azereditorial.html (urging psychiatrists to protest 
managed care formulary restrictions). His website on access to atypical antipsychotics is 
available at http://www.medaccess.glazmedsol.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2002). 
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An adequate exploration of these ethical questions would take us far 
beyond the scope of this Article. Parts V and VI of this Article focus on 
some of the closely related legal issues that the new drugs may generate. 
Before turning to these matters, however, the next Section reviews some 
actual developments related to limitations of access to atypical antipsychotics. 
D. Access to Atypicals 
In July 2001, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) promulgated a 
guideline for atypical antipsychotic use that contains two significant 
financially based goals. It suggests that physicians: 
(1) Prioritize the use of atypical antipsychotic medication for new antipsychotic 
medication starts and for patients not responding to or having problematic side 
effects on typical antipsychotic medication. 
(2) ... begin therapy with an effective less expensive agent. At the present 
time, this would lead to the preference of quetiapine and risperidone over 
0lanzapine.259 
The VA's policy quickly generated protests from consumer groups, who 
thought the policy would jeopardize veterans' care?60 However, an 
April 2002 report by the General Accounting Office concluded that the 
"guideline ... is sound and consistent with published clinical practice 
guidelines. . .. Almost all of the public and private sector psychiatric 
experts we interviewed agree that VA's use of cost as a factor to 
prioritize atypical antipsychotic drugs is reasonable, appropriate, and 
consistent with providing quality and cost-effective medical care.,,26I 
Although most V A psychiatrists who were interviewed for the report felt 
that guideline allowed them to prescribe the best medication for their 
259. REpORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, V A HEALTH CARE: IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE FOR 
ATYPICAL ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS GENERALLY SOUND U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO-02-
579, at 27 (2002) [hereinafter PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE]. For fiscal year 2001, the 







ld. at 6. 
260. See, e.g., Don Harper, Program Robs Veterans of Help, N. COUNTY TIMES (San 
Diego), June 25, 2001, http://www.nctimes.comlnewsl2001/20010625nI40I.html; Letter 
from Rex Cowdry, Medical Director, National Alliance for the Mentally III & Andrew 
Sperling, Policy Director, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, to Anthony J. Principi. 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs (July 23, 2001), http://www.nami.org/ 
update/20010723.html; National Mental Health Association, supra note 253, at 
http://www.nmhaorglnewsroomlsysteml lal. vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=330. 
261. PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE, supra note 259, at 2-3. 
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patients, nine percent did not feel free to prescribe the medication of 
their choice.262 
The VA's medication guideline explicitly recommends two novel 
agents as fIrst-line therapy for psychoses. Neuroleptics are to be used 
only if several atypicals have failed.263 By the year 2000, policies that 
explicitly require fIrst-use of neuroleptics had become rare to nonexistent. 
However, subtle fInancial incentives may affect psychiatrists' medication 
choices. A study by the Bazelon Center64 found that Medicaid patients 
had better access to atypicals than to comparison medications used to 
treat physical illnesses, but some restrictions on novel agents still 
operated. The authors noted that "Medicaid oversight of managed care 
was found to be very limited," and that in the future, "Medicaid 
programs will have powerful incentives to restrict access to atypical 
antipsychotics, given the likelihood of a continued increase in drug 
prices, the two- to three-times higher cost of atypical antipsychotics, and 
the 85 new medicines now under development to treat mental disorders.,,265 
A study of Medicaid managed care plans in Florida provides an 
example of possible ways that access to atypicals may be limited. When 
provider organizations were themselves at risk for pharmacy costs, novel 
agents were prescribed at about half the rate demonstrated by programs 
that were not at risk for pharmacy costs?66 Recently, a Florida federal 
district court dismissed a suit by a pharmaceutical manufacturers 
association opposing development of Medicaid formularies that might 
limit reimbursement to specifIc drugs. The court held that Florida statutes 
and federal Medicaid law permit "the establishment of a 'preferred drug list' 
and a 'prior authorization program.",267 However, the Florida Medicaid 
formulary currently includes all approved atypical antipsychotic drugs.268 
262. [d. at 18. 
263. [d. at 27. 
264. ''The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law is a nonprofit 
legal advocacy organization based in Washington D.C." Bazelon Center for Mental 
Health Law, Who We Are, at http://www.bazelon.orglwho.html Oast visited Aug. 4, 
2002). 
265. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 253, at http://www. 
bazelon.orglfonnulary.html. 
266. LoUIS DE LA PARTE FLORIDA MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, PATIERNS OF CARE: 
WHAT EFFECT Do FINANCIAL INCENTIVES HAVE ON PRESCRIPTION RATES IN MEDICAID 
PLANS? (2000), htlp://www.fmhi.usf.edufmstituteipubsinewslettersipolicybriefsiissue002.pdf. 
The study covered the period 1997-98, id., and may not reflect more recent practices. 
267. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1188 
(N.D. Fla. 2001). 
268. Agency for Health Care Administration, Florida Medicaid Preferred Drug 
1091 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1092 2002
Having examined some recent developments concerning availability 
of antipsychotic agents, let us next consider the potential outcomes of 
malpractice suits and other types of civil actions alleging damages from 
having received an older drug rather than an atypical antipsychotic. 
V. LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE USE OF NEUROLEPTICS 
A. The Perceived Threat of Malpractice Litigation 
The view that novel antipsychotics should be the flrst choice treatment 
for most patients with schizophrenia269 has generated speculation that 
administering conventional neuroleptics could now constitute grounds 
for lawsuits, even if clinicians that prescribed and managed administration 
of the drugs followed treatment practices that would have seemed 
impeccable in the mid-1990s. For example, at a January 2001 workshop 
on liability issues sponsored by the American Health Lawyers Association, 
attorney Steven B. Tannenbaum commented: "In today's climate, I 
would not like to be a defendant psychiatrist on the witness stand being 
cross-examined by a plaintiff s lawyer, having prescribed a typical drug 
as opposed to an atypical drug. And I do not know under today's 
circumstances of many psychiatrists who would use a typical drug as 
opposed to an atypical with the risk factors involved."270 At the same 
meeting, psychiatrist William M. Glazer agreed that prescribing cheaper 
but more side effect prone neuroleptics increasingly exposes psychiatrists to 
malpractice liability.27I 
These concerns must be considered in light of past experience, which 
suggests that psychiatrists have been overly afraid that neurologic 
damage from neuroleptics will lead to successful malpractice litigation,272 
as well as the actual practice patterns of psychiatrists that form the basis 
for judging whether alleged malpractice has occurred. Yet, a few well-
publicized cases have resulted in large judgments against clinicians that 
List, at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.uslMedicaidlPrescribed_Druglpharm_thera/fmpdl.shtml 
(last visited May I, 2002). 
269. See Chiles et aI., supra note 210, at 72; Guideline Series, supra note 210, at 
12-13; Miller et aI., supra note 210, at 652; supra Part IV. 
270. American Health Lawyers Association, Minimizing Physician Liability in 
Psychiatric Medicine, at http://www.healthlawyers.orglpublicinterestlpi_NYCsummary. 
cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002). The workshop was funded by Eli Lilly and Company, 
which markets olanzapine. Id. 
271. Carl Sherman, Antipsychotic Prescribing Limits Increase Liability, CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY NEWS, March 2001, at 12, available at http://www2.eclinicalpsychiatry 
news.comlscripts/om.dlllserve?action=searchDB&searchDBfor=art&artType=full&id=a 
qcO 10290312. 
272. 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 380 (2000). Despite predictions of increased tardive 
dyskinesia litigation, "the expected 'flood' [of such cases] has not yet materialized." Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
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improperly administered or monitored conventional neuroleptics,273 and 
these instances have probably fueled a common tendency among 
physicians to develop pervasive, inflated fears about their vulnerability 
to successful malpractice litigation.274 
Given this background, it is not surprising that the arrival of new 
medications with fewer neurological side effects, coupled with published 
proclamations that these drugs comprise a "new standard of care," has 
generated concerns about the potential for costly lawsuits stemming 
from continued use of the older, more risk-prone antipsychotic drugs. In 
January 1998, Dr. Steven E. Hyman, Director of the National Institute of 
Mental Health, sent what has become a widely circulated letter to Sally 
K. Richardson, Director of Medicaid Operations at the Health Care 
Financing Administration. This letter warned that state Medicaid agencies 
should not balk at paying for more expensive novel medications because 
"the potential cost of lawsuits" from tardive dyskinesia "would ... make 
up the difference between the cost of generic standard antipsychotics and 
the atypical antipsychotic medications currently available."275 Similarly, 
psychiatrists Kaye and Reed have warned their colleagues that allowing 
state-run facilities to skimp on paying for the new drugs would 
ultimately be foolish, because "expensive civil rights litigation arising 
from patients developing TD [tardive dyskinesia] from older medication 
is as important an economic consideration as the initial cost of 
medication.,,276 
This Part examines potential sources of liability related to continued 
use of typical antipsychotic medications. First is an explanation of why 
physicians' concern about successful malpractice lawsuits brought 
simply because patients developed injuries during proper administration 
273. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the jury 
negligence verdict of more than $750,000); Accardo v. Cenac, 722 So. 2d 302, 313 (La. 
Ct. App. 1998) (ordering an increased damage award). 
274. "[M]ost physicians live in constant apprehension of being named a defendant 
in a medical malpractice lawsuit." MARSHALL B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE TIED: LEGAL 
TENSIONS AND MEDICAL ETHICS 8 (1998). 
275. Letter from Steven E. Hyman, Director, National Institute of Mental Health, to 
Sally K. Richardson, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Health Care 
Financing Administration (Jan. 16, 1998), reprinted in National Alliance for the 
Mentally TIl, HCFA Provides State Medicaid Office with Guidance on Access to Atypical 
Antipsychotic Medication, at http://www.nami.orglcgi-binlprintfyl.cgi?/update/ 980225. 
html (last visited Aug. 4, 2002). 
276. Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331. 
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of older antipsychotics is, at this point, premature.277 This Article then 
reviews other types of malpractice lawsuits, including claims for injuries 
related to informed consent violations and wrongful death claims 
stemming from failure to take available precautions, which seem more 
likely to receive sound support from current clinical knowledge.278 
Finally, this Part of the Article explains why litigation construing use of 
older drugs as violations of civil rights and of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act279 may be on the horizon.28o 
B. Malpractice Lawsuits: Four Potential Strategies 
If a patient filed a suit for damages resulting from a conventional 
antipsychotic, defending such a prescription decision might well be an 
expensive and emotionally troubling experience for the accused 
clinician. From a legal perspective, however, the important question is 
whether such a lawsuit might succeed. The following Sections examine 
four legal theories under which such a lawsuit might be filed and 
consider the factors that might determine whether each type of lawsuit 
might lead to a successful outcome for the plaintiff. 
1. Prescribing Neuroleptics as Per Se Malpractice 
The previously cited comments of Mr. Tannenbaum and Dr. Glazer 
envision what one might call a "prescribing neuroleptics as per se 
malpractice" claim. Such a claim might be brought by a patient281 who 
received a conventional neuroleptic well after less risky medications had 
become available and who, as often happens, suffered permanent neurological 
damage. Central to a per se malpractice claim is the belief that even if 
the prescribing physician followed prescribing practices that were 
acceptable only a few years ago, the advent of novel agents has made it 
possible to drastically reduce the risk of neurological damage, so that 
injuries from older neuroleptics ought to be compensable in a malpractice 
action. Unless a doctor has a compelling reason to prescribe a neuroleptic, 
this claim might state, failure to prescribe the more benign atypicals 
constitutes a deviation from the current national282 standard of care. 
277. See infra Part V.B.!. 
278. See infra Parts V.B.2-V.BA. 
279. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.c., 42 U.S.c., 97 U.S.C.). 
280. See infra Part V.c. 
281. To simplify exposition, this section refers to plaintiffs as though they were 
single patient litigants. Of course, lawsuits seeking recompense for medication induced 
injuries could also be brought by groups of plaintiffs or by a plaintiffs family members. 
282. For an endorsement of a national (rather than a local) standard of care, see 
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How might a patient-plaintiff support this contention? If his doctor 
prescribed a neuroleptic as the fIrst choice antipsychotic therapy after 
1999, the patient could point to the guidelines and algorithms cited 
earlier in this Article, arguing that these publications represent the 
consensus of experts about optimal care. Many prominent U.S. 
psychiatrists believe that the novel antipsychotics have raised expectations 
about therapeutic efficacy and functional outcomes for patients with 
schizophrenia and that these drugs have changed expectations about how 
to assess the effectiveness of pharmacological treatment. For example, 
in contrasting the treatment of a patient with schizophrenia in 1985 with 
current treatment, Dr. Ronald Pies suggests that formerly a substantial 
reduction in positive symptoms with only mild side effects represented 
the sought after treatment result in academic medical centers. Now, 
however, academic psychiatrists examine a patient's post-treatment 
cognitive function, affective state, relationships with family, and 
vocational functioning.283 
Declaring novel antipsychotics the new standard of care may be an 
effective and legitimate rhetorical device to encourage physicians to 
update their practices and to goad public and private third party payers 
into making the new drugs readily available. In medical malpractice 
litigation, however, the phrase "prevailing standard of care" refers to 
"the average degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of 
the same medical specialty community in similar situations,,284 as 
established from the testimony of expert witnesses. Among the defenses 
permitted to a physician-defendant is the assertion that the chosen course 
of treatment had received the endorsement of "a respectable minority" of 
physicians and that he followed "acceptable procedures of administering 
the treatment as espoused by the minority."285 
Systematic, up-to-the-minute data on the selection of antipsychotic 
agents are hard to come by. However, a multistate study of prescribing 
practices in the late 1990s found that conventional agents accounted for 
fIfty-one percent of antipsychotic prescriptions.286 A 1999 publication 
Morrison v, MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555,564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
283. Ronald Pies, The Shifting Paradigm of Antipsychotic Outcome Assessment, 
PSYCIDATRIC TIMES, Nov. 2000, at 54, 54. 
284. Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 1976). 
285. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), affd, 554 
S.W.2d. 160 (Tex. 1977). 
286. TAM! L. MARK ET AL., ACCESS To NEW MEDICATIONS To TREAT ScmzoPHRENIA 
(n.d.), at http://www.medstatcom/products/posters/mark_2k.pdf (last visited Sept 24, 2002). 
1095 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1096 2002
also reported that conventional neuroleptics still accounted for a 
substantial fraction of U.S. antipsychotic prescriptions.287 A survey of 
1998 Medicare and Medicaid funded antipsychotic prescription practices 
in nine states, published in January 2000, showed that just over half of 
the prescriptions for antipsychotics were for novel agents.288 A study of 
1998 antipsychotic prescribing patterns in Texas prisons found that 
eighty-seven percent of inmates received only conventional neuroleptics?89 
In December 2000, Kapur and Remington stated that in North America, 
novel agents accounted for three-fourths of new antipsychotic 
prescriptions/9o implying that conventional agents still accounted for the 
other quarter. Finally, from the time of her arrest in June 2001 through 
her internationally publicized criminal trial in March 2002, Andrea Pia 
Yates received the conventional antipsychotic drug haloperidol, which 
successfully treated her psychosis.291 A few psychiatrists in the U.S.292 
and Great Britain293 have voiced their support in print for trying older 
antipsychotic medications before employing the newer, more expensive 
agents.294 Although he was among the earliest of psychiatrists to support 
fIrst-line use of novel antipsychotics,295 Dr. Jeffrey Lieberman nonetheless 
believed in late 2000 that "a clinical and public policy decision to 
replace conventional with atypical antipsychotic agents, although 
appealing, requires more empirical evidence.,,296 Clearly, at least a 
287. Meltzer, supra note 251, at 7. 
288. CATHERINE HARRINGTON ET AL., THE LEWIN GROUP, ACCESS AND UTILIZATION 
OF NEW ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS (2002), at http://aspe.hhs. 
gov/healthlreports/psychmedaccess/index.htm. 
289. Jacques Baillargeon & Salvador A. Contreras, Antipsychotic Prescribing 
Patterns in the Texas Prison System, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 48, 51 (2001). 
290. Kapur & Remington, supra note 204, at 1360. 
291. Carol Christian, Yates on Video: 'Psychosis Seems to Have Left Me', Hous. 
CHRON., Mar. 7, 2002, at lA. Ms. Yates was convicted of killing her five children. Jim 
Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother Who Drowned Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2002, at A23. 
292. Robert A. Rosenheck, Taking Issue: Pharmacological Progress: Seeking 
Balance, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1213, 1213 (2000). ("The clinical benefit of atypical 
anti psychotics is small to modest, with little evidence of widespread dramatic gains in 
quality of life. The clearest advantage is reduction of extrapyramidal side effects. but 
adverse effects such as weight gain, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia threaten to take their 
place."). 
293. Geddes et aI., supra note 20, at 1374. 
294. Worldwide, atypical agents account for only one-tenth of prescriptions for 
antipsychotic drugs. Herbert Y. Meltzer, Side Effects of Antipsychotic Medications: 
Physicians Choice of Medication and Patient Compliance, 61 1. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
3, 3 (Supp. 8, 2000). Whether prescribing practices outside the U.S. would be relevant 
evidence concerning behavior within "the same medical community" would, of course. 
be a question for courts to settle. 
295. Lieberman, supra note 209, at 71. 
296. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et aI., Commentary & Analysis: Atypical Alltipsychotics 
and SSRIs: Second Generation Drugs of the Psychopharmacological Revolution in 
1096 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1097 2002
[VOL. 39: 1033,2002] Unbuckling the Straitjacket 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
respectable minority of psychiatrists still considers that first choice use 
of conventional antipsychotics would constitute acceptable psychiatric 
care, though experts increasingly prefer and recommend other patterns 
of medication selection. Prescribing neuroleptics is not yet malpractice, 
even if the older medications come with a higher risk that patients will 
suffer pennanent neurological damage. 
2. Failure to Inform 
Though there is little reason to believe that a prescribing neuroleptics 
as per se malpractice claim would succeed, the opposite may be true for 
a malpractice lawsuit alleging that damages stemming from failing to tell 
a patient about the availability and possible advantages of the novel 
antipsychotics. Among the fIrst psychiatrists to recognize this were Dr. 
Debra Pinals and Dr. Peter Buckley,297 who raised the specter of a 
malpractice claim similar to that brought in Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 
Inc. 298 
In the late 1970s, Raphael Osheroff, a physician, underwent hospitalization 
at Chestnut Lodge, a psychiatric hospital in Maryland that had a national 
reputation for treating psychiatric disorders with psychoanalytically 
oriented treatment. The hospital's clinicians conceptualized Dr. Osheroffs 
emotional problems as manifestations of personality flaws, and his 
treatment consisted of psychotherapy alone. After spending seven 
months at Chestnut Lodge without improving, Dr. Osheroff went to 
Silver Hill Foundation Hospital in Connecticut, where clinicians 
diagnosed him with severe depression and treated him with 
antipsychotic and antidepressant medication. In three weeks, Dr. 
Osheroff had improved. In three months he had recovered enough to 
leave the hospital and soon thereafter he returned to medical practice. In 
1982, Dr. Osheroff sued Chestnut Lodge, contending that the hospital 
negligently failed to tell him about and offer him pharmacological 
treatment. He also contended that pharmacological treatment was 
backed by scientifIc studies showing that it would likely be effective for 
treating his condition, whereas no study supported use of psychotherapy.299 
Clinical Psychiatry, 51 PSYCIDATRIC SERVICES 1254, 1256 (2000). 
297. Debra A. Pinals & Peter F. Buckley, Novel Antipsychotic Agents and Their 
Implications/or Forensic Psychiatry, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 7,16 (1999). 
298. 490 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
299. Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient's Right to Effective Treatment: 
Implications o/Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 409,410 (1990). 
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Osheroff has received little discussion in formal legal circles300 and 
ultimately produced no official legal precedent or standard concerning 
the obligation to provide information about treatment because it was 
settled before triaPOI Yet the case has been the subject of intense debate 
within psychiatry, where it has symbolized the specialty's ongoing and 
contentious disagreements about the comparative merits of pharmacological 
and psychotherapeutic treatments, and physicians' obligations in selecting 
those treatments.302 
For the present discussion, the importance of Osheroff stems from the 
effect of an institution wide approach to managing psychiatric patients 
on the plaintiff s treatment. Psychiatrists whose drug selections reflect 
institutional policies, particularly money saving policies that reflect 
managed care incentives or limitations in public sector funding, find 
themselves in therapeutic contexts that are analogous to those litigated in 
Osheroff. When a treating clinician prescribes one form of therapy but 
knows, or at least should know, about alternative therapies that other 
doctors might recommend under the circumstances, what is the doctor's 
obligation to his patient? 
300. As published, Osheroff does not discuss the plaintiffs substantive malpractice 
claims. Subsequent cases have cited Osheroff in connection with judicial review of 
malpractice arbitration claims but not regarding standards of care themselves. See, e.g., 
State Cent. Collection Unit v. Gettes, 584 A.2d 689, 693 n.3 (Md. 1991). Two law 
review articles briefly discuss aspects of Dr. Osheroff s complaints about his treatment at 
Chestnut Lodge and his lawsuit's potential implications for mental health professionals. 
See Ron Nichwolodoff, Expert Psychological Opinion Evidence in the Courts, 6 HEALTH 
L. J. 279, 289 (1998); Note, Deborah Pergament, Intemet Psychotherapy: Current Status 
and Future Regulation, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 233, 254 (1998). 
301. Alan A. Stone, Law, Science, and Psychiatric Malpractice: A Response to Klennan's 
Indictment of Psychoanalytic Psychiatry, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 419, 420 (1990). 
302. The centerpieces of the debate are the two just cited articles by Klerman and 
Stone. Letters responding to these articles filled eight pages in subsequent issues of the 
American Psychiatric Association's (APA) principal scientific publication. See 
Comments on the Klennan-Stone Debate on Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 148 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 139 (1991); see also Gerald L. Klerman, The Osheroff Debate: Finale, 148 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 387 (1991). For a recent discussion, see DAVID HEALY, THE 
ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA 217-55 (1997). 
Dr. Klerman died in 1992. Summarizing his views in the case, psychologist Myrna 
Weissman wrote: 
[M]y late husband, Gerald L. Klerman, M.D. (a developer of 
psychotherapy and an expert in treatment evaluation), argued that a patient had 
the right to receive treatments that had been demonstrated to be effective for 
his or her condition. Osheroffs serious psychotic depression had resulted in 
his hospitalization and damage to his personal life and had not responded to 
psychotherapy alone. The empirical evidence, Klerman argued, pointed to 
treatment with antidepressants, with or without psychotherapy, rather than long-
term psychoanalytic psychotherapy alone, which had not been demonstrated to 
be effective for psychotic depression and had not been effective in this case. 
Myrna M. Weissman, Book Review, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1475, 1475 (1998) 
(reviewing DAVID HEALY, THE ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA (1997». 
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O'Keefe v. Orea,303 the only published appellate level psychiatric 
malpractice case that concerns the issue of choosing a typical versus a 
novel antipsychotic drug,304 addresses this specific issue. Ruth O'Keefe 
sued the psychiatrist who treated her son Christopher as an inpatient at 
Florida's Baptist Medical Center in 1993. Mter leaving the hospital, 
Christopher attacked his mother and father, killing the latter.305 During 
the hospitalization, a consultant psychiatrist had evaluated Christopher 
and had suggested consideration of a clozapine trial?06 The lawsuit 
alleged that the treating physician had failed to discuss this suggestion 
with Christopher's parents and that this failure, along with many other 
alleged errors, constituted negligence?07 Although the trial court dismissed 
Mrs. O'Keefe's suit, an appellate court reversed.308 Among the appellate 
court's holdings was the conclusion that the psychiatrist's fiduciary 
obligations included "a duty to inform Christopher's parents 
concerning. .. the diagnosis of other physicians who had observed 
Christopher, together with his personal treatment recommendations and 
the treatment recommendations of other physicians.,,309 
U.S. legal requirements regarding a physician's duty to disclose 
information fall into one of two major categories. Most jurisdictions 
assess the duty using a "customary" or "professional standard,,,31o 
303. 731 So. 2d 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
304. At least three other published malpractice cases have concerned alleged misuse 
of clozapine. See Baker v. Lane County, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295-97 (D. Or. 1999) 
(permitting a new trial over a clozapine related death because the previous verdict had 
been against the great weight of evidence, and the trial court had improperly admitted 
prejudicial evidence about the decedent); Presto v. Charter Peachford Behavioral Health 
Sys., Inc., 494 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court's grant of 
Charter Peachford's motion for summary judgment); Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487 
S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
claims against Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and affirming the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Caremark, Inc.). A fourth case does not mention 
clozapine, but concerns a patient who gained weight and died of respiratory failure while 
taking the drug. Patten v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 517, 520 (Va. 2001) (affirming 
the trial court's decision to dismiss because the defendants were protected by sovereign 
immunity); see also Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing 
weight gain from clozapine). 
305. O'Keefe, 731 So. 2d at 682. 
306. [d. at 683. 
307. [d. 
308. [d. at 681. 
309. [d. at 686. 
310. "[I]n most jurisdictions, ... the duty is measured by a professional medical 
standard: either the customary disclosure practices of physicians or what a reasonable 
physician would disclose under the same or similar circumstances." Laurent B. Frantz, 
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according to which physicians must disclose the information that other 
similarly qualified and situated physicians would disclose in the same 
situation.311 In contrast, a minority of jurisdictions apply a "materiality 
of the information" approach,312 which requires physicians to disclose to 
patients all information that would be considered "material" to a 
reasonable patient making a decision about a physician's proposed 
course of treatment.313 Rules in some states, including Louisiana,314 
Iowa/15 Oregon,316 and Tennessee,317 represent variations on these two 
major approaches.318 
Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to 
Illfonn Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 § 2(a) (1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
311. For example, in Nebraska, "Informed consent ... mean[s] consent to a 
procedure based on information which would ordinarily be provided to the patient under 
like circumstances by health care providers engaged in similar practice in the locality or 
in similar localities." Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Neb. 1997). 
312. "A number of jurisdictions, however, have recently embraced the view that a 
physician's duty to inform his patient of the risks of a proposed treatment is measured, 
not by a professional medical standard, but by the patient's need for information material 
to his decision whether to accept or reject the proposed treatment." Frantz, supra note 
310, § 2(a). 
313. The most influential decision espousing the "materiality" standard, Canterbury 
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), explicitly rejected the "professional" 
disclosure standard, id. at 783-84, and held that doctors must tell patients about "the 
inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that 
treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated," id., at 787-88. 
For a listing of cases following this later rule, see Frantz, supra note 310, § 6. 
314. Louisiana statutory law requires disclosure of known risks of death, brain 
damage, paralysis, loss of limb, loss of function of organs, and disfiguring scars. LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.40 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). If the consent forms do not 
meet the statutory requirement, the materiality standard applies. LaCaze v. Collier, 437 
So. 2d 869, 870 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., concurring). 
315. The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted Iowa statutes as codifying the 
materiality standard. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 
1987) (interpreting IOWA CODE § 147.137 (1981». 
316. In Oregon, physicians must disclose only in general terms the nature of the 
procedure and that there may be alternatives and risks. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.097(1) 
(200 I). The physician must then ask the patient if a more thorough explanation is 
desired, and if so, all material risks and viable alternatives are to be disclosed. !d. § 
677.097(2). 
317. In Tennessee, "[i]f informed consent is not effectively obtained, the 
Defendants' departure from the standard of care is not negligence, but battery, because 
the doctrine of battery is applicable to cases involving treatment performed without 
informed or knowledgeable consent." Roddy v. Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 
572,576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); see also Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63, 70 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1972) (discussing the distinction between cases based on lack of informed consent 
and cases alleging injury that resulted from negligent treatment). 
318. Some jurisdictions have applied the materiality standard as an additional 
requirement beyond what physicians customarily tell patients in similar circumstances. 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 702 
(Minn. 1977), modified, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980). 
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O'Keefe articulates a disclosure requirement that appears consistent 
with the latter approach, that is, a requirement that the psychiatrist 
disclose not just the information about the particular proposed therapy, 
which some decisions endorsing the materiality standard have 
emphasized,319 but also of the existence of other therapies and the 
benefits and risks of those therapies?20 In O'Keefe this requirement 
stemmed from the recommendation of another psychiatrist who had 
personally evaluated Christopher. It would not be surprising, however, 
for courts in jurisdictions that follow the materiality standard to view as 
potentially liable for damages a psychiatrist who prescribed neuroleptics 
but did not tell his patient about the novel antipsychotic drugS.32 ! This 
319. See, e.g., Blincoe v. Luessenhop, 669 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1987). A prima 
facie case in an infonned consent action is established when the plaintiff shows: 
1. the doctor failed to infonn plaintiff of certain risks of the medical 
procedure; 
2. the undisclosed risks were "material," i.e. the reasonable person, in what 
the physician knows or should know to be the plaintiff s position, would 
be likely to attach significance to the allegedly undisclosed risks in 
deciding to accept or to forego the proposed treatment; 
3. the prudent person, in the plaintiffs position, would have decided to 
decline treatment if suitably infonned of all perils bearing significance; 
4. the undisclosed risk actually manifested itself and caused the damage for 
which plaintiff seeks recovery. 
ld. at 616 (citations omitted). Ohio follows the same standard. Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 
N.E.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Ohio 1985). 
320. Compare Blincoe, 669 F. Supp. 513, with Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107 
(Minn. 1998), and Farina v. Kraus, 754 A2d 1215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). In 
Biga)', the Minnesota Supreme Court held that: 
To establish a claim of negligent nondisclosure, a plaintiff must show five 
elements: (1) a duty on the part of a physician to know of a risk or alternative 
treatment plan; (2) a duty to disclose the risk or alternative program; (3) a 
breach of that duty; (4) causation, Le., the undisclosed risk must materialize in 
harm; and (5) damages. 
Riga)', 575 N.W.2d at 111 n.3. In Farina, the court stated that: 
[T]he infonned-consent basis of malpractice, as opposed to deviation from the 
applicable standard of care, rests not upon the physician having erred in 
diagnosis or administration of treatment but rather in the failure to have 
provided the patient with adequate infonnation regarding the risks of a given 
treatment or with adequate infonnation regarding the availability of alternative 
treatments and the comparative risks and benefits of each. 
Farina, 754 A2d at 1222-23. 
321. John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of 
Ph),sician to lnfonn Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 AL.R. 
4th 900, 903 (1985): 
[T]here is a duty imposed on the physician to disclose to the patient the 
existence of any methods of... treatment that would serve as feasible 
alternatives to the method initially selected by the physician. . .. The failure 
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may apply even if the psychiatrist had disclosed the risks of neuroleptics 
and monitored his patient carefully, and notwithstanding agency or 
institutional policies that endorsed a stepped care approach322 to drug 
selection. 
Available empirical data suggest that in actual practice, psychiatrists 
often do not inform patients of serious material risks associated with 
neuroleptic therapy.323 Also, studies suggest that psychiatrists typically 
do not document discussions about informed consent with patients that 
take antipsychotic drugs324 nor have they documented telling most 
patients that take neuroleptics either about the availability of atypicals or 
about their lower incidence of side effects.325 
3. Injuriesfrom Mandated Depot Neuroleptics 
Malpractice litigation also might arise from medication selection in 
circumstances where informed consent to treatment is attenuated, such 
as outpatient civil commitment (OPC).326 ope is just one method used 
by agencies, institutions, or individuals to induce, or coerce, nonhospitalized 
mentally ill persons to get psychiatric treatment, including medication. 
Examples of other means include conditioning receipt of welfare 
benefits on obtaining treatment, tying favorable disposition of a criminal 
case to the defendant's receiving treatment mandated by a mental health 
court, and advance directives,327 It is easily conceivable that the liability 
issues discussed here concerning ope might apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
these other forms of leveraged treatment. American psychiatrists have 
endorsed ope under certain circumstances328 as a treatment for severely 
of a physician to disclose feasible alternatives has been held to pennit a finding 
that the physician thereby failed to obtain the patient's infonned consent to the 
method employed by the physician .. , and that the physician was thereby 
liable for malpractice. 
322. See supra Part IV.B.6 (discussing the stepped care approach). 
323. Irwin Kleinman & Debbie Schachter, Obtaining lnfonned Consent of Patients 
at Risk of Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1182, 1183 
(2000). 
324. Debbie Schachter & Irwin Kleinman, Psychiatrists' Documentation of 
lnfonned Consent, 43 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1015 (1998). 
325. Prakash S. Masand et aI., Prescribing Conventional Antipsychotics at Two 
Veterans Administration Hospitals: Are There Geographical Differences?, 6 CNS 
SPECTRUMS 894, 895 (2001). 
326. A recent discussion of the history of OPC and empirical research was prepared 
under the auspices of the APA's Council on Psychiatry and Law as an information 
source for persons preparing legislation. See Joan B. Gerbasi et aI., Resource Document 
on Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 127, 127 
(2000). 
327. John Monahan et aI., Mandated Community Treatme1lt: Beyond Outpatient 
Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198, 1199-1201 (2001). 
328. See generally DAVID STARRETI ET AL., INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO 
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mentally ill persons that suffer frequent psychotic relapses because they 
stop taking medication?29 Such patients also appear to be at a 
heightened risk for becoming violent shortly after they leave the 
hospital.330 Long-acting, "depot" injections of medication are often 
recommended for patients who will not or cannot comply with oral 
antipsychotic therapy, but the only depot preparations currently available 
in the United States contain neuroleptics.331 
A person subject to an OPC order could develop tardive dyskinesia 
because he was required to receive depot injections of neuroleptics.332 
Thus far, litigation about OPC related medication has focused on 
whether courts could require individuals to take drugs as part of the OPC 
orde233 and what legal consequences might ensue if a patient did not 
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT: REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INvOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT 
COMMITMENT 16 (1987) (stating the APA's position favoring the judicious use ofOPC). 
329. Thomas W. Haywood et al., Predicting the "Revolving Door" Phenomenon 
Among Patiellts with Schizophrenic, Schizoaffective, and Affective Disorders, 152 AM. J. 
PSYClllATRY 856, 856 (1995); see also S. Davies, Involuntary Out-patiellt Commitmellt 
and Supervised Discharge, 177 BRIT. J. PSYClllATRY 183, 183 (2000) (reporting 
recidivism that was reduced in British outpatients); Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can 
Involulltary Outpatient Commitmellt Reduce Hospital Recidivism?: Findings from a 
Randomized Trial with Severely Melltally III Individuals, 156 AM. J. PSYClllATRY 1968, 
1973 (1999) (reporting long-term OPC reduced recidivism in North Carolina patients). 
But see Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitmellt Pilot Program, 52 PSYClllATRIC SERVICES 330, 332-33 (2001) (reporting 
that OPC did not affect rates of rehospitalization). 
330. Marvin S. Swartz et al., Violence and Severe Mental Illness: The Effects of 
Substance Abuse and Nonadherence to Medication, 155 AM. J. PSYCIDATRY 226, 230 
(1998) (finding an increased risk of violence among discharged patients who use drugs 
but do not take prescribed psychotropic medication); see also Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., 
Involuntary Out-Patiellt Commitment and Reduction of Violent Behaviour in PersollS 
with Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCIDATRY 324, 329 (2000) (reporting OPC 
successful in reducing violence). 
331. The neuroleptics are haloperidol and fluphenazine. For a chemical description 
of long-acting injectable haloperidol, see PDR, supra note 49, at 2535-56. 
332. Several statutes include medication compliance as a criterion for invoking 
OPC. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-602(2) (1997) (stating that an OPC patient 
may be "obligat[ed] to participate in any medically appropriate outpatient treatment, 
including ... medication"); WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(dm) (1999-2000) (stating that OPC 
is permissible if a patient's dangerousness "is likely to be controlled with appropriate 
medication administered on an outpatient basis"). Although North Carolina's statute 
does not authorize forcible administration of medication, most patients believe that OPC 
mandates compliance with medication. Randy Borum et al., Consumer Perceptions of 
Involuntary Outpatiellt Commitment, 50 PSYCIDATRIC SERVICES 1489, 1489-90 (1999). 
333. See, e.g., In re K.B., 562 N.W.2d 208, 211-12 (Mich. Ct App. 1997) 
(reasoning that returning an outpatient to a hospital involuntarily after refusing to take 
antipsychotic medication is not a violation of due process). 
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take medication.334 The arrival and increased U.S. usage of novel 
anti psychotics suggests another type of litigation addressed not to the 
requirement of medication itself, but to the type of antipsychotic 
medication that was required. A patient might bring a malpractice 
lawsuit alleging negligence because his doctor insisted that he needed a 
compliance-guaranteeing depot neuroleptic preparation and did not try 
one of the orally administered novel antipsychotics. Even the strong 
proponents of the novel agents believe that outpatient noncompliance is 
an unambiguous indication for a depot neuroleptic.335 Therefore, a key 
issue in a malpractice case would be the evidence the psychiatrist could 
muster to show that the patient would not have taken oral medication, 
would have been likely to experience quick relapse and dire consequences, 
and therefore needed a long-acting injectable antipsychotic drug. 
Although successful suits for tardive dyskinesia have been uncommon to 
date,336 evidence on patients' compliance with and acceptance of new 
medications337 may increase the likelihood that injuries from neuroleptics 
could lead to successful litigation over the next few years. 
4. Neuro[eptics and Harm to Self or Others 
Persons with schizophrenia appear to be at unusually high risk for 
334. In re Matter of Tarpley, 581 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (Ind. 1991) (finding that the 
trial court lacked authority to either require the patient to take medication or hold him in 
contempt for noncompliance); In re Matter of Utley, 565 N.E.2d 1152, 1156-67 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991) (stating that the trial court committed error in finding the patient guilty of 
criminal contempt for failing to take medication without a determination that the 
patient's noncompliance was willful and not caused by illness). 
335. Guideline Series, supra note 210, at 12; Miller et aI., supra note 210, at 652. 
336. 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 354-55 (2000); Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331. 
337. See, e.g., Julio Bobes et aI., Risperidone: A Real Alternative to Depot 
Neuroleptic Treated Patients, 28 ACTAS Esp. PSIQUJATR. 367 (2000) (reporting that 
risperidone improved disability, psychotic symptoms, and tolerability in patients); John 
G. Csernansky et aI., A Comparison of Risperidone and Haloperidol for the Prevention 
of Relapse in Patients with Schizophrenia, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 16, 18 (2002) 
(reporting that patients treated with risperidone had a lower risk of relapse, and were less 
likely to stop treatment, than were patients taking haloperidol); N.M. Desai et aI., 
Switching from Depot Antipsychotics to Risperidolle: Results of a Study of Chronic 
Schizophrenia, 16 Anv ANCES THERAPY 78 (1999) (stating that patients previously taking 
depot neuroleptics benefited from, complied with, and preferred risperidone). 
This evidence is not unanimous. A study of prescription refill patterns suggests that 
outpatients' compliance with most oral atypicals is no better than with neuroleptics. 
Mark VaneIIi et aI., Refill Patterns of Atypical and Conventional Antipsychotic 
Medications at a National Retail Pharmacy Chain, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1248, 
1249 (2001). The exception was clozapine, where the demands for frequent blood 
drawing required eight pharmacy visits per month, plus additional visits to psychiatrists. 
"This process may have resulted in better patient engagement," or it may have been the 
case that the patients doctors selected to receive clozapine were more compliant patients 
or patients with good social support. Id. 
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committing suicide338 and have an increased risk of acting violently 
toward others.339 Self-harming behavior that results in serious injury and 
aggression by patients towards others are well known sources of 
malpractice litigation for psychiatrists.34o In 1999, Pinals and Buckley 
described published reports on the superiority of novel antipsychotic 
agents in reducing patients' aggressiveness?41 Recent studies have 
found that arrest rates fall after patients began receiving c1ozapine342 and 
338. Herz et al., supra note 143, at 5 ("[S]uicide ... occurs in up to 10% of 
patients" with schizophrenia.). 
339. See, e.g., Louise Arseneault et al., Mental Disorders and Violence in a Total 
Birth Cohort: Resultsfrom the Dunedin Study, 57 ARCIDVES GEN. PSYCIDATRY 979, 982 
(2000) (reporting that persons with schizophrenia are 2.5 times more likely to become 
violent than nondisordered persons and persons with schizophrenia and marijuana 
dependence had far higher rates of violence); Patricia A. Brennan et aI., Major Mental 
Disorders and Criminal Violence in a Danish Birth Cohort, 57 ARCIDVES GEN. 
PSYCIDATRY 494, 494 (2000) ("Individuals hospitalized for schizophrenia and men 
hospitalized with organic psychosis have higher rates of arrests for violence than those 
never hospitalized."); Sheilagh Hodgins et al., Mental Disorder and Crime: Evidence 
From a Danish Birth Cohort, 53 ARCmVES GEN. PSYCIDATRY 489, 489 (1996) ("Women 
and men who had been hospitalized in psychiatric wards were more likely to have been 
convicted of a criminal offense than persons with no history of psychiatric 
hospitalization."); Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental 
Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 275, 275 (1992) (reporting that the risk of 
violence stems from active symptoms of the disorder, not from having the disorder per 
se); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychotic Symptoms and Disorders and the Risk of 
Violent Behaviour in the Community, 6 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 309, 317 
(1996) (reporting that the risk of violence stems from active symptoms of the disorder, 
not having the disorder per se); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric 
Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 
41 Hosp. & COMMUNITYPSYCIDATRY 761,769 tbl.7 (1990) (reporting that schizophrenia 
increases the risk by approximately six times); Jari Tiihonen et aI., Specific Major 
Mental Disorders and Criminality: A 26-Year Prospective Study of the 1966 Northern 
Finland Birth Cohort, 154 AM. J. PSYCIDATRY 840, 840 (1996) ("[The] risk of criminal 
behavior was significantly higher among subjects with psychotic disorders, even though 
the socioeconomic status of the childhood family was controlled."). 
340. Douglas Mossman & Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice and the Psychiatrist: A 
Primer for Residents, 21 ACADEMIC PSYCIDATRY 11 (1997). Under a variety of 
circumstances, psychiatrists face potential malpractice liability for wrongful death claims 
stemming from a patient's suicide. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 7A-8 (2000) 
(discussing suicide cases and related commentary). The leading case finding therapist 
liability for failing to protect the potential victim of his patient is Tarasoff v. Regents of 
the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). For a discussion of Tarasoff, its 
case law progeny, and related commentary by legal scholars and mental health 
professionals, see 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 7C-2 (2000). 
341. Debra A. Pinals & Peter F. Buckley, Novel Antipsychotic Agents and Their 
Implications for Forensic Psychiatry, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCIDATRY L. 7, 7 (1999). 
342. W. Gordon Frankle et al., Clozapine-Associated Reduction in Arrest Rates of 
Psychotic Patients with Criminal Histories, 158 AM. J. PSYCmATRY 270, 273 (2001) 
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that olanzapine reduced scores on a scale measuring intentional 
aggressive behavior.343 Conceivably, following violence done to a third 
party by a neuroleptic treated patient, especially a patient who 
previously had exhibited behavior indicative of a propensity to act 
aggressively,344 the injured party or his relatives might sue the patient's 
psychiatrist, alleging that by not prescribing a novel antipsychotic, the 
clinician had negligently failed to take reasonable measures to reduce a 
foreseeable risk.345 Family members of a neuroleptic treated patient who 
committed suicide and had exhibited depressive symptoms might lodge 
a similar claim against their relative's psychiatrist. To support their 
claim, they could cite prominent psychiatrists' beliefs that atypical 
agents reduce schizophrenic patients' depressive symptoms and risk of 
suicide.346 
("[A]rrest rates of the patients taking clozapine were significantly lower while they were 
taking the drug than before they were given the drug."). 
343. Narendran et aI., supra note 50, at 515. 
344. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965) ("One who takes charge 
of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third 
person to prevent him from doing such harm."). That doctors have a long recognized 
legal duty to protect persons from a patient with a known propensity toward violence is 
illustrated in University of Louisville v. Hammock, 106 S.W. 219 (Ky. 1907). In 
Hammock, the court stated that a patient's 
disease being known, as it was, to a physician of the institution [and other 
personnel], ... and their further knowledge, especially that of the physician, 
that a person so afflicted might reasonably be expected to become violent, 
uncontrollable, and dangerous at any time, ought to have induced them to take 
such reasonable precautions with reference to his control or confinement as 
would have prevented his inflicting injury upon other inmates .... 
/d. at 220. 
345. In an article authored before the advent of novel antipsychotic agents, 
Appelbaum listed administration of medication as one potential option for reducing a 
patient's risk of violence. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems 
in Fulfilling the Duty to Protect, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 425, 426 (1985). 
346. Paul E. Keck, Jr. et aI., The Efficacy of Atypical Antipsychotics in the 
Treatment of Depressive Symptoms, Hostility, and Suicidality in Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 4, 8 (Supp. 3, 2000); Herbert Y. Meltzer et 
aI., Assessing Cardiovascular Risks Versus Clinical Benefits of Atypical Antipsychotic 
Drug Treatment, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 25, 27 (Supp. 9, 2000); William H. Reid et 
aI., Suicide Prevention Effects Associated with Clozapine Therapy in Schizophrenia and 
Schizoaffective Disorder, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1029, 1032 (1998). But see 
Fontaine et aI., supra note 238, at 286 (finding absence of data to support claim of 
decreased mortality associated with clozapine or olanzapine); Michael J. Semyak et aI., 
Impact of Clozapine on Completed Suicide, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 931, 935 (2001) 
(reporting that taking clozapine was associated with a decreased death rate but not with a 
decrease in the suicide rate). For a case involving a therapist's not taking "appropriate 
preventive measures" prior to a patient's suicide (although ultimately barred due to the 
statute of limitations), see Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538-39 (Ct. App. 1978). 
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C. Neuroleptics as Civil Rights Violations and Discrimination 
Besides malpractice lawsuits, psychiatrists and treatment agencies that 
provide care to patients with psychoses must consider two additional 
types of litigation as possible consequences of administering older 
neuroleptics: civil rights actions and actions alleging discrimination 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
1. Neuroleptics as Civil Rights Violations 
A patient who was involuntarily committed to a government run 
hospital and who received treatment from hospital employed physicians 
could fIle an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983347 alleging that using 
neuroleptics as drugs of first choice constituted a violation of his civil 
rights. The starting point for any analysis of such a claim is Youngberg 
v. Romeo.348 
During a two-year stay at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 
Nicholas Romeo, a severely retarded, involuntarily committed resident, 
sustained scores of bodily injuries that had been inflicted by himself and 
other residents, including cuts, broken bones, and damaged genitalia.349 
His mother filed a next friend civil rights suit alleging that administrators' 
failure to protect Romeo violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. After the suit was fIled, Romeo was transferred to the 
facility's hospital for treatment, where he was restrained daily. His 
mother's suit was subsequently amended to seek relief from excessive 
restraint and compensation for failure to provide him with treatment.350 
In its Fourteenth Amendment analysis of Romeo's claim, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that institutionalized individuals in Romeo's 
position were entitled to "adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical 
347. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
348. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
349. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 
(1982). Some skin injuries became infected either because of inadequate attention or 
failure to clean up human excrement. [d. 
350. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 311-12. 
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care,,,351 and to the substantive due process rights of safe conditions352 
and freedom from excessive restraint.353 In addition, Romeo had a 
limited right, if not to treatment, then to training that could "ensure his 
safety and... facilitate his ability to function free from bodily 
restraints. ,,354 
The Court also said, however, that the proper standard for assessing 
whether these rights had been satisfied was only whether the decision 
concerning the Eatient's care had been that of an appropriate "professional 
decisionmaker" 55 and had reflected "professional judgment." A decision 
by an appropriate professional was presumptively valid, and liability 
could be imposed only if "the decision by the professional 
[represented] ... such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.,,356 
Professionals would not be liable individually if they could not satisfy 
their normal professional standards "because of budgetary restraints."357 
Several cases that predated novel antipsychotics established that a 
psychiatric inpatient might enforce his right to refuse involuntarily 
administered psychotropic medication through a § 1983 claim, while 
affirming that professional judgment was the standard against which a 
violation of that right must be judged.358 With the availability of novel 
351. [d. at 324. The Court characterized these items as "the essentials of the care 
that the state must provide," id., despite Romeo's having been lawfully committed to 
Pennhurst. 
352. !d. at 315-16. 
353. [d. at 316. 
354. !d. at 324. 
355. [d. at 323. The Court defined "professional decisionmaker" as "a person 
competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision 
at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with 
degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training .... " [d. at n.30. Moment-
to-moment decisions could be made by employees "subject to the supervision of 
qualified persons." [d. The choices concerning psychotropic medications focused on 




358. See, e.g., Walters v. W. State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that the patient's right to refuse psychotropic drugs was clearly established when 
the defendants allegedly deprived the plaintiff of this right); Dautremont v. Broadlawns 
Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the right to maintain a § 1983 
claim against forced administration of medication); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 
825 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to 
involuntarily committed mental patients violates a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in freedom from bodily restraint); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3rd Cir. 
1983) (stating that involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional right to refuse 
antipsychotic drugs and endorsing the "acceptable professional judgment" standard 
enunciated in YOllngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
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antipsychotics, a new twist has been added: Can administration of 
conventional neuroleptics, even judicious administration to patients who 
had not refused antipsychotic drug therapy, generate a successful civil 
rights claim? Might a court find that it was "a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,,359 for an 
institution to make financial rather than clinical considerations the 
primary factor in its drug selection policies? 
In her analysis of this issue, attorney Susan Stefan describes a 
hypothetical situation in which a public sector psychiatrist did not offer 
his patient clozapine36o because the state had not budgeted funds for the 
costly drug. She suggests that "the 'decision' not to use Clozaril may 
not represent a judgment by the professional at all, but a [financial] 
decision by agency administrators who are not mental health 
professionals."361 The distinction between "acceptable professional 
standards based on expertise in diagnosis and treatment" and policies 
"developed on the basis of state budgetary or resource considerations," 
Ms. Stefan argues, was implied in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to 
exempt state professionals from individual liability for financially 
induced departures from professional judgment.362 The Youngberg 
standard, says Ms. Stefan, implies "that it is not appropriate to consider 
budgetary constraints,,363 in determining what constitutes the prevailing 
professional standard. The professional judgment standard contemplates 
"an assessment of challenged actions at a given institution against 
professional standards developed nationwide."364 The proper question to 
ask is whether the allegedly inadequate treatment "would be among the 
options offered this patient in a private setting,,,365 where patients make 
decisions for themselves about how much to spend on various alternative 
therapies. "If so, then the professional judgment standard is met.,,366 
Accordingly, it would be acceptable for a state not to provide clozapine 
or, presumably, the other novel agents now available, to all patients who 
359. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. 
360. In 1992, when Ms. Stefan's article was published, clozapine was the only 
available novel agent. 
361. Stefan, supra note 41, at 691. 
362. Id. at 696 (citing American Psychiatric Association, Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 390-95 (1989) (discussing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
323)). 
363. Stefan, supra note 41, at 696 n.277. 
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might receive potential benefit from the drug only "if there [we]re other 
more economical treatments that [we]re sufficiently effective that 
professionals in the private sector would also prescribe them.,,367 
If Ms. Stefan's analysis is correct, then a financially motivated 
approach to antipsychotic treatment selection probably would not 
represent a violation of a public sector patient's civil rights. When 
treating a cost conscious patient, a private psychiatrist might well 
recommend treatment with an inexpensive conventional agent, with 
plans to try an atypical antipsychotic agent only if a cheaper medication 
were inadequately effective or caused intolerable side effects?68 
Complete refusal to provide novel drugs at all, even after failed 
treatment with neuroleptics, might yield a somewhat different result. 
Due to the fact that c10zapine is the first atypical agent to become 
available in the U.S., the five major decisions concerning institutionalized 
patients' access to novel antipsychotics have focused on that drug.369 
The first two decisions were issued in the early 1990s following 
c1ozapine's U.S. release. Although these cases did not address the 
concerns of institutionalized patients only, they clarified a key obligation 
in the program that pays for many patients' c10zapine treatment, state 
funded Medicaid. Courts in Kansas370 and New Y ork371 found that state 
367. [d. at 699. 
368. Patients may prefer older drugs for reasons besides cost. Although some 
weight gain is a concomitant of most antipsychotic therapy, the novel agents appear 
more prone to inducing this problem; the neuroleptic molindone appears to be associated 
with some weight loss. Masand & Gupta, supra note 191, at 301. According to one 
recent review, atypical associated "weight gain ... is highly distressing to patients, may 
reduce treatment adherence, and may increase the relative risk for diabetes mellitus and 
hypertriglyceridemia." Roger S. McIntyre et aI., Antipsychotic Metabolic Effects: 
Weight Gain, Diabetes Mellitus, and Lipid Abnormalities, 46 CANADIAN 1. PSYCHIATRY 
273, 273 (2001). Also, the pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia can last for decades. 
Psychiatrists' experience with risperidone treatment comprises just nine years, and we 
have even less experience with the other novel agents. Lieberman et aI., supra note 296, 
at 1256. 
369. A sixth case addresses the rights of a woman who had been jailed for less than 
20 hours. Eres v. County of Alameda, No. C-96-2094 MHP, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1385, at *31-32 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (finding that failure of county jail personnel to 
provide an inmate with risperidone was not deliberate indifference). A seventh case, 
granting summary judgment to prison officials in a case alleging that deliberate 
indifference led to an inmate's suicide, discusses the allegation that prison therapists did 
not administer clozapine because of the drug's expense. Pelletier v. Magnusson, 201 F. 
Supp. 2d 148, 168 (D. Me. 2002) (stating that plaintiffs assertion about financial 
motivation "is nothing more than a theory"). The inmate had been receiving risperidone. 
[d. at 159. 
370. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1990). In Visser, the plaintiffs 
action was authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Kansas Medicaid's refusal to cover 
clozapine in its prescription drug program violated 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) because it 
was an arbitrary reduction in services to eligible individuals. !d. at 504, 507-08. 
Furthermore, the court required state Medicaid coverage of clozapine for eligible patients 
and ordered the drug to be included in the program's formulary list. [d. at 507-08. 
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Medicaid programs were obligated to include clozapine in formularies 
and cover the drug's costs. The option to take clozapine had to be 
available to patients whose physicians believed the drug was necessary 
and appropriate therapy.372 
Three other decisions have looked at whether particular individuals or 
classes of patients were entitled to clozapine therapy. In a 1993 
unpublished decision, a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed a 
§ 1983 action brought by Sherman Miller, who had been a resident of 
the Bridgewater (Massachusetts) Treatment Center for Sexually 
Dangerous Persons (BTC) for about fIfteen years following hiS 1978 
conviction for rape.373 Although Miller had been offered several 
psychosocial and nonpharmacological therapies, he claimed that "his 
only hope of release might rest on securing clozapine therapy" and that 
BTC's failure to prescribe clozapine for him therefore represented 
inadequate treatment.374 The court of appeals supported the district 
court's dismissal of Miller's claim, including the lower court's ruling 
"that, without more, the BTC's mere failure to provide this one 
recommended treatment was insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue 
of material fact.,,375 
In Gates v. Shinn, a 1996 decision dealing with California prisoners, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a 1990 consent 
decree mandating "appropriate psychiatric care for prisoners" did not 
obligate the state to make clozapine therapy available to inmates?76 In 
371. Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct 1992) (holding that a 
mandamus order is an appropriate remedy to compel the state's health commissioner to 
include clozapine in the Medicaid formulary). "Cost alone, or unique but necessary 
medical care for Medicaid recipient have not been a bar to Medicaid Coverage." Id. 
372. Following the Visser decision, Pennsylvania officials abandoned that state's 
lottery system for assigning clozapine therapy three months after a § 1983 action was 
brought against the practice. Alliance for the Mentally TIl of Pa., Inc. v. White, No. 90-
6389, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15994, at *1-2 (B.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1991). 
373. Miller v. Dep't of Corr., No. 91-2183, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17463, at *1 
(1st Cir. July 14, 1993). 
374. [d. at *9. 
375. [d. at *17-18. 
376. Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463,464,472 (9th Cir. 1996). The case originated as a 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794. Gates v. Gomez, 60 
F.3d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1995). It challenged the medical care, psychiatric care, and 
conditions of confinement at the California Medical Facility and Main Northern 
Reception Center in Vacaville, California, and also challenged the treatment of HIV-
infected inmates. [d. The case went to trial in September 1989. [d. After the plaintiffs 
rested their case, settlement negotiations culminated in a consent decree that was 
approved March 8,1990. [d. 
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reaching this decision, the court cited an affidavit filed several months 
before the decision by Richard Yarvis, M.D., the prison system's 
psychiatric expert, whose opinions had been considered in mediation 
discussions. Dr. Yarvis believed that not treating prisoners with 
clozapine made sense, because low staffing levels would make it 
difficult to administer the medication safely. He added, however, that 
"new medications with potentially less risk are about to come on line in 
psychiatric practice.,,377 
Finally, a 1997 federal court ruling378 concerning adherence to treatment 
standards promulgated in the original Wyatt v. Stickne/79 case criticized 
Alabama suite facilities for sloppy record keeping and for leaving long-
term patients "on stagnant medication regimes."38o However, the court 
declined to fault clinicians for not prescribing clozapine. The court felt 
it could not, "and should not, fault the defendants for deciding, in their 
professional judgment, not to use [clozapine]. Moreover, the court's 
duty does not extend to such minuscule oversight.,,381 
These five cases suggest the following conclusions. A financially 
motivated institutional posture that precluded any use of the newer 
antipsychotics might trigger an ultimately successful § 1983 action. 
However, U.S. courts have not held that civil rights considerations 
obligate psychiatrists, institutions, or public agencies to treat a particular 
patient with a particular drug. Medication choices that reflect professional 
judgment, including use of old neuroleptics, would pass constitutional 
muster.382 Courts have not held that psychiatrists or government 
agencies must use novel antipsychotic drugs rather than neuroleptics as 
first-line treatment for all patients that need antipsychotic therapy. As 
long as patients can get novel agents when their doctors think they need 
them, it seems permissible to make drug choices using a financially 
377. Gates, 98 F.3d at 470. The medications to which Dr. Yarvis referred are the 
atypical antipsychotics released since 1994 which, unlike clozapine, do not require 
frequent blood testing. 
378. Wyatt v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
379. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The subsequent history of the Wyatt 
litigation is summarized in Wyatt, 985 F. Supp. at 1361-83. For a thorough, 
perspicacious description of the background, development, and impact of HJ:vatt v. 
Stickney, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, §§ 3A-3, 3A-14.2 (1999). 
380. Wyatt, 985 F. Supp. at 1386. 
381. [d. at 1396. 
382. Failure to offer any reasonable treatment might well be unacceptable, however. 
If a prisoner could show a serious need for psychiatric treatment and that prison 
authorities displayed deliberate indifference in declining to provide medical attention, he 
might successfully litigate a constitutional rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 
(1991). Merely negligent treatment is not cognizable under § 1983. Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). However, such treatment might be the basis for a 
tort action (unless barred by sovereign immunity). [d. 
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motivated policy of stepped care, that is, trying cheaper drugs fIrst and 
using atypicals if neuroleptics fail or cause side effects?83 This would 
seem particularly acceptable if professional judgment had deemed the 
policy to represent the best use of limited but adequate treatment 
resources. Not giving c10zapine to prisoners also appears permissible if 
staffing is not suffIcient to make sure that the medication can be 
administered safely. Lack of staffing would not excuse a prison from 
not treating inmates with the other atypicals, however, because these 
drugs are no harder to administer than cheaper, conventional 
neuroleptics. :l 
Before concluding this section, we must distinguish a judicious, 
stepped care approach that manages atypicals wisely and provides them 
when patients need them from a situation that results from a state's 
failure to allocate sufficient funds to make atypical antipsychotics 
available at all. That the latter scenario, which reflects legislative 
budgetary decisions and not professional judgment, represents a civil 
rights violation was endorsed by the Clinton Administration's Justice 
Department. In an October 6, 19991etter384 to Virginia Governor James 
S. Gilmore ill that summarized fIndings of an investigation385 of 
conditions at Western State Hospital in Staunton, Virginia, Bill Lann 
Lee, then the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Justice 
Department's Civil Rights Division, described what he termed 
"constitutional and federal stat1!tory violations at Western State.,,386 
383. For a fuller definition of stepped care as used in this Article, see supra Part 
IV.B.6. 
384. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division, to the Honorable James S. Gilmore ill, Governor of Virginia (n.d.), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplitldocuments/westernfl.htm Oast visited Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Letter from Lee]. The state of Virginia agreed to federal monitoring under a 
consent decree reached May 6, 1999. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Virginia 
Institution for the Mentally ill Agrees to Improve Conditions Under Justice Department 
Agreement (May 6, 1999), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalprI1999IMayI175cr.htm Oast 
visited Sept. 24, 2002). 
385. The investigation was conducted pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000). 
386. Mr. Lee's letter does not specify which of the problems discussed in his letter 
are constitutional violations, violations of statutes, or both. His letter mentions the 
Olmstead decision, discussed in Part V.C.2. Letter from Lee, supra note 384. 
The Justice Department's investigation is mentioned in Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 
829,833 (4th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, the Patten plaintiffs § 1983 action alleged, inter 
alia, that allowing an already obese, civilly committed inpatient with respiratory 
problems to gain thirty-seven pounds while taking clozapine represented a departure 
from professional judgment. [d. at 831. The Court found that the Youngberg standard 
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Mr. Lee noted: 
Western State frequently fails to provide necessary psychotropic medications to 
its patients. Our expert consultants found that the restricted availability of 
particular psychotropic medications is a significant deficiency in psychopharmacologic 
practice at Western State. Facility officials and staff report that when a 
physician determines that a patient requires one of the newer, more effective 
antipsychotic medications, known as "atypicals," the required medicine is not 
available because of budgetary restrictions. As a result, Western State 
psychiatrists prescribe antipsychotic medications based on budgetary constraints, 
rather than clinical indications. Physicians on all units indicated that the 
unavailability of atypicals is a significant impediment to providing appropriate 
patient care. Western State's clinical psychopharmacologist confirmed that the 
budget has allowed no new prescriptions of atypical antipsychotic medication 
since December 1997. As a result, many Western State patients are not 
receiving medications that their psychiatrists have determined to be clinically 
necessary and appropriate. Citing numerous examples of patients who would 
benefit from atypical medications, our psychiatric consultant concluded that 
patients deprived of appropriate medications are harmed by suffering prolonged 
psychotic symptoms, endure unnecessary painful physical side effects, suffer a 
greater risk of suicide, and are subjected to seclusion and restraint beyond what 
would be required if appropriate medications were available.387 
2. Treatment Selection and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
A final source of potential litigation stems from the limited 
effectiveness of conventional agents in ameliorating negative symptoms 
and cognitive deficits, which are major sources of long-term disability in 
schizophrenia.388 A patient who received treatment only with conventional 
agents might allege that an atypical antipsychotic drug could have 
permitted him to live successfully in a less restrictive setting or to 
achieve greater success in a community setting. To support this claim, 
the patient could cite the opinion of many clinicians that medication 
induced improvements in cognition can lead to better overall social 
functioning389 as well as studies suggesting that the newer drugs improve 
cognitive functioning390 and do more to reduce negative symptoms than 
do the neuroleptics.391 
was applicable, but that the defendants' alleged conduct constituted (at most) negligence, 
rather than a failure to exercise professional judgment. [d. at 845-46. 
387. Letter from Lee, supra note 384. 
388. See supra Part IILD.2. 
389. It is becoming increasingly apparent that cognitive impairment and the 
possible therapeutic reduction of this impairment will have an important 
contribution to the emotional, interpersonal, and vocational implications of 
schizophrenia. . .. An improved cognitive profile is likely to contribute to 
educational and occupational opportunities that may also require the 
simultaneous addition of creative rehabilitative and psychotherapeutic strategies 
directed toward full reintegration. 
Purdon et aI., supra note 207, at 257. 
390. See supra note 207. 
391. See supra note 206. 
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Accumulating data showing that the atypicals improve the long-term 
prospects of schizophrenic patients may soon provide scientific 
justification for a lawsuit alleging failure to provide the pharmacological 
means to allow good community functioning.392 Such a claim might be 
grounded on assertions about psychiatric patients' rights under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act393 (ADA) as construed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L. C. 394 
Olmstead concerned two institutionalized, mentally retarded women 
who sued various Georgia officials for failing to place them in 
community settings that their doctors believed could provide appropriate 
care. The state, which had paid for the plaintiffs' care and had cited 
limited funding for such placements, claimed that the women had not 
been denied community placements and services "by reason of' their 
disabilities, and had therefore not experienced disability based 
discrimination.395 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding "that unjustified 
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of 
discrimination,,396 under the ADA for two reasons: 
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from 
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so 
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. Second, 
confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of 
individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic 
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.397 
Justice Ginsburg's plurality opinion in Olmstead addressed Georgia's 
claim that an ADA-based mandate to place plaintiffs in the least 
restrictive setting possible would require the State to expend funds and 
would therefore constitute a violation of established principles of 
federalism. After examining the Justice Department regulation concerning 
392. See, e.g., Meyer et al., supra note 204, at 108 (stating that a study evaluating 
ability to work in patients treated with neuroleptics and atypicals found that: "[The] type 
of medication prescribed was associated with better symptom control but not better work 
status. The association between symptoms and work status, however, may suggest an 
indirect link favoring atypical antipsychotics for achieving paid employment."). 
393. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C.). 
394. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
395. [d. at 598. 
396. [d. at 600. 
397. [d. at 600-01 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the ADA and 
its regulations do not mandate community placements of persons who cannot function as 
outpatients; also, persons who do not desire community placements may not be forced to 
accept them. [d. at 601-02. 
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reasonable modifications,398 Justice Ginsburg concluded that states must 
have some flexibility in complying with the ADA's integration mandate399 
and that courts must consider costs when determining the appropriate 
remedy for a state's failure to comply with that mandate. Nonetheless, 
Title II of the ADA requires states 
to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities 
when the State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is 
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the 
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.4OO 
Olmstead's ultimate impact will be a function of how lower courts 
interpret and apply its general principles; funding decisions by local 
governments; and the behavior of local, state, and federal agencies that 
actually help patients obtain services that allow them to function in 
community placements.401 
In a few cases, plaintiffs with mental disabilities have cited Olmstead 
as a basis for claiming that private, employer sponsored health benefits 
for psychiatric illnesses should equal the health benefits for other 
medical illnesses.402 Courts have dismissed these claims,403 pointing out 
398. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." General Prohibitions 
Against Discrimination, 28 c.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000). 
399. If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, 
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities 
in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace 
not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, 
the reasonable modifications standard would be met. 
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06. 
400. Id. at 607. 
40 I. For a brief summary of recent developments, see Kate Mulligan, States SlolV to 
Implement Community-Care Mandate, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, MAY 17, 2002, at 4, 20. 
President George W. Bush accurately summarized the current state of affairs when he 
stated: "Olmstead has yet to be fully implemented." GEORGE W. BUSH, NEW FREEDOM 
INITIATIVE 20 (2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/freedominitiativel 
freedominitiative.html. 
402. See also Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) ("So 
long as every employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's 
contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the 
plan offers different coverage for various disabilities."). But see Boots v. Northwestern 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (D.N.H. 1999) (concluding that providing 
disparate long-term disability benefits to physically and mentally disabled insured 
persons may violate the ADA). 
403. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1117-18 (9th 
Cir. 2000) ("Olmstead does not speak to insurance classifications ... and Congress's 
clear instruction in the insurance safe harbor [shows] that the Act was not intended to 
reach common insurance practices such as underwriting of risks."); EI-Hajj v. Fortis 
Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that the ADA does not 
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that Olmstead concerned Title IT of the ADA, which concerns public 
accommodations,404 rather than employment matters, which are addressed 
by Title 1.405 At least two cases have looked at the extent to which the 
ADA's "integration mandate" requires state Medicaid programs to 
modify their programs and services. A federal district court ruled, in 
Makin v. Hawaii, that using a wait list to implement a housing program 
for individuals with mental retardation 
could potentially force Plaintiffs into institutions in violation of the ADA's non-
discrimination policy. . .. Since the State provides the [housing] services, it 
create a cause of action against insurers that provide lower levels of coverage for 
mentally disabled persons versus persons with physical disabilities); Pelletier v. Fleet 
Fin. Group, Inc., No. 99-245-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456, at *10-11 (D.N.H. Sept 
19, 2000) (stating that the reasoning underlying Olmstead did not invalidate private 
employer's disability insurance policy that limited the benefit period for mental illness); 
see also Witham v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., No. 00-268-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7027, at *7, *11 (D. N.H. May 31, 2001) (following Pelletier); Morrill v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. 00-214-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18810, at *5-8 (D. N.H. 
Dec. 7, 2000) (following Pelletier and holding that an employer health plan that 
provided less favorable coverage for outpatient psychotherapy than for other forms of 
outpatient treatments did not violate the ADA); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 
117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that the ADA does not require a private 
employer sponsored disability plan to provide equal benefits for mental and physical 
disabilities and distinguishing Olmstead as involving ADA provisions which govern 
reasonable accommodation by public entities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-P-
C, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12258, at *26 (D. Me. Aug. 2, 2000) (stating that there is "no 
requirement under the ADA that insurance policies provide the same benefits to all 
categories of disabled people"). For additional citations with similar findings, see 
Pelletier, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456, at *7 (citing other circuits' decisions, including 
several that were issued before Olmstead). 
404. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (stating that "no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability ... be subjected to discrimination by any 
[public] entity"). 
405. Cf. id. § 12112 (setting forth numerous definitions of disability discrimination 
in employment matters covered under Title I of the ADA). For example, in Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Staten Island Savings Bank, the court 
concluded that: (1) Title I does not explicitly prevent an employer from adopting a 
disability plan that provides reduced benefits for mental illness, (2) the ADA's 
legislative history strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to restrict an 
employer's ability to impose special limitations on disability insurance coverage for 
mental illness, (3) the inclusion of a safe harbor provision in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 
12201, suggests that disability plans may lawfully place special limitations on mental 
illness coverage, (4) the reasoning in Olmstead does not invalidate the type of disability 
insurance policy that is at issue in this case, and (5) Congress would have spoken more 
clearly had it intended to prohibit the well-established practice of provided differential 
(lesser) benefits for mental illness. 207 F.3d 144, 149-153 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the 
court held that the Bank's long-term disability plan did not violate Title I of the ADA 
even though it authorized two years of disability benefits for psychiatric conditions, but 
more extended benefits for other types of disabilities. Id. at 152-53. 
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cannot discriminate against the disabled by denying them services in an 
'integrated' setting since that could constitute unjustified isolation .... if a state 
is found to have discriminated against disabled individuals through the 
administration of a program, it must modify the program to remedy the situation 
unless it can prove that any modification would fundamentally alter the 
program.406 
By contrast, the Second Circuit held, in Rodriguez v. New York, that 
providing "safety-monitoring" services for a mentally disabled person 
was not required by the ADA, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' claims that 
they needed such services to remain able to live in the community.407 
The court held that the plaintiffs were requesting new services, whereas 
Olmstead had held only that "[s]tates must adhere to the ADA's 
nondiscrimination requirements with regard to the services they in fact 
provide.'.408 
Moreover, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a decision issued in 
February 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, absent "a pattern of 
discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment," 
the U.S. Constitution's Eleventh Amendment barred state employees 
from seeking money damages in federal court for a state's alleged failure 
to comply with Title I of the ADA.409 
The influence of Garrett on lower court decisions is not yet clear 
regarding cases that involve treatment or services provided by entities 
operated by states and their subdivisions that fall under the ADA's Title 
II. For example, in Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County,410 a federal 
district court's pre-Garrett reading of the ADA led to its refusing to 
dismiss a claim alleging that Baltimore County, Maryland's zoning 
regulations discriminated against the subgroup of substance abuse 
patients that needed to take methadone. The court cited Justice 
Department regulations that prohibit public entities from providing some 
qualified individuals with opportunities and services not equal to those 
given to other qualified individuals, from limiting qualified individuals' 
access to benefits or services, or from administering services that subject 
qualified individuals to disability related discrimination.411 The same 
regulations, the court noted, prevent public entities from imposing or 
applying unnecessary eligibility criteria that might prevent persons with 
disabilities from taking advantage of services or programs412 and require 
406. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1034 (D. Haw. 1999) (interpreting 
Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 605-606 (1999». 
407. Rodriguez v. New York, 197 F.3d 611, 613-14 (2d Cir. 1999). 
408. [d. at 619 (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14). 
409. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrettt, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
410. 68 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. Md. 1999). 
411. !d. at 620 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii), (vii), (b)(3)(i) (2001». 
412. !d. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8». 
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public entities to make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, 
or procedures" unless doing so "would fundamentally alter" the services 
or programs.413 The court concluded that even if the zoning policy had a 
rational basis, the county's special methadone policy placed 
"disproportionate burdens on ... opiate addicts who require methadone 
therapy" and unless it could not be eliminated through "reasonable 
modifications," it would violate the ADA.414 
This case and the quoted regulatory language suggest that limiting 
public sector patients' access to novel antipsychotic medications might 
be suspect under the ADA. Patients who did not get the newer drugs 
might be deemed not to have received services and opportunities equal 
to those who did get them. To date, no published decision has addressed 
this issue concerning atypicals, but it is endorsed by the Bazelon 
Center,415 which, in its interpretation of Olmstead, concluded, 
An important part of the treatment for a mental illness is access to the newer 
"atypical" medications for psychiatric disorders. These drugs have significantly 
fewer and less severe side effects; they are also more effective than older 
antipsychotics. 
In addition to being in violation of the Medicaid statute, a state that fails to 
provide adequate access to the atypical medications in compliance with these 
federal Medicaid rules will have weakened its defense under the ADA that it is 
unable to provide necessary services for all individuals who are or are at risk of 
unnecessary institutionalization.416 
However, the holding in Frederick L. v. Department of Public 
Welfare417 suggests that after Garrett, courts may not be favorably 
inclined toward ADA-related arguments about psychiatric patients who 
take antipsychotic drugs. Frederick concerned four adults hospitalized 
at Norristown State Hospital (NSH) who had sued a state agency (DPW) 
and the Secretary of Public Welfare, alleging § 1983 violations, 
413. Id. at 620-21 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). 
414. Id. at 621-22 (citing Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of 
Greenfield, 23 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (B.D. Wis. 1998) (stating that the ADA confers 
"protected class" status to disabled persons, so a "rational basis [argument] will no 
longer support a law which burdens the disabled")). 
415. It may also have been implicitly endorsed by the Clinton Administration's 
Justice Department. See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
416. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Under Court Order: What the 
Community Integration Mandate of the Supreme Court Ruling in Olmstead v. L.C. 
Means for People with Mental Illness, at http://www.bazelon.org/lcruling.html (last 
visited Aug. 14,2002). 
417. 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 512-14 (B.D. Pa. 2001). 
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violations of the ADA's Title II, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.418 The plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and other 
patients at NSH, challenged their needless institutionalization and the 
state's failure to provide them with treatment in the community. The 
problem was summarized by the court as follows: 
The DPW has the authority to shift funds used for institutionalized care to 
community care. The counties make annual requests to the DPW for funds 
needed to provide appropriate community-based services. The DPW, however, 
has consistently failed to satisfy the requests of those counties whose residents 
are institutionalized at NSH (Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and 
Philadelphia). As a result, all of the individuals with mental disabilities who 
could be appropriately served in the community cannot be accommodated and 
remain unnecessarily institutionalized where they are either not recommended 
for discharge or placed on waiting lists for community care indefinitely.419 
The suit alleged that the defendants unlawfully had failed to "properly 
assess the Plaintiffs' community service needs and fund sufficient 
appropriate community-based programs to serve them," and sought "an 
injunction compelling the Defendants to remedy the ongoing violations 
of federal law.,,42o The DPW and the Secretary moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment and that plaintiffs had otherwise failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.421 
In a complex decision,422 the court held that the plaintiffs could 
proceed on their section 504 and § 1983 claims against the DPW and the 
official, but it dismissed the ADA claims against the DPW.423 Concerning 
the section 504 claims, the court cited statutory language,424 Lane v. 
Pena,425 and several decisions by courts of appeals,426 to "conclude that 
418. [d. at 512. 
419. [d. at 513. 
420. [d. at 514. 
421. [d. at 512. 
422. Reflecting this, District Judge Schiller concluded his decision: 
The fact that federal judges have a great many constitutional powers and 
duties which enable them to resolve difficult issues with authority is put to the 
test in a situation like this where the law is developing and many of the 
principles are amorphous. Even had I the benefit of the Oracle at Delphi some 
of these issues will be finally resolved in another forum. Nonetheless, I believe 
that at this stage of the pleadings plaintiffs are entitled to proceed on several of 
their claims. 
[d. at 541. 
423. [d. at 512. 
424. "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .... " [d. at 520 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) 
(2000». 
425. 518 U.S. 187,200 (1996) (stating that in enacting 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-7(a)(1), 
Congress unmistakably expressed its intent to waive the states' sovereign immunity but 
not the federal government's). 
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section 504 unambiguously expresses Congress' intent to condition the 
grant offederal funds on a States' [sic] consent to suit ... :.427 
Concerning the ADA claim, and with Garrett expressly in mind, the 
Frederick court held that Congress had not sufficiently identified a 
"history and pattern" of discrimination by states against persons with 
mental disabilities that would make the ADA applicable.428 Even if 
Congress had done so, the court said, the plaintiffs would still have to 
show that their sought-after remedy met the "congruence and 
proportionality" test set out in Garrett regarding the rights and remedies 
created by Title ll.429 The plaintiffs' proposed remedy exceeded what 
was constitutionally required: 
State public welfare agencies are not constitutionally required to undergo a 
comprehensive modification of their rules, policies, and practices in order to 
accommodate all disabled individuals. . .. [E]nforcement of the substantive due 
process right asserted here by the Plaintiffs may require modification of State 
policies that irrationally interfere with the provision of treatment recommended 
by professionals, but the Constitution does not require the State to make all 
modifications necessary to prevent discrimination.430 
Similarly, an Oregon court held that a state's health plan43 1 that 
refused to pay for a combined lung and liver transplant did not violate 
the ADA's nondiscrimination mandates. Stroeder v. Office of Medical 
Assistance Programs found that Olmstead "held only that 'States must 
adhere to the ADA's nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the 
426. Frederick, 157 F. Supp. at 521 (citing Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 
1082 (8th Cir. 2000); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000); Pederson v. 
La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 875-76 (5th Cir. 2000». 
427. ld. 
428. ld. at 528. 
429. ld. 
430. ld. at 530 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the ADA's 
implementing regulations state that "[a] public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary 
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity." ld. at 529-30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000» 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
431. In Oregon, the Office of Medical Assistance Programs coordinates the state's 
Medical Assistance Program, which provides for payment for health care services to 
Oregonians eligible for Medicaid and other state and federally funded assistance 
programs. See OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120 (LEXIS through 2002 filings); see also 42 USC 
§ 1396(a)(5) (2000) (authorizing the creation of state agencies to administer state plans 
of medical assistance). 
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services they in fact provide.",432 The administrative regulation 
governing treatment for the claimant's condition "does not provide 
coverage for a combined lung and liver transplant for any Oregon Health 
Plan recipient. Thus, ... claimant cannot demonstrate that ... denial of 
that benefit or service to her has discriminated against her on the basis of 
any disability she may have.,,433 
Finally, courts considering Olmstead claims of discrimination appear 
very sensitive to the decision's focus on costs as a factor in the 
defendants' decisionmaking. Two cases illustrate this. 
First, Sanon v. Winl34 concerned three elderly women plaintiffs with 
multiple medical disabilities who had received Medicaid funded twenty-
four hour home care from New York City and state health agencies. The 
agencies decided to terminate the home care, which would likely 
necessitate having the women go to nursing home for the care they 
needed. In response to the plaintiff s claim that the decision to terminate 
home care violated the ADA, the defendants argued that the cost of 
continuing home care would fundamentally alter the state's Medicaid 
program. The court reversed the agencies' decision,435 saying that the 
defendant agencies could not merely assert that an increase in cost 
would create a fundamental alteration; the agencies would have to make 
some factual showing that a fundamental alteration would occur.436 
However, the court found 
no indication in the record that any factual inquiry took place here. . .. Nor has 
DSS [a defendant agency] demonstrated that there would be a "massive" change 
in the program. 
Before that determination can be made, DSS must demonstrate what the 
cost of such an undertaking would be with respect to the system as a whole 
and not just the comparative cost with respect to the individual. . .. Unless 
respondents can demonstrate that accommodating Medicaid recipients who 
otherwise qualify for 24-hour home care would result in a fundamental 
alteration in the Medicaid program, respondents must provide services in "the 
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of' petitioners.437 
Second, in Williams v. Wasserman,438 a case that raised "complex 
medical, social and fiscal issues not easily addressed by litigation,'.439 twelve 
brain injured or developmentally disabled patients brought claims under 
432. Stroeder v. Office of Med. Assistance Programs, 37 P.3d 1012, 1021 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2001) (quoting Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618-19 (2d Cir. 
1999); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999». 
433. [d. 
434. No. 403296/98, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000). 
435. [d. at *23-24. 
436. !d. at *18. 
437. !d. at *18-20 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2001» (other citations omitted). 
438. 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001). 
439. [d. at 595. 
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the Due Process Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the ADA, seeking relief 
for Maryland's failure to provide them community placements rather 
than inpatient treatment in state institutions. After finding that "the 
staffs at the state hospitals were [not] so undertrained as to deprive the 
patients of their due process rights,'MO the court addressed the plaintiff's 
Olmstead based contention that their continued institutionalization 
violated their rights under the ADA.44I Against this claim, Maryland 
offered a cost-based defense, arguing that placing the patients in the 
community would require added expenses. The hospital would need 
additional monies to house the placed patients but still would have to 
preserve the availability of hospital beds for persons that needed them.442 
Noting the state's significant progress at reducing the number of mental 
patients persons treated in hospitals,443 the court concluded that 
Olmstead supported Maryland's claim that the cost of immediately 
placing patients in the community would constitute a "fundamental 
alteration of the State's provision of services,,,444 and entered a judgment 
in favor of the defendants. 
Taken together, what can Olmstead, Garrett, and the other previously 
discussed cases tell us about how a federal court would respond to a 
lawsuit seeking relief under the ADA concerning a state agency's 
--financially motivated, stepped care drug policy? Following Olmstead, 
the agency could defend the policy by showing that using the more 
expensive, novel antipsychotic drugs could not "be reasonably 
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State 
and the needs of others with mental disabilities.'M5 Certainly, providing 
the newer drugs to all eligible patients would not "fundamentally alter" 
pharmacological treatment in the public sector to nearly the same degree 
that finding hospitalized patients a community placement alters patterns 
of overall psychiatric care. However, the agency might reasonably argue 
that paying for more expensive medicines would critically compromise 
the other nonpharmacological services being provided to its clientele. 
The agency also might argue, following Garrett, that providing patients 
440. [d. at 627. 
441. [d. at 630. 
442. [d. at 637. The case offers a nice example of the complex calculations needed 
to determine whether clinical intervention, applied to a healthcare system, actually saves 
money in the short or long term. [d. at 637-38. 
443. !d. at 634-36. 
444. [d. at 638. 
445. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). 
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with free neuroleptic therapy did not constitute a "history and pattern" of 
discrimination, especially when those drugs were standard therapy in the 
mid-1990s and remain the predominant therapy in Europe, and 
especially when the atypical agents were available to patients who could 
not tolerate or benefit from neuroleptics. Finally, if the policy applied to 
all patients in a state program, the agency might argue that no ADA 
prohibited discrimination based on disability had taken place because the 
stepped care policy applied to everyone, not just persons who had a 
mental disability. 
What about situations in which a state's asserted inability to fund 
expensive new drugs stems from a less than adequate apportionment of 
total tax dollars to mental disability care and treatment? What part of a 
state's total budget might come under scrutiny in assessing its ADA 
related obligations to improve patients' chances for integrated 
community life? In Helen L. v. DiDario,446 a pre-Olmstead decision that 
found an ADA violation where a Pennsylvania plaintiff was confined to 
a nursing home despite needing only home health care, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit commented: 
It is not now up to us to invent a funding mechanism whereby the Commonwealth 
can properly finance its nursing home and attendant care programs. However, 
the ADA applies to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, and not just to DPW 
[the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare]. DPW can not rely upon a 
funding mechanism of the General Assembly to justify administering its 
attendant care program in a manner that discriminates and then argue that it can 
not comply with the ADA without fundamentally altering its program.447 
The Third Circuit's reading of the ADA suggested that, at least in some 
evaluations of whether increased funding constituted a "reasonable 
accommodation," a court could look to a state's entire budget as a 
resource for rectifying discrimination. Olmstead, however, indicated 
that in deciding whether making a proposed accommodation was 
"reasonable" or would pose an "undue hardship" to the state, a court's 
inquiry should only examine the particular program under which a 
recipient was receiving treatment.448 Having "a waiting list that moved 
446. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). 
447. Id. at 338. 
448. In a footnote, the plurality opinion noted that Congress had required the 
Attorney General to make ADA TITLE II regulations consistent with the regulations that 
implement section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
The § 504 regulation upon which the reasonable modifications regulation is 
based provides now, as it did at the time the ADA was enacted: 
"A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical 
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or 
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program." 28 CFR § 41.53 
(1990 and 1998 eds.). 
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at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its 
institutions fully populated" would be a reasonable accommodation, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote.449 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
was even more explicit about the degree to which courts could influence 
states' funding choices. States are free to apportion their limited resources as 
they see fit, he wrote, and "must make hard decisions on how much to 
allocate to treatment of diseases and disabilities. . .. [Such decisions] 
may be unfortunate. The judgment, however, is a political one and not 
within the reach of the statute.'.450 A state may not be forced to create 
programs where they do not exist, wrote Justice Kennedy.451 Moreover, 
"[t]he State is entitled to wide discretion in adopting its own systems of 
cost analysis, and, if it chooses, to allocate health care resources based 
on fixed and overhead costs for whole institutions and programs.,,452 
* * * * * 
Malpractice suits, civil rights claims, and ADA related challenges to 
medication practices are nascent areas of litigation that may someday 
affect patients that take antipsychotic drugs and caregivers that 
administer those medications. By contrast, several cases have already 
addressed how the distinctive properties of novel antipsychotics may 
influence judicial decisions about forcing persons to take psychotropic 
drugs. It is to an examination of these cases that we now turn. 
While the part 41 regulations do not define "undue hardship," other § 504 
regulations make it clear that the "undue hardship" inquiry requires not simply 
an assessment of the cost of the accommodation in relation to the recipient's 
overall budget, but a "case-by-case analysis weighing factors that include: (1) 
[t]he overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of 
employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2) [t]he type of 
the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of the 
recipient's workforce; and (3) [t]he nature and cost of the accommodation 
needed." 28 CPR § 42.511(c) (1998); see 45 CPR § 84.12(c) (1998) (same). 
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (alterations in original). 
449. [d. at 606. 
450. [d. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
451. [d. at 613. 
452. [d. at 615. 
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VI. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT: CHANGING 
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES 
A. Background 
No issue in mental disability law has more polarized psychiatrists and 
legal academics453 than the right of involuntarily institutionalized 
patients to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication.454 On one 
side are most psychiatrists, whose professional ethos, medical school 
socialization, and training experiences lead them to see patients as sick 
persons with diseases that can and must be treated.455 Psychiatrists 
regard psychotropic medication as an effective means for improving 
patients' functioning and for reducing the risk patients pose to 
themselves and other persons. Psychiatrists also point out that without 
medication, many patients who undergo involuntary hospitalization 
would be subject to long-term institutionalization and, potentially, long-
term use of physical restraints.456 On the other side, some legal scholars 
and patient advocates, while acknowledging, sometimes only in 
passing,457 that antipsychotic medication is effective, have emphasized 
that antipsychotic drugs can cause serious side effects458 and that 
453. Cichon, supra note 35, at 286 ("The right to refuse antipsychotic drugs soon 
became the most controversial and divisive issue between the medical and legal 
professions."); Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging-Atomistic and Structural 
Remedies, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1983-84) (stating that lawsuits have been 
"unusually contentious"); Jonathan Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers: The Burger 
Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 345 (1983) 
(stating that the right to refuse was "the most controversial issue in forensic psychiatry 
today"); 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 166 n.28 (1999) (stating that "[tJhe rhetoric has 
certainly been contentious" and citing examples). 
454. Although lawsuits and other legal actions might, in principle, have involved 
involuntary use of any psychotropic medication, all the major litigation in this area has 
focused on antipsychotic medication. Perlin lists several interrelated reasons for this 
focus, including the risk of wrongful administration of these drugs arising from incorrect 
diagnoses, the high percentage of state hospital patients that received them, and the use 
of the drugs for purposes other than treatment of psychiatric problems (for example, for 
behavioral control). Yet the main reason, Professor Perlin suggests, was the uniquely 
toxic neurological effects of phenothiazines and other older antipsychotic medications. 2 
PERLIN, supra note 4, at 157-65 (1999). 
455. Cichon, supra note 35, at 284; Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True 
Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and "Rotting with Your Rights 011," 
137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 327 (1980). 
456. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 350 (2d ed. 1997). 
457. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 159 (1999) (mentioning the benefits of 
antipsychotic medication in one sentence, while misuse, limitations, and drawbacks are 
discussed over nine pages). 
458. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 758-60 (La. 1992) (describing the 
purpose and benefits of neuroleptics in twenty-eight words, and devoting nearly thirty 
times as much space to the drugs' side effects); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 
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unwanted administration of medications automatically raises a host of 
legal issues.459 At the core of these issues is the "sacred ... [and] 
carefully guarded ... right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.'.460 As 
Cichon has succinctly expressed: ''The professional discord surrounding 
the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs reflects the inherent tension 
between the law's respect for the values of self-determination and bodily 
integrity and the medical profession's concern for the treatment and care 
of the mentally ill.'.461 
Common law rules preventing unwanted medical treatment would 
seem applicable in toto to persons undergoing psychiatric hospitalization,462 
and rules requiring informed consent:463 would seem as appropriate to 
psychiatric care as to any other type of medical treatment. When the 
seminal "right to refuse treatment" cases were litigated, however, courts 
40, 52-54 (Mass. 1981) (using twelve words to acknowledge the benefits of 
antipsychotic drugs and devoting 1400 words to potential adverse effects); Cichon, supra 
note 35, at 292-310 (summarizing the drugs' benefits in approximately 220 words and 
the limitations and detailing side effects in approximately 3400 words); cf. Rennie v. 
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136-38 (D.N.J. 1978) (devoting more than 700 words to the 
benefits of neuroleptics and approximately 460 words to their side effects), suppl., 476 F. 
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and 
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); HYMAN Er AL., supra note 9, at 14-40 (discussing 
antipsychotic drugs in their 1995 psychopharmacology text and emphasizing 
neuroleptics' toxicity, discussing then available alternatives treatments for psychoses, 
and devoting eight pages to indications for neuroleptics, nine pages to their therapeutic 
usage, and eight pages to side effects). 
459. MELTON, supra note 456, at 350. 
460. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
461. Cichon, supra note 35, at 288. 
462. Ordinarily, the mere apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact by another 
is actionable in tort. PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (yV. Page Keeton 
ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
463. The doctrine of informed consent establishes a prohibition against unwanted 
medical treatment. There are several important cases establishing that nonconsensual 
treatment is battery. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972); In re Quackenbush, 383 
A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body .... "). Other leading cases discuss the 
requirements for valid consent. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir.) 
(stating that a doctor must disclose all "material" risks relevant to a patient's decision 
about a treatment); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that a provider's duty includes disclosing "any facts 
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient"); Natanson 
v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (stating that a provider must disclose the 
nature of proposed treatment, probability of success, alternative treatments, and risks). 
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had not previously held that these traditional tort remedies were available to 
institutionalized persons.464 Instead, mentally disabled inpatients were regarded 
as "per se incompetent to make rational treatment decisions.'.465 Therefore, 
lawyers that represented institutionalized patients offered arguments that 
saw "the Constitution as a potential source of a right to refuse 
treatment.,,466 When courts accepted the arguments of patient advocates, 
it was often the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs, rather than 
a principled opposition to nonconsensual medical treatment per se, that 
gave force to a patient's constitutionally based right to refuse treatment.467 
Because neuroleptic side effects played such a pivotal role in earlier 
decisions about refusing antipsychotic therapy, one might wonder 
whether the availability of less noxious medications might now make 
courts more favorably disposed toward involuntary treatment. At least 
two courts suggested that this might occur. Following a highly critical 
description of then-available antipsychotic drugs, Chief Justice 
Hennessey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote, in In re 
Guardianship of Roe:468 
We admit the possibility and express the hope that future medical advances may 
produce antipsychotic drugs free from the severe adverse side effects we have 
described above. At the same time, it must be noted that the intended effect of 
the medication-to alter mental processes-by definition cannot be eliminated 
from those drugs we have described as "antipsychotic." Nevertheless, we do 
not foreclose reconsideration of these issues when and if it can be shown that 
the characteristics of antipsychotic drugs have changed.469 
In his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada,470 Justice Kennedy 
argued that society might have to forego prosecution of some psychotic 
defendants because side effects of the antipsychotic medications then 
464. 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 168-70 (1999). 
465. Cichon, supra note 35, at 315; see, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 
911 (Minn. 1976) (relying on "the need for the state to assume the decision-making role 
regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively, based on the fact of 
commitment on the grounds of mental illness, is unable to rationally do so for himself' 
(footnote omitted»; Denny v. Tyler, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 225, 227, 228-29 (1861) 
(holding that involuntarily hospitalized patient cannot form "a judgment concerning his 
own condition," and "abstract" liberty guarantees "can have no legitimate application 
where ... the person who is alleged to be ... restrained of his liberty is insane"). 
466. 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 170 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
467. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-32 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (describing 
common law bases for a right to refuse treatment, but ultimately grounding the right in 
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee). But see Rivers v. Katz, 495 
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (grounding the right to refuse psychotropic medication in 
common law principles, New York case law, and New York statutes that affirm a 
competent patient's right to decline medical treatment even when "the recommended 
treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life"). 
468. 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981). 
469. /d. at 54 n.12. 
470. 504 U.S. 127 (1990). 
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used to restore competence could compromise their right to a fair trial.471 
Yet, he noted: ''The state of our knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and 
their side effects is evolving and may one day produce effective drugs 
that have only minimal side effects."472 
As the twenty-fIrst century commences, atypical antipsychotics are 
indeed shifting judicial attitudes about refusals of antipsychotic 
medication by mentally disabled persons. Decisions issued before wide 
use of novel agents often contain scathing descriptions of the horrors of 
then standard psychiatric treatment of psychotic disorders. Part VI.B 
provides summaries and examples of such cases, organized according to 
the various types of federal and state constitutional rights putatively 
implicated by drug side effects. Part VI.C contains examples of 
published holdings from the last decade in which trial level and appellate 
court judges have demonstrated an awareness of the advantages of 
atypical agents. These cases express less concern about potential side 
effects and often emphasize the advantages of antipsychotic medications 
to patients that might receive them involuntarily. 
B. Constitutional Arguments from the Neuroleptic Era 
1. Side Effects and the First Amendment 
Professor Bruce J. Winick has argued that involuntary administration 
of antipsychotic medication necessarily implicates the First Amendment's 
free expression guarantee473 because psychotropic medications influence 
emotions and change how patients think.474 Although State v. Perry475 
was decided on state constitutional grounds, this decision invoked 
freedom of thought as one of several grounds for barring involuntary 
treatment to restore competence for execution. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court described involuntarily medicating a condemned inmate as an 
471. [d. at 142. 
472. [d. at 145. 
473. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment was found 
applicable to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Supreme 
Court has held that the free speech clause contains protections for related activities, 
including the freedom to think about what one wishes. Thus, in ruling unconstitutional a 
Georgia law prohibiting private possession of pornographic materials, the Court wrote: 
"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power 
to control men's minds." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
474. Winick, supra note 18, at 103. 
475. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). 
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"invasion of his brain and body[,] ... the seizure of control of [the 
prisoner's] mind and thoughts, and the usurpation of his right to make 
decisions,,,476 the "chemical[] alter[ation of] his mind and will,,,477 and as 
compelling the prisoner "to yield control of his thoughts and will to the 
state.',478 The court deemed involuntary psychotropic treatment equivalent to 
governmental "thought control" prohibited by Stanley v. Georgia. 
"Government does not have 'the power to control men's minds' or 'the 
right to control the moral content of a person's thought.",479 
Though a treatment that could change someone's thoughts, feelings, 
mood, and attitudes might seem to raise First Amendment issues, most 
courts have generally not taken Winick's view. That is, although side 
effects of medication could be violative of an individual's First 
Amendment rights, courts have not held that psychotic thinking deserves 
First Amendment protection from the intended, beneficial effects of 
antipsychotic drugs.48o This makes sense for two reasons. First, persons 
who are psychotic have severely impaired thinking abilities, and 
antipsychotic medications can, by reducing this impairment, improve 
thinking and thereby confer greater freedom of expression on their 
recipients. As Gutheil points out: "[P]sychosis is itself involuntary mind 
control of the most extensive kind and itself represents the most severe 
'intrusion on the integrity of a human being.' The physician seeks to 
liberate the patient from the chains of illness .... "481 Some forms of 
psychosis render meaningful expression impossible. During the acute 
phase of catatonic schizophrenia, for example, 
patients may demonstrate marked negativism or mutism, profound psychomotor 
retardation or severe psychomotor agitation, echolalia (repetition of words or 
phrases in a nonsensical manner), echopraxia (mimicking the behaviors of 
others), or bizarreness of voluntary movements and mannerisms. . .. Patients 
with catatonic stupor... may remain in the same position for weeks at a 
time.482 
Second, psychotropic medications do not alter a patient's thoughts 
476. [d. at 747. 
477. [d. at 758. 
478. [d. at 760. 
479. [d. at 758 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969». 
480. Cichon, supra note 35, at 321-24 (noting that "courts have been hesitant to 
extend First Amendment protection to disordered thoughts," but discussing several cases 
in which courts found that potential side effects raised First Amendment issues). 
481. Gutheil, supra note 455, at 327. Similar reasoning led Judge Brotman to 
conclude that in treating a patient who wished "to be cured, not warehoused," a 
hospital's administration of medication to "alter his thinking disorder cannot be seen as a 
first amendment violation." Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D. N.J. 1978), 
suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated 
and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). 
482. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 931-32. 
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about specific political or social issues. Properly administered, they 
improve a psychotic patient's ability to think about whatever he wishes. 
Antipsychotic medications "restore existing imbalance toward the 
balanced norm. .. [and] are generally incapable of creating thoughts, 
views, ideas or opinions de novo, or of permanently inhibiting the process 
of thought generation.'.483 As the author has pointed out elsewhere in 
discussing the majority's flawed First Amendment reasoning in Perry: 
The majority opinion analyzes "positive symptoms" such as hallucinations and 
delusions as though they were unpopular moral viewpoints or expressions of 
individual privacy that neuroleptics "suppress." When neuroleptics alleviate 
schizophrenic hallucinations and delusions, however, the drugs do not act on the 
basis of the peculiar moral or intellectual content of psychotic thoughts. Thus, 
when antipsychotic medications restore patients' ability to think logically, 
entertain doubts about or evidence that conflicts with delusional beliefs, 
consider alternatives, formulate coherent sets of wishes, and make those wishes 
known, the action of antipsychotic drugs should not be construed as performing 
the intrapsychic equivalent of "banning books" or abolishing specific thoughts 
because their content is objectionable. 
In altering neuronal transmission, antipsychotic medications do not 
"censor" particular thoughts, "seize control" of patients' minds, nor "alter" 
patients' will. Medications also do not let the state "usurp" one's right to make 
decisions .... When an individual's very ability to make (legally cognizable) 
decisions does not exist without medication, it makes little sense to suggest that 
medication could usurp his "ability to control his own mind and thoughts." 
Neuroleptics are to psychosis what eye glasses are to myopia: both interventions 
remove impediments to perception; neither proscribes particular thoughts or 
actions, though both may enhance decision-making and the ability to 
respond.484 
When courts have accepted First Amendment arguments against 
involuntary antipsychotic therapy, they usually have done so because of 
the drugs' potential adverse side effects, rather than their therapeutic 
impact on thinking.485 For example, in an appellate decision reversing 
the district court's dismissal of an involuntary medication case, the Third 
Circuit found that "involuntary administration of drugs which affect 
mental processes,... could amount... to an interference with [the 
plaintiff's] rights under the fIrst amendment.,,486 In Rogers v. Okin,487 
483. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting with their Rights On": 
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 308 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
484. Douglas Mossman, Denouement of an Execution Competency Case: Is Perry 
Pyrrhic?, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269, 274 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
485. Cichon, supra note 35, at 320-22. 
486. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939,946 (3d Cir. 1976). 
487. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (lstCir. 1980). 
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one of the seminal "right to refuse" cases, the district court declared that 
"[t]he right to produce a thought... is a fundamental element of 
freedom.,,488 Similarly, the potential side effects of neuroleptics, including 
their "capacity to severely and even permanently affect an individual's 
ability to think and communicate,"489 led the Tenth Circuit to rule that 
"less restrictive courses of action" should be considered before 
medication was forced on a pretrial inmate.49o 
In some cases, courts have explicitly considered whether side effects 
interfere with First Amendment rights, but have rejected this as a basis 
for the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Davis v. 
Hubbard cited First Amendment cases as a conceivable basis for a 
constitutional right to refuse, but ultimately grounded the right in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protections.491 In 
Rennie v. Klein, the district court held that a medication that induced 
"temporary dulling of the senses" did not constitute a First Amendment 
violation.492 
2. Side Effects and the Eighth Amendment 
In cases litigated before Bell v. Wolfish,493 some courts held that 
neuroleptic side effects could, under some circumstances, give rise to a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment,494 particularly if the drugs were used inappropriately in 
correctional settings. For example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
the Eighth Amendment applied in a case involving a juvenile correctional 
facility where antipsychotic drugs were administered without adequate 
medical guidance and were used "not as part of an ongoing 
psychotherapeutic program, but for the purpose of controlling excited 
beha vi or. ,,49; 
488. Id. at 1367. 
489. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984). 
490. Id. at 1396. 
491. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980). In declining to 
ground the protection of "a person's interest in being free to use his mind as he so 
desires" in the First Amendment, the Davis court stated: "It is enough to observe that 
'the power to control men's minds' is 'wholly inconsistent' not only with the 
'philosophy of the first amendment but with virtually any concept of liberty.'" Id. at 933 
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1964». 
492. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 
U.S. 1119 (1982). 
493. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
494. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Louisiana ex reI. Francis v. 
Resweber makes the Eighth Amendment applicable to states. 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
495. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Scott v. Plante, 
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Whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual 
punishment" applies outside correctional settings is unclear.496 In 1977, 
the U.S. Supreme Court avoided the issue, holding that a case addressing 
whether the Eighth Amendment applied to corporal punishment 
administered in schools497 provided "no occasion... to consider 
whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in 
mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment.,,498 Two years later, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, was the 
appropriate vehicle for evaluating constitutional claims about a jail's 
living conditions and restrictions for pretrial detainees.499 In a pre-Bell 
decision, the district court ruled that the Eighth Amendment could apply 
to psychotropic medication if it were "found to have no proven 
therapeutic value and its use was not recognized as acceptable medical 
practice, ... [or] the adverse effects seemed unnecessarily harsh," or it 
were "used improperly and for punishment rather than as part of an 
ongoing psychotherapeutic program.,,500 Three years later, however, 
when the court of appeals issued its decision in the same case, it relied 
on Bell to reject the Eighth Amendment as a standard against which to 
assess involuntary treatment.50l Patients, the court said, were "entitled to 
more humane consideration,,502 than convicts. Cichon pointed out, 
however, that "[t]he Court [in Bell] did not hold that the Eighth 
Amendment protects only those convicted of crimes.,,503 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court ruled, in In re K.K.B., that it was a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to use drug treatment on an involuntary patient "for 
control or punishment, rather than as part of an on-going psychotherapeutic 
532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976) (reinstating an involuntary medication complaint, 
citing "conceivable constitutional deprivations," including "an eighth amendment 
issue"), vacated by, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982). 
496. Cichon, supra note 35, at 318. 
497. The majority ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not apply in this setting. 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (stating that the Eighth Amendment "was 
designed to protect those convicted of crimes"). 
498. /d. at 669 n.37. 
499. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
500. Rennie v. Klein, 426 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978). suppl., 476 F. Supp. 
1294 (D.NJ. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 
U.S. 1119 (1982). 
501. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844 n.lO. 
502. /d. at 844. 
503. Cichon, supra note 35, at 319 n.215 (emphasis added). 
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program designed to aid the patient.,,504 
Although State v. Perry was decided on state constitutional grounds, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court certainly characterized the effects and side 
effects of competence restoring treatment for a condemned inmate as 
cruel and unusual punishment. The court said that after receiving 
neuroleptics, the prisoner 
will be forced to linger for a protracted period, stripped of the vestiges of 
humanity and dignity usually reserved to death row inmates, with the growing 
awareness that the state is converting his own mind and body into a vehicle for 
his execution. 
Unlike sane death row prisoners who retain dignity until the end, Perry 
would. .. experience an indefinite period of indignity, anxiety and fear, 
assimilating unwanted antipsychotic drugs into his brain and body against his 
will at the risk of harmful and fatal side effects. . .. These circumstances ... 
[would] degrade human dignity and reach a sum in which there is something 
inhuman, barbarous, and analogous to torture.505 
3. Side Effects and the Due Process Protections of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments 
In Youngberg v. Rome0506 and Vitek v. Jones,507 the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that mentally disabled patients and prison inmates 
retain a liberty right to freedom from certain government intrusions50s 
despite their having been legally confined. In two later cases, 
Washington v. Harper509 and Riggins v. Nevada,510 drug side effects led 
the Supreme Court to recognize that convicted prisoners and pretrial 
detainees retained liberty rights to avoid unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic medication. 
504. 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980). 
505. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766, 768 (La. 1992). 
506. 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (stating that institutionalized persons retain a 
substantive due process right of freedom from excessive restraint). 
507. 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1980) (stating that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental 
hospital for treatment without a hearing violates the Due Process Clause because the 
prisoner retains the "right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified 
intrusions on personal security" (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977». 
508. The Supreme Court's Vitek decision notes explicitly that at the hospital, the 
prisoner might have to undergo a "mandatory behavior modification [program] as a 
treatment for mental illness," but does not describe the program. [d. at 494. According 
to the brief filed by Jones's counsel, the treatment included involuntary administration of 
the neuroleptic Thorazine® (chlorpromazine). Brief of Appellee Larry D. Jones at 16, 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (No. 78-1155). 
509. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (stating that a convicted prisoner "possesses a 
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic 
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
510. 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992). 
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Washington v. Harper examined the propriety of a state prison 
procedure that allowed involuntary medication to be given following a 
finding by a three member administrative panel that the drug was a 
medically appropriate remedy for the inmate's grave disability or risk of 
harm.511 Harper contended that the prison's procedure was an unconstitutional 
violation of his due process rights and that forcible medication should 
occur onli after a judicial finding that he was incompetent to refuse 
treatment. 12 The majority opinion recognized the drugs' potentially 
"serious, even fatal" adverse effects and concluded that "forcible 
injection of medication into an nonconsenting person's body represents a 
substantial interference with that person's liberty.,,513 Though the 
majority holding and the dissent in Harper disagreed on the type of 
procedural protections that were constitutionally required, both opinions 
agreed that because of the risk and severity of side effects, some sort of 
systematic review was necessary before a prisoner could receive 
antipsychotic medication over his objection.514 
511. The panel consisted of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and associate 
superintendent of corrections. For a description of the prison's policy, see Harper, 494 
U.S. at 215-16. 
512. The Washington Supreme Court had agreed partially with Harper, stating that: 
[A] judicial hearing must be held to determine whether the State can treat a 
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. A court may order 
imposition of antipsychotic drug treatment upon a nonconsenting prisoner 
when the State proves (1) a compelling state interest to administer 
antipsychotic drugs, and (2) the administration of the drugs is both necessary 
and effective for furthering that interest. 
Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358,364 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
Notice that the Washington Supreme Court did not require the state to prove that an 
inmate is incompetent to make treatment decisions. See id. 
513. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. 
514. The majority concluded that the prison's internal review procedure struck an 
acceptable balance between the prisoner's liberty interests and the prison's need to 
maintain order and protect inmates. [d. at 229-31. Justice Stevens's dissent maintained 
that this procedure was inadequate, because the panel members would be subject to 
internal pressure from colleagues and because institutional interests of jail personnel 
would undermine their professional judgment about the inmate's medical condition. [d. 
at 251-53 (Stevens J., dissenting). He concluded: 
[I]t is difficult to imagine how a committee convened under [the prison's] 
Policy ... could conceivably discover, much less be persuaded to overrule, an 
erroneous or arbitrary decision to medicate or to maintain a specific dosage or 
type of drug. Institutional control infects the decisionmakers and the entire 
procedure. . .. I would affirm the decision of the Washington Supreme Court 
requiring a judicial hearing, with its attendant procedural safeguards, as a 
remedy in this case. 
[d. at 257 (citation omitted). 
1135 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1136 2002
In Riggins, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and death 
sentence of a Nevada prisoner who contended that the antipsychotic drug 
MeUaril he received before and durin§ his trial for capital murder had 
compromised his right to a fair trial.5 The majority quoted Harper's 
view that forced medication is a substantial interference with liberty. 
Citing Harper's descriptions of the adverse effects of antipsychotic 
drugs,5'6 the Riggins court noted that the interference with a person's 
liberty caused by "antipsychotic drugs like MeUaril ... is particularly 
severe.,,517 Comparing Harper's situation to that of Riggins, the Court 
concluded that a pretrial detainee deserved "at least as much protection" 
as a prisoner before receiving involuntarily administered drugs.518 The 
state could meet its burden by demonstrating that administering a drug 
was medically appropriate and necessary for the safety of the inmate or 
others, or that there was no less intrusive means for the state to make the 
prisoner able to proceed with criminal adjudication.519 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet stated what procedural 
protections are due to persons institutionalized outside of correctional 
settings, many lower court decisions have, again concluding that the side 
effects of medications implicate liberty interests that require some sort of 
procedural protection. In Davis v. Hubbard,520 a federal district court 
examined conditions of treatment at the Lima State Hospital in Ohio.52l 
As was the case with the Washington Supreme Court's ruling, the U.S. Supreme 
Court's Harper ruling permits involuntary administration of medication irrespective of 
the inmate's capacity to make informed treatment decisions. Harper, 494 U.S. at 226. 
Thus, the Harper majority countenances administering antipsychotic drugs over the 
objections of competent inmates. 
515. Throughout his trial, Riggins received the maximum FDA-approved dose (800 
milligrams/day) of the antipsychotic medication thioridazine (trade name Mellaril®). 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 131 (1992). Among conventional antipsychotic 
medications, thioridazine has a high potential to cause sedation. HYMAN ET AL., sllpra 
note 9, at 8. 
516. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30). 
517. [d. 
518. [d. at 135. 
519. [d. 
520. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
521. In addition to evincing concern about neuroleptics' side effects, the Davis 
court was troubled by holV the drugs were being used: 
Psychotropic drugs are not only overprescribed; they are also freely 
prescribed. They are prescribed by both licensed and unlicensed physicians. 
Both licensed and unlicensed physicians regularly prescribe drugs for any 
patient in the institution without regard to whether he is personally assigned to 
the patient or whether he has even seen the patient. It is not unusual for 
attendants to recommend a certain dosage or increased dosage. Such 
recommendations are often accepted by the physician without having 
examined the patient. Further, when dealing with an especially disturbed 
patient, attendants can obtain additional medication by submitting appropriate 
forms to the pharmacy when there is no physician available. . .. [P]atients are 
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After reviewing the side effects associated with neuroleptics, the Court 
concluded that a right to refuse treatment derived from each patient's 
constitutional entitlement to "substantive due process, or phrased 
differently, as an aspect of 'liberty' guaranteed by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."522 
Similarly, the fmal ruling in Rennie v. Klein523 specified that although 
exercise of professional judgment was sufficient to override an 
involuntary patient's Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse treatment, 
doctors must consider "whether and to what extent the patient will suffer 
harmful side effects.,,524 Although Project Release v. Prevosf25 ultimately 
concluded that then-existing New York state regulations were adequate 
to protect patients' due process rights, drug side effects were again cited 
as the source of a constitutionally significant liberty.526 In Johnson v. 
Silvers,527 the Fourth Circuit relied on Project Release in reaching its 
similar conclusion that the side effects of antipsychotic medication were 
sufficiently intrusive to implicate protected liberty interests.528 
4. Side Effects and Privacy Protections 
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Cruzan v. Direct9r, Missouri 
Department of Health, "many state courts have held that a right to refuse 
treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of 
generally not given the opportunity to refuse psychotropic drugs, although 
roughly 85% of the patients are capable of rationally deciding whether to 
consent to their use. 
Id. at 926-27. Besides medication issues, the Davis court examined the hospital's 
staffing, treatment planning, and physical plant. !d. at 917-22. 
522. Id. at 929. 
523. 720 F.2d 266 (1983). 
524. Id. at 269. In his concurrence, Judge Seitz noted the "dangerous and 
irreversible side effects" of then-available antipsychotic drugs as grounds for explicitly 
holding "that the Due Process Clause at a minimum requires the authorities to administer 
antipsychotic drugs to an unwilling patient" only when such administration derives from 
a professional judgment about the patient's welfare. Id. at 273;-74 (Seitz, C.J., 
concurring). 
525. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). 
526. Id. at 978-80. In Rivers, a New York appellate court held that state 
constitutional guarantees required more extensive procedural protections before 
involuntary medication could be administered, including a judicial hearing and 
determination of incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Rivers v. Katz, 495 
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986). 
527. 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984). 
528. Id. at 825. 
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privacy.,,529 Privacy was first recognized as an implicit constitutional 
right in Griswold v. Connecticut, a 1965 U.S. Supreme Court case holding 
that state law could not preclude a person's use of contraception.53o In 
those court decisions that rely on privacy rights as reasons for precluding 
automatic administration of antipsychotic drugs to nonconsenting 
persons, side effects are often cited as the source of this potential 
constitutional violation. For example, in Bee v. Greaves,531 the Court of 
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit characterized antipsychotic medications as 
"potentially dangerous drugs" in concluding "that the decision whether 
to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of sufficient importance 
to fall within this category of privacy interests protected by the 
Constitution."s32 The characterization of antipsychotic therapy as a 
"potentially dangerous treatment,,533 supported the view of the Court of 
Appeals of the First Circuit that "a person has a constitutionally 
protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself' 
whether to receive such medication.534 A scathing description of 
antipsychotic drug therapy led the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court to recognize a constitutionally protected privacy interest as the 
source of the right of patients or guardians to decide whether to permit 
treatment with antipsychotic medication.535 
5. Side Effects and State Constitutional Justifications 
In a number of cases, state courts have held that individuals enjoy 
529. 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990). The Court continued, however, that "we have 
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest." Id. 
530. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In his plurality opinion, Justice Douglas argued that 
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras" that give citizens "zones of 
privacy" protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 484. 
Justice Goldberg's concurrence finds that privacy is a nonenumerated right preserved by 
the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, however, 
stated that privacy is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and found its basis in 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937». 
531. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984). 
532. !d. at 1392-93. 
533. !d. at 1395. 
534. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated, Mills v. Rogers, 
457 U.S. 291 (1982). 
535. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 n.9 (Mass. 1981). The Court 
deemed antipsychotic therapy an "extraordinary medical treatment." Id. at 51. The 
Court further noted: "We can identify few legitimate medical procedures which are more 
intrusive than the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication. . .. [W]e treat these 
drugs in the same manner we would treat psychosurgery or electroconvulsive 
therapy. . .. [T]he impact of the chemical upon the brain is sufficient to undermine the 
foundations of personality." Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted). 
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additional substantive and procedural protections beyond those that 
federal constitutional law requires.536 Here again, the side effects of 
antipsychotic drugs have figured prominently in state appellate courts' 
deliberations. Mter summarizing the benefits and adverse effects of 
neuroleptic medication,537 the court of appeals in Rivers v. Katz 
concluded that New York's state constitution "affords involuntarily 
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic 
medication.,,538 The court directed judicial decisionmakers to consider 
"adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive 
alternative treatments" in determining whether the state had shown, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that "the proposed treatment is narrowly 
tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest."539 
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court, after noting that "the final 
decision to accept or reject a proposed medical procedure and its 
attendant risks is ultimately not a medical decision, but a personal 
choice," found that the intrusive side effects of neuroleptics implicated a 
state constitutional right to privacy. This right, the court claimed, could 
be protected only by requiring that doctors get judicial approval before 
administering medication over a patient's objection.54o 
C. Case Law Since the Arrival of Atypical Agents 
Since the arrival of novel antipsychotic agents, several courts have 
held that the substantive and procedural protections owed to patients 
who wished to refuse treatment with neuroleptics also applied to patients 
who wished to refuse atypical antipsychotic agents. Some cases discuss 
older and newer antipsychotic agents together without mentioning the 
special features or more benign side effect profIles of the newer drugs.541 
536. The U.S. Supreme Court noted this with specific reference to antipsychotic 
medication in Mills v. Rogers. 457 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1982). 
537. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,339 n.l (1986). 
538. Id. at 341. 
539. Id. at 344. 
540. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 145, 148-49 (Minn. 1988). 
541. See, e.g., In re Locks, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495,500 (Ct App. 2000) (stating that 
the petitioner being held and treated at state mental hospital for insanity while habeas 
relief was sought was not entitled to a hearing to determine his competence to refuse 
treatment with haloperidol or olanzapine); State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 93 (Haw. 1999) 
(applying the three-fold test articulated in Riggins v. Nevada to pretrial medication with 
novel antipsychotic drugs); In re Frances K., 749 N.E.2d 1082, 1087 (lll. App. Ct. 2001) 
(using the same statutorily prescribed seven-factor test in jury trial concerning the 
administration of psychotropic medication against a patient's will), appeal denied, 763 
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In re Gwendolyn N.S42 reversed a trial courts' involuntary medication 
order for older and newer agents because the order did not specify drugs 
and dosages. This decision noted that newer antipsychotic "drugs have 
fewer side effects" but noted that "death" remains a possible side effect 
of the atypicals.s43 In Steinkruger v. Miller, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court found that previous federal and state case law applied to refusals 
of novel antipsychotics, despite its explicit recognition of the advantages 
of novel agents. After citing the list of neuroleptic side effects found in 
Justice Stevens's Harper concurrence,S44 the Steinkruger court stated: "We 
recognize that pharmaceutical advancements have brought into use new 
medications with fewer side effects, but adverse reactions have not been 
eliminated."S4S The Steinkruger court concluded: "As forced medication intrudes 
on a patient's basic rights, due process requires that psychotropic drugs not 
only be deemed medically appropriate, but before approving their forced 
administration the court must also consider 'less intrusive altematives.",S46 
In contrast to the often harsh descriptions of antipsychotic therapy that 
one finds in decisions on forced treatment with neuroleptics, a few 
appellate decisions concerning involuntary administration of atypical 
antipsychotics have described these newer drugs favorably. Moreover, 
the reduced risk and superior effectiveness of the novel antipsychotics 
have, on occasion, been factors that convinced courts to favor involuntary 
treatment. 
N.E.2d 318 (III. 2001); In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104, 108-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating 
that specifying the type and dosage of antipsychotic medication implicated a substantive 
right and was not a mere procedural formality and that failure to specify the dose 
justified the reversal of the trial court's medication order); In re Edward S., 698 N.E.2d 
186, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that because the state did not make a diligent effort 
to tell the patient about the risks and benefits of psychotropic medication, the order to 
medicate was manifestly erroneous); In re Mental Commitment of Laura I.M., No. 01-
1174-Ff, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 832, at *1 (Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2001) (unpublished 
opinion) (reversing the involuntary medication order and remanding because the trial 
court failed to make the findings required by Virgil D. v. Rock County, 524 N.W.2d 894 
(1994». 
Haloperidol is the generic name for the conventional neuroleptic marketed under the 
trade name Haldol®. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8. 
542. 760 N.E.2d 575,578-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
543. Id. at 577. 
544. Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that neuroleptic 
"reactions include drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams, hypertension, 
nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration, headache, constipation, 
blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and muscle spasms"). 
545. Steinkruger v. Miller, 612 N.W.2d 591, 598 (S.D. 2000). 
546. Id. at 599 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,135 (1992». 
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1. Involuntary Administration of Atypicals to Civil Patients 
a. Minnesota Appellate Cases 
In a series of Minnesota cases, the advantages of atypicals have been 
noted explicitly by appeals courts, and in some instances have served as 
reasons for involuntarily administering novel agents, particularly 
c1ozapine. First, In re Stewarr47 involved an appeal of an involuntary 
medication order in which the trial court authorized either the conventional 
neruoleptic loxapine or c1ozapine. However, Stewart wished to be 
treated only with c1ozapine. Although the appeals court ruled that the 
trial court properly left the choice of medication "to the discretion of the 
medical professionals,,,548 it also noted that the trial court had 
"recognized that the use of Clozaril would further reduce the risk of 
tardive dyskinesia.,,549 
Next, Dibley v. Gomel50 concerned a long-term inpatient who denied 
that he was mentally ill, but also objected to antipsychotic therapy 
because of its side effects. Despite its decision to affIrm the trial court's 
involuntary medication order, the appeals court was 
concerned about the hospital's failure to ... use the newer medications that do 
not precipitate the adverse side effects associated with the older 
neuroleptics. . .. Clozaril or other new medication may forever eliminate the 
need for Dibley to confront the regrettable side effects of traditional 
neuroleptics. We must, however, leave to the treating professionals the decision 
of how best to proceed.55 ! 
In re Tyle~52 reviewed a trial court's authorization of antipsychotic 
medication for a patient who had suffered from delusions that ceased 
during treatment with the neuroleptic fluphenazine (Prolixin®), but 
whose aggressiveness had not sufficiently diminished. His doctors 
wanted to prescribe c1ozapine. In affirming the trial court's order, the 
appeals court noted: 
547. No. C3-9l-439, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 697 (Ct. App. July 10, 1991) 
(unpublished opinion). 
548. [d. at *5. 
549. [d. at *3. 
550. No. C4-94-870, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 801 (Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994) 
(unpublished opinion). 
551. [d. at *6-7. 
552. No. C4-95-1432, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1403 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1995) 
(unpublished opinion). 
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Clozaril is known to be more effective with some patients than other 
neuroleptics, and he may not experience many of the side effects which Prolixin 
causes. . . . There is a possibility that an atypical neuroleptic such as 
[rJisperidone or Clozaril may better treat appellant's remaining problematic 
behaviors, and there is little disadvantage to either medication.553 
In addition, the superiority of clozapine figured importantly in two 
appellate court decisions to allow administration of medication by nasogastric 
tube, which would require passing a tube through the patient's nose and 
down his esophagus, if the patient refused to swallow it. 
In re Witthans554 concerned a patient who would take haloperidol and 
risperidone, but refused clozapine. The patient's doctors had recommended 
clozapine because the patient was not responding to his medication. 
Because clozapine cannot be administered by injection, Witthans's 
doctors sought and received the trial court's permission to administer the 
drug via nasogastric tube if Witthans would not swallow it. The 
appellate court backed the trial court's decision. Witthans was not 
participating adequately in psychosocial treatments,555 and the appeals 
court recognized that "Clozaril can produce significant improvement in 
individuals who do not respond to typical neuroleptics.,,556 The appeals 
court agreed with the trial court that 
the use of a nasogastric tube to administer the Clozaril ... [isJ a routine medical 
procedure involving no significant risk of serious harm.... If appellant 
continues his refusal to take it orally, the only alternative is to use a nasogastric 
tube. Since there is present medical necessity for the Clozaril, the trial court did 
not clearly err in authorizing the use of a nasogastric tube to administer it.557 
Involuntary nasogastric tube administration of clozapine was the chief 
issue examined in In re Martin.558 Based on evidence heard by the trial 
court that clozapine decreased Martin's delusional preoccupations and 
aggressiveness, the appellate court concluded: 
Clozaril is a better medication for Martin because it greatly reduces his 
symptoms of mental illness and makes him more amenable to other treatment 
while avoiding the risk of tardive dyskinesia .... 
. . . If the medication is medically necessary, the means to administer it must be 
medically necessary as well. The trial court's weighing of the extent of the intrusion 
of the tube, and authorization of the procedure, were not clearly erroneous.559 
553. /d. at *6-7. Although this decision refers to the novel agents clozapine and 
risperidone as "neuroleptics," psychiatrists usually reserve this term for older, "typical" 
antipsychotic drugs. 
554. No. CX-94-1280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 934 (Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1994) 
(unpublished opinion). 
555. Id. at *2-3. 
556. !d. at *8. 
557. Id. at *8-9. 
558. 527 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
559. Id.at 172-73. 
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b. Appellate Cases from Other States 
In a New York appellate opinion that approved a trial court's 
involuntary medication order, the advantages and diminished side effect 
burden of atypicals was acknowledged, and indeed, exaggerated. The 
opinion said that giving an incompetent patient antipsychotic therapy "in 
turn would allow him to take newer antipsychotic drugs which have no 
side effects and to participate in schooling and training programs which 
would allow reentry into the community."560 
In re R.A.J.561 reviewed a trial court's involuntary medication order 
that authorized administering either "Haldol and Tegretol or Risperdal 
and Tegretol.,,562 But because risperidone has fewer side effects that 
haloperidol, the appeals court stated that 
the least restrictive combination of medications for R.AJ. is oral Risperdal and 
Tegretol, and that the combination of injectable Haldol and Tegretol is to be 
given only ifR.AJ. should change his mind and refuse Risperdal. Accordingly, 
we direct modification of the order to authorize the combination of Haldol with 
Tegretol only ifR.AJ. should refuse Risperdal while it is prescribed .... 
So modified, we affirm the forced medication order.563 
The potential advantages of novel agents in a risk benefit calculus 
became the key issue in In re Nancy M.,S64 which examined an lllinois 
jury's decision to authorize forced medication with halo!?eridol, 
risperidone, and olanzapine. At trial, the patient's doctor testified that 
haloperidol had more risk of neurological side effects than did the other 
drugs. The doctor had requested haloperidol only because the newer 
drugs were not injectable, and therefore could not be given to a patient 
who might refuse oral therapy.565 In her trial testimony, the patient 
denied having a mental illness, but said she would take the novel agents 
if ordered because they were less dangerous than Haldo1.566 
Using a form that did not name any particular drug, the jurors 
"returned a general verdict" saying the patient met lllinois's criteria for 
receiving involuntary medication, and the trial court judge authorized all 
560. Mausner v. William E., 694 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (App. Div. 1999). 
561. 554 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1996). 
562. Id. at 812. Tegretol® (generic name carbamazepine) is an antiseizure 
medication that is sometimes used by psychiatrists to treat emotional and behavioral 
conditions, including mania and aggressiveness. HYMANET AL., supra note 9, at 131-35. 
563. In re R.AJ., 554 N.W.2d at 812-13. 
564. 739 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
565. Id. at 610. 
566. Id. at 611. 
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three medications.567 The appeals court ruled that this was improper. 
After reviewing the doctor's trial "testimony that the medications were 
very different," the appeals court reversed the trial court's order, citing 
the failure of 
the verdict forms ... [to] distinguish the medications. Based on the testimony 
presented, the jury reasonably could have found that the benefits of 
administering either [0 ]lanzapine or Risperdal to respondent outweighed the 
harm and that the benefit of administering Haldol to respondent did not 
outweigh the harm to her. However, the jury's verdict simply states that respondent 
qualifies for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The 
verdict does not show that the jury found that the benefits of administering 
Haldol to respondent outweighed the harm it would pose to her, nor does it 
show that the benefits of administering Risperdal or [o]lanzapine to respondent 
outweighed the harm. The verdict here fails to show that the jury clearl( 
intended to authorize the involuntary administration of all three medications.56 
2. Involuntary Administration of Atypicals to Pretrial Detainees569 
The relatively benign side effect profile of the newer antipsychotic 
drugs figures importantly in at least three federal court decisions that 
concern the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to restore 
competence to stand trial. Tw0570 of these decisions involve Russell 
Eugene Weston, Jr., the man charged with killing two Capitol police 
officers in July 1998.571 
In April 1999, the district court found Weston incompetent to stand 
trial and ordered him to undergo competence restoring treatment at a 
federal correctional hospital.572 Later that year, the district court 
approved involuntary medication for Weston. In March 2000, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeal remanded the case to the district court to 
consider whether medication was medically appropriate, necessary to 
567. [d. 
568. [d. at 615-16. 
569. This section focuses on the Weston courts' recognition of the special properties 
of novel agents, and how that recognition has influenced decisionmaking. For a 
summary of developments in Weston's case through March 2000, see Siegel et aI., supra 
note 35, at 308-12. 
570. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001), affd, 255 F.3d 
873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
571. On December 10, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Weston's 
appeal of the D.C. Circuit Court's decision. Weston, 122 S. Ct. 670 (2001). Therefore, 
after going three years without antipsychotic medication, Weston finally began receiving 
treatment that could permit him to undergo trial. Neely Tucker, High Court Passes on 
Capitol Suspect: Decision Clears Way for Medicating Weston, WASH. POST, Dec. II, 
2001, at BOL For a recent case that follows the D.C. Circuit's reasoning, see United 
States v. Arena, No. 00 CR. 398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 
2001). As of early August 2002, Weston continued to receive antipsychotic medication, 
but had not achieved competence to stand trial. Judge Rules Capitol Gunman Can Be 
Forced to Take Medicine, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at All. 
572. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 117. 
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restore Weston's competence, and could be administered without unacceptably 
compromising Weston's fair trial rights.573 In his latest ruling, district 
court Judge Sullivan concluded that involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic medication to Weston could be accomplished in a manner 
that met all these tests. 
Judge Sullivan's latest decision contains an extensive574 discussion of 
the properties of older and newer antipsychotic drugs. He noted that: 
Atypical antipsychotics have a more favorable side effect profile and are better 
tolerated by the average patient. . .. Dr. Zonana testified that atypicals have so 
few side effects that studies use them on individuals who have not yet been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, but who only have symptoms that suggest they 
might develop the disease.... In short, "there is a world of difference" 
between the antipsychotic medications described in the judicial opinions of the 
early 1990s and the current atypical antipsychotic medications now available.575 
This helped "persuade the [c]ourt that antipsychotic medication is 
appropriate, notwithstanding the potential side effects since they can be 
managed with close oversight.,,57 
The district court also considered whether the side effects of 
competence-restoring antipsychotic therapy might impair Weston's 
ability to undergo trial and adversely affect his demeanor and appearance 
before a jury. The court noted that drug therapy probably would 
improve many trial related abilities, including Weston's abilities to 
consult with counsel, pay attention, and concentrate.577 However, the 
advantages of atypicals were central to the court's conclusions about 
how medication would affect Weston's presentation. Citing psychiatrists' 
testimony at hearings concerning the newer medications, Judge Sullivan 
specifically addressed the concerns about side effects expressed in 
Justice Kennedy's Riggins concurrence578 as follows: 
Advances in the primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies make 
such side effects less likely. Additionally, medications that help control side 
effects are available and Weston will be very closely monitored. In fact, 
antipsychotic medication is likely to make Weston's affect more, rather than 
less, appropriate.579 
573. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 13-14 (D.C. Cir.2000). 
574. The discussion extends for approximately 1000 words, and describes the 
benefits and side effects in detail. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 123-25. 
575. [d. at 124 (citations omitted) (quoting Dr. Sally Johnson). 
576. [d. at 125. 
577. [d. at 133. 
578. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138-43 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
579. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citation omitted). 
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In a decision issued July 27,2001, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.58o After summarizing the 
side effects of "typical antipsychotics" and atypical agents in a 
footnote,581 the circuit court panel cited the benefits of antipsychotic 
therapy as a factor favoring its administration to Weston. 
[T]he record [of medical testimony heard by the district court] indicates that 
medication will likely enhance rather than impair Weston's right to a fair 
trial. . .. The possibility of side effects from anti-psychotic medication is 
undeniable, but the ability of Weston's treating physicians and the district court 
to respond to them substantially reduces the risk they pose to trial fairness."582 
The panel quoted the favorable views of novel agents offered by the 
district court's independent psychiatric expert583 and commented that 
"[a]ntipsychotic drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed 
their side effects in Riggins. There is a new generation of medications 
having better side effect profiles.,,584 
The "better side effect profiles" of the atypicals also figured 
importantly in recent thinking about competence restoration articulated 
by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. Like the Weston cases, 
United States v. Gomes585 concerned a defendant whose lawyers wished 
to have their client avoid involuntarily administered antipsychotic 
medication, the purpose of which was to restore competence to proceed 
with adjudication.586 The appellate court articulated a five-factor standard 
for administering antipsychotic medication under these circumstances, 
and sent the case back to the district court for further fact finding related 
to these factors.587 However, the court of appeals clearly saw the 
580. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
581. Id. at 877 n.3. 
582. /d. at 885. 
583. "General experience with antipsychotics, particularly the newer medications, 
indicates that given their benefits they are reasonably safe and well-tolerated." /d. at 886 
(quoting report of Dr. David G. Daniel, M.D.). 
584. /d. at 886 n.7. The panel went on to quote from an article by attorney Paul 
Nidich and psychiatrist Jacqueline Collins: 
[1]n light of the progress made in the development of new antipsychotic 
medications since the Supreme Court's Riggins decision in 1992, the courts 
should revisit this issue with an open mind. . .. [Because of new atypicals,J 
the fear of side effects should not weigh heavily in the decision whether to 
treat pretrial detainees or civilly committed persons with antipsychotic 
medication against their will when that treatment is medically appropriate. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins, Involuntary 
Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update, 11 HEALTH LAW., 
May 1999, at 12, 13). 
585. 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002). 
586. /d. at 75. 
587. The five factors are: (1) the government's interest in prosecuting the defendant 
versus the defendant's interest in being free of medication, (2) the medical 
appropriateness of the defendant's proposed treatment, (3) whether medicating the 
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availability of atypicals in much the same light as did the Weston courts: 
[W]e first note that significant improvements have been made in antipsychotic 
medication in the decade since Justice Kennedy expressed his misgivings in 
Riggins. Justice Kennedy himself presciently acknowledged then that "[t]he 
state of our knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is evolving 
and may one day produce effective drugs that have only minimal side effects." 
As the American Psychiatric Association has pointed out [in an amicus brief 
filed in the case], a new generation of antipsychotic drugs "largely post-dating 
Riggins" and with a "more favorable side effect profile" has appeared. The 
American Psychological Association agrees, stating [in an amicus brief filed in 
the case] that these new drugs, called atypicals, "generally exhibit equal or 
improved therapeutic efficacy in comparison to the traditional or conventional 
agents, yet they have a more favorable side effect profile." Most of the 
atypicals present relatively low risks of the serious side effects associated with 
conventional drugs such as Mellaril, the drug at issue in Riggins. 
Gomes's effort to discount the significance of the atypicals is not 
convincing.588 
D. Observations and Comments 
Although several years have passed since risperidone became 
defendant was necessary because less invasive means of restoring competency are not 
available, (4) the need for continued monitoring of the defendant to assess the actual 
effects of medication on the defendant's ability to stand trial, and (5) the impact of 
medication on a defendant' s ability to mount an insanity defense. !d. at 85-88. The 
court of appeals reasoned that the lower court's decision to permit involuntary 
medication had not adequately addressed the first four of these factors. [d. at 85. 
In articulating this standard, the Gomes court determined, as did the court in 
Weston, that heightened scrutiny was the appropriate standard for evaluating whether 
involuntary medication would adversely affect a pretrial detainee's due process rights. 
[d. at 82; Weston, 255 F.3d at 880. By contrast, in a case involving use of antipsychotic 
drugs to restore competence of a defendant charged with mailing a threatening letter, the 
Sixth Circuit held that courts must apply a strict scrutiny standard when the state wishes 
to forcibly medicate a nondangerous pretrial detainee. United States v. Brandon, 158 
F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998). In a case involving a dentist charged with filing false 
Medicaid and private insurance claims, the Eighth Circuit adopted heightened scrutiny as 
its standard, and explicitly rejected the strict scrutiny approach taken in Brandon. United 
States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567-68 (8th Cir. 2002). On November 4, 2002, the U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed to review the Sell decision solely on "the following question: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's argument that allowing the 
government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him 
competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his rights under the First, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments." Sell v. United States, No. 02-5664, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 
8315, at *1 (Nov. 4, 2002). One may expect that the Supreme Court's decision will 
resolve the conflicting standards for reviewing involuntary competence; it will be 
interesting to see whether the availability and properties of novel antipsychotics play a 
role in the Court's opinion. 
588. Gomes, 289 F.3d at 83 (citations omitted). 
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available in the U.S. as a first-line therapy for psychosis, the ultimate 
impact of current and future novel agents on "right to refuse treatment" 
litigation remains unclear. For several reasons, it seems very unlikely 
that courts will undo the cautions and procedural protections embodied 
in litigation that addressed involuntary treatment with older, more 
noxious antipsychotic drugs. First, the newer drugs, though much more 
tolerable, still carry some risk of the neurological side effects that 
alarmed courts in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the newer drugs appear 
to place patients at more risk than neuroleptics of developing 
troublesome metabolic conditions, including obesity, alterations in lipid 
metabolism, and diabetes mellitus.589 Though these conditions are not as 
uncomfortable as the acute neurological side effects induced by 
neuroleptics, they are sources of concern for doctors and patients and 
should receive courts' consideration as wel1.590 Third, when the new 
drugs serve their intended purpose, they lead to changes in the way 
patients think. Almost any reasonable observer would characterize 
quelling psychosis as a desirable outcome of medical treatment. Yet this 
means that novel antipsychotic drugs are indeed "mind altering," and 
their unwanted administration therefore should raise legally significant 
questions about intrusions into a person's privacy. Finally, current legal 
rules and procedures concerning involuntary drug therapy may, and 
probably should, be preserved because they serve a valuable ethical 
purpose beyond protecting patients from side effects. Even if legal 
barriers to automatic administration of unwanted medication were 
initially justified in consequentialist terms, these protections also serve 
the nonconsequentialist purpose of respecting the personhood of 
patients. This is especially true in those states that require a judicial 
finding of incompetence before authorization of involuntary medication. 
Though courts can be expected to preserve currently existing legal 
barriers against automatic treatment of drug refusing psychotic patients, 
In re Tyler, In re Martin, In re Nancy M., Gomes, and the Weston 
decisions may show us how future courts will evaluate and make 
decisions about involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. In these 
cases and others discussed in the previous Part, the flaws of antipsychotic 
medications are often noted, but so are their benefits. Gone are extensive 
judicial diatribes about horrible side effects that all but ignore the benefits of 
medication and the horror of being psychotic. In some cases, courts have 
even endorsed the values of antipsychotic therapy, and because such treatment 
589. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. 
590. Both of the Weston decisions did so explicitly. See United States v. Weston, 
134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2001), aff'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Weston, 
255 F.3d at 877 n.3. 
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can be delivered with less risk to a patient's nervous system, judges have 
seemed more willing to approve of its involuntary administration. 
The cases discussed in Part VI.C also demonstrate that at least some 
courts are capable of receiving and understanding complicated, nuanced 
scientific information about currently available antipsychotic therapy. 
This should encourage psychiatrists and other medical experts who 
testify or otherwise provide information about treatment to courts. Psychiatrists 
have always had an obligation, when presenting information to courts, to 
provide legal decisionmakers with up-to-date, detailed information on 
newly developed treatments. Recent legal developments give psychiatrists 
reason to believe that when judges consider information about antipsychotic 
therapy, they now may be more inclined to accept physicians' generally 
pro-treatment position and less persuaded by the antimedication views of 
some patient advocates. 
VII. CASES MENTIONING NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTICS: A SHORT 
QUANTITATIVE SUMMARY 
The previous Parts review legal issues concerning novel antipsychotic 
agents that have been addressed in cases published as of late June 2002. 
Can we gain additional insight into these cases by examining them as a group? 
Figures 1 and 2 address this question by summarizing information from 
cases listed in this Article's Appendix, which constitute all cases as of 
October 1, 2002 in the LEXIS database of federal and state cases after 
1944591 discovered using the search strategy described earlier.592 Figure 1 
describes the frequency with which cases mention the various atypical 
agents.593 Most cases mention a single drug. Olanzapine and risperidone 
are the drugs most frequently named, appearing in fifty-five and ninety-
nine cases, respectively. This finding in part reflects the fact that these 
drugs were the first two first-line atypical antipsychotics approved in the 
U.S.594 At least five cases contain language referring to the special 
591. This database provides all available case law decided since 1945, including 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, federal district courts 
and state cases. It also includes decisions of specialty courts dealing with military 
appeals, customs, patents, tax law, trade, commerce, veterans' appeals, and bankruptcy. 
592. See supra note 28. 
593. In both Figures, "clz" refers to a case that mentions clozapine, "rsp" to one that 
mentions risperidone, "olz" to olanzapine, and "que" to quetiapine. No case had yet mentioned 
the latest novel agent, ziprasidone. The abbreviation "atyp" designates cases that discuss 
the properties of atypical agents in general, independent of mentioning a specific drug. 
594. See supra Parts m.D.1, m.D.2. 
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properties of atypical antipsychotics, either from testifying physicians,595 or 
from the court itself.596 
Figure 2 shows the frequency with which each drug has been 
mentioned since atypical agents became available.597 Looked at this 
way, the corpus of cases suggest the following trends. 
First, with one exception (1997), no more than six cases mentioning 
clozapine have appeared each year, and such cases do not seem to be 
increasing in frequency. One reason for this is that clozapine's use is 
largely restricted to patients that cannot tolerate or benefit from other 
antipsychotic agents.598 Therefore, only a fraction of patients who need 
antipsychotic therapy take clozapine, and the drug receives a limited 
number of mentions. However, as the discussions in previous Parts of 
this Article have shown, many cases that refer to clozapine have addressed 
major legal issues concerning the use or availability of atypical agents.599 
When courts address important principles related to antipsychotic therapy, 
clozapine often gets mentioned. Yet, courts hear just a few cases each 
year that raise such issues, and the rate at which this occurs has been 
fairly constant. 
Second, an increasing number of cases are mentioning novel 
antipsychotic agents. Cases mentioning risperidone first appear in 1994, the 
year of the drug's U.S. release, and increase steadily in frequency after that. 
595. United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 211 (B.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting 
psychiatric testimony that "[m]odern day atypical anti-psychotic medication has 
completely destroyed th[e] myth" that "[c]onsistent deterioration of personality 
functioning is... the rule when talking about psychotic disorders such as 
schizophrenia"), amended by 989 F. Supp. 436 (1997), affd, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999); 
State v. Jung, 724 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (quoting psychiatrist 
Douglas Songer as asserting "that there are several newer medications which have fewer 
side effects" than neuroleptics which had bothered the patient). 
596. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 877 n.3 (D.c. Cir. 2001) (differentiating 
atypicals and typical agents, that is, neuroleptics); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 
2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2001), aff'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("'[T]here is a world of 
difference' between the antipsychotic medications described in the judicial opinions of 
the early 1990s and the current atypical antipsychotic medications now available." 
(quoting Dr. Sally Johnson»; Mausner v. William E., 694 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (App. Div. 
1999) (discussing "newer antipsychotic drugs which have no side effects"). 
597. Although clozapine became available in late 1989, no case mentioned any 
atypical agent until 1990. Data shown for 2002 represent those cases that had been placed in 
the LEXIS database of federal and state cases after 1944, as of October 7, 2002. 
598. See supra Part III.D.1. 
599. See, e.g., Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoners' access to 
clozapine); Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); O'Keefe v. Orea, 
731 So. 2d 680, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring a psychiatrist to disclose 
clozapine as a treatment option); Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 
1992) (inclusion of clozapine in Medicaid formulary); supra Part Vr.c.l.a (discussing 
five cases mentioning clozapine while discussing special properties of atypicals as they 
relate to the involuntarily administered therapy). 
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A similar pattern obtains for olanzapine, and perhaps for quetiapine, 
which psychiatrists appear to have used less than the two other first-line 
novel agents. In contrast to what one finds in the clozapine cases, many 
cases that mention the other novel agents are not concerned with 
medication issues themselves. The drugs' names simply appear in 
descriptions of the treatment received by persons with psychiatric 
disorders. Exceptions to this finding are found in cases that mention 
more than one atypical agent. Often, for example, olanzapine and 
risperidone occur together as examples of new antipsychotics that are 
recognized to have different and usually more desirable properties when 
compared to the older antipsychotic drugs.60o 
A third point emerges when one determines what fraction of all cases 
discuss antipsychotic drugs discuss novel agents. A search of the LEXIS 
database of federal and state cases after 1944 for the years 2000 and 
200 1, using a strategy that contained names of the most commonly used 
neuroleptics as well as novel antipsychotic drugs601 yielded 265 cases 
that mentioned an antipsychotic drug by name. Sixty-five of these cases 
included the name of one or more atypical antipsychotics. In other 
words, at a time when an estimated three-fourths of U.S. antipsychotic 
drug prescriptions were for novel agents,602 fewer than one quarter of the 
published cases mentioning antipsychotic therapies referred to atypicals. 
Clearly, the frequency with which various drugs are mentioned in U.S. 
case law does not reflect American psychiatrists' current pattern of drug 
selection. 
600. See, e.g., In re Nancy M., 739 N.E.2d 607, 610, 615 (III. App. Ct. 2000) 
(finding that with the doctor's testimony that risperidone and olanzapine "have the same 
possible neurological side effects [as neuroleptics] but at a substantially reduced rate," 
the jury reasonably could have concluded that the benefits of atypicals outweighed their 
risks, but that the opposite was true for haloperidol); In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104, 106 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating that the newer drugs "have fewer side effects"); Baer v. 
Baer, 738 A.2d 923, 926 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (doctor recommends risperidone 
or olanzapine as "safe medicines"); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 96-11156(001-004), 
1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 664, at *3 (Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that pretrial 
detainee regained competence with risperidone, "an atypical antipsychotic medication," 
after treatment with a neuroleptic had been unsuccessful). 
601. The search strategy was: "cloza! or risperid! or resperid! or respirid! or risperd! 
or resperd! or respird! or olanzap! or zyprexa or quetiapine or seroquel or ziprasidone or 
geodon or haldol or haloperidol or navane or thiothixene or mellaril or thioridazine or 
trilafon or perphenazine or molindone or moban or stelazine or trifluoperazine or 
prolixin or fluphenazine or loxitane or loxapine or thorazine or chlorpromazine and 
date(geq (0110112000) and leq (0110112002»." 
602. Kapur & Remington, supra note 204, at 1361. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
For patients who need antipsychotic therapy and for the psychiatrists 
who provide their care, the arrival of novel antipsychotic drugs has had 
enormous therapeutic significance. Older antipsychotic agents clearly 
helped most psychotic patients who took them and freed many psychotic 
patients from the horrors of their illness. Yet for many persons, neuroleptic 
therapy was an unpleasant experience fraught with uncomfortable side 
effects and risk to the nervous system, and, for a small fraction of the 
millions of patients who took the older antipsychotic drugs, their 
experience could rightfully be likened to being placed in a chemical 
straitjacket.603 Atypical agents have all the antipsychotic benefits of the 
older drugs but are more easil~ administered at doses that cause few or 
no extrapyramidal side effects.6 In addition, investigators are developing 
and accumulating evidence that these drugs, when administered to 
persons with schizophrenia, may rectify some of the neuropsychological 
dysfunction that underlies and contributes to the disability associated 
with the disorder.6os 
Because antipsychotic therapy is, in so many situations, a legally as 
well as medically significant phenomenon, current trends in the 
psychopharmacology of psychotic disorders are important to attorneys 
who represent and judges who hear cases concerning mentally disabled 
litigants. Moreover, an understanding of what schizophrenia is and of 
how its current treatment works is vital to the work of scholars and 
academics who supply legal decision makers with perspectives on the 
issues faced by litigants who take antipsychotic drugs. This Article has 
endeavored to explain to legal readers how psychiatrists think about 
antipsychotic medications and the illnesses they treat. The Article has 
also tried to suggest several ways in which an important development in 
psychiatric medicine has a growing legal significance, that is, has altered 
the way attorneys and courts should think about the actions and legal 
ramifications of antipsychotic drugs. 
603. This experience was, for the vast majority of patients, avoidable through the 
skillful prescription and monitoring of medication. Unfortunately, psychiatrists' dosing 
practices typically fell far short of the ideal. See Mossman, supra note 227, at 66, 71-72 
(describing psychiatrists' ham-handed dosing of neuroleptics and their nonclinical 
reasons for using needlessly large amounts of these drugs). 
604. Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 223. 
605. See supra Part ll.A.3.e (discussing cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia); 
supra notes 206-07 (citing studies concerning partial reversal of deficits using novel agents). 
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To summarize this Article's major points: 
1154 
(1) As of October 2002, nearly 200 published cases had 
mentioned novel antipsychotic agents. These cases 
feature discussions of informed consent, the right to 
refuse treatment, and the rights of Medicaid patients and 
prisoners to have these drugs available. 
(2) Psychiatry's perception of what schizophrenia is changed 
markedly in the last three decades of the twentieth 
century. During that period, scientists accumulated a 
huge body of evidence from sources such as genetic 
studies, population studies, and brain imaging procedures, 
which shows that schizophrenia is a brain-based disorder. 
The crazy beliefs, hearing voices, social withdrawal, apathy, 
and other clinically detectable symptoms of schizophrenia 
reflect faulty brain circuitry. Although signs and symptoms 
vary enormously over time and among persons with 
schizophrenia, persons with the disorder typically have 
distinctive problems in performing discrete, precisely 
measurable neuropsychological tasks. 
(3) The novel antipsychotic agents appear to have several 
advantages over older neuroleptics. These include 
reduced neuromotor side effects, lower risk of tardive 
dyskinesia, fewer drug-induced negative symptoms, and 
the potential to alleviate cognitive deficits and improve 
patients' social functioning. Also, patients who have 
taken both types of medication typically prefer the newer 
drugs. 
(4) Novel agents are not free of side effects. As a group, they 
appear more likely than older neuroleptics to induce 
weight gain and related metabolic problems, including 
diabetes mellitus and hyperlipidemia. 
(5) At present, the chief disadvantage of novel agents is their 
high acquisition cost relative to oral neuroleptics. 
Because of this, third party payers, including public sector 
hospitals and employer funded managed care 
organizations, have a financial incentive to limit access to 
the newer drugs. This does not mean, however, that 
payers will act on these incentives. 
(6) Despite the claims of several extant pharmacoeconomic 
studies, prescribing novel agents may not yield enough 
savings to completely offset the higher cost of the new drugs. 
(7) A growing number of American psychiatrists believe that 
HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1155 2002
[VOL. 39: 1033,2002] Unbuckling the Straitjacket 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
novel agents should be the fIrst-line therapy for patients 
that need antipsychotic medication. A respectable 
minority of psychiatrists has questioned this 
recommendation, however, and it remains the case that a 
substantial fraction of prescriptions for antipsychotic 
medications are written for neuroleptics. Despite 
suggestions from some psychiatrists and attorneys to the 
contrary, psychiatrists appear not to be at risk of being 
held liable simply because they have continued to 
prescribe conventional antipsychotics. 
(8) Damages that stem from failing to properly inform 
patients about the option of taking newer medications 
appear more likely to give rise to successful malpractice 
litigation. 
(9) Conceivably, plaintiffs might also sue doctors for failing 
to minimize risk of harm to self or others. Reports 
suggesting that atypicals reduce aggression and lower the 
likelihood of suicide might support such claims. 
(10) Lack of access to atypicals has attracted the attention of 
legal scholars as a potential source of civil rights claims or 
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Extant 
litigation and several published appellate decisions have 
already signifIed that these areas, rather than malpractice 
cases, could become a major source of medication-related 
liability. 
(11) Cases litigated before the early 1990s often contain severe 
criticisms of antipsychotic therapies. By contrast, in 
several recently decided cases that mention novel agents, 
one detects less judicial concern about drug side effects 
and more recognition of the benefIts of antipsychotic 
medications to patients who might receive them involuntarily. 
(12) These recently decided cases also show that some courts 
can receive and assimilate complicated, nuanced scientifIc 
information about currently available antipsychotic therapy. 
This should encourage psychiatrists and give them reason 
to believe that courts may be more sympathetic to 
physicians' pro-treatment positions than to the frequently 
asserted anti-medication views of some patient advocates. 
(13) Although the names of novel agents are appearing with 
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increased frequency in U.S. case law, older agents still 
account for the majority of instances in which published 
decisions discuss antipsychotic therapy. 
Chemical straitjacketing is rapidly becoming an unusual phenomenon 
for patients who take antipsychotic medication. The last decade's advances 
in psychopharmacology require courts and legal scholars to re-evaluate 
the role and value of antipsychotic drugs without being misled by 
distorted and increasingly outdated views found in existing case law and 
secondary legal sources. 
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IX. APPENDIX 
CASES MENTIONING NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTIC AGENTS 
SEARCH COMPLETED JULY 1, 2002 
CASE NAME 
1. In re Ingram 
2. Visser v. Taylor 
3. Alliance for the Mentally TIl, Inc. 
v. White 
4. InreM.H. 
5. In re Reinhold 
6. In re Stewart 
7. Adelson v. GTE Corp. 
8. Alexander L. v. Cuomo 
9. Alliance for the Mentally TIl, Inc. 
v. White 
10. Holmes v. Kizer 
11. In re Welsh 
12. Lafleur v. Hogan 
13. Millerv.Dep'tofCorr. 
14. Dibley v. Gomez 
15. III re Witthans 
16. People v. Bell 
17. Hanafin v. United States 
CITE 
No. C2-90-700, 1990 Min. App. LEXIS 723 
(Minn. Ct App. July 24, 1990). 
756 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1990). 
No. 90-6389, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXlS 15994 (E. 
D.PaNov.4,1991). 
475 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1991). 
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